- All articles

All articles

- In Brief: The team behind 9DASHLINE

- Resurging monarchist sentiment in Nepal: Challenges to democratic redemption

- Increased engagement with Taiwan needs less rhetoric and more (quiet) action

- BRICS Plus: India’s perspective on the group’s expansion

- Democratic resilience – Why Taiwan and Europe must be more ambitious in 2024

- The Fukushima water release and South Korea: it's complicated

- Australia-China relations: Where to now?

- EU-China Summit: A relationship stuck in time

- BIMSTEC revival: A compelling alternative to the BRI in the Bay of Bengal

- Manila is shopping, not re-aligning

- Southeast Asia’s security partnerships stronger and more diverse at the end of 2023

- NZ: Maori foreign policy to manage increasingly challenging relationship with China

- Movement on climate mobilities: developments from the Pacific Islands Forum

- Italy and the Indo-Pacific: towards an Italian Indo-Pacific strategy

- How the UK supports regional order in the Indo-Pacific

- Inconvenient truth — Young and unemployed in China

- Building a safe shared future for the People’s Republic of China

- In Conversation with Vincent Brussee

In Brief: The team behind 9DASHLINE

22 December 2023

2023 has been an incredible year of growth for 9DASHLINE — we have seen our team expand, our offerings diversify and we published some stellar content for our growing audience.

As we look forward to a brief break during the holiday season, 9DASHLINE’s leadership — David MacSweeney (Founder), Dr Manali Kumar (Editor-in-Chief), and Dr Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy (Head of the Associates’ Network) — reflect on the major developments over the past year and answer some frequently asked questions about our goals and hopes for 2024.

Q. It has been another remarkably busy year. What were some key moments that stood out?

MK: It’s been a really rewarding year. We published more original expert analyses this year, which reached an even larger audience than in previous years — this really makes all our efforts worth it. I have also been very happy to see the editorial team grow with new assistant and associate editors coming on board. Our team has become more international and our in-house expertise has also become broader, allowing us to cover a wider range of issues affecting the Indo-Pacific. With wars and the increasing risk of conflict dominating global headlines this year, it is even more important to make sure that we pay attention to other social, political, and economic trends in the Indo-Pacific.

ZAF: One of the key objectives of the Associates’ Network remains to develop local partnerships in the region. It has been rewarding to see that such partnerships benefit our global audience with local knowledge and insight, which has ensured that we have better, and often direct, access to what is really happening on the ground in the Indo-Pacific. This year we were delighted to partner with Korea’s Sejong Institute in a series of joint webinars on EU-Korea relations and the Indo-Pacific, with the help of our Korea Associate, Dr Tereza Novotna. With Taiwan of high relevance not just in the Indo-Pacific but also in Europe, the webinar series also brought together experts discussing the Taiwan Strait from European and Korean perspectives. Similarly, in partnership with La Trobe Asia, our Australia Associate, Hunter Marston, helped coordinate the online launch of the Blue Security study focusing on maritime security and hedging in the South China Sea. It is great to see our Associates’ Network grow and participate in ongoing global conversations on what matters in the Indo-Pacific.

DMacS: From my perspective, it was great to finally launch our consultancy service, which has been in the works for several years. The scope and scale of work we are engaged in across an average week means that we are incredibly well-positioned to understand and interpret the trends and forces shaping the Indo-Pacific today. We are constantly scanning the horizon for key developments, which alongside our relationships with key analysts, policymakers, and decision-makers means we are well-positioned to offer a nuanced perspective on the region.

Q. What inspired you to start a consulting service, and what distinguishes it from other service providers in the rather crowded consulting space?

DMacS: Simply put, as individuals and as a group we are passionate about the Indo-Pacific region and so following the success of the platform it was clear from an early stage that there was an opportunity to harness our respective skills, experience, and reach to build a consulting firm. The executive team, with a solid background in consulting, has worked hard to build the team's capabilities over recent years. We have focused on developing a group — mainly staffed by PhD candidates, post-docs and other specialists — which offers the kind of scope and analytical rigour that distinguishes us from the crowd. We have also worked hard to develop a strategy which ensures 9DL stands out as a consultancy that combines in-depth regional knowledge, a network of experts, and a commitment to delivering high-quality results so that our clients benefit from tailored solutions underpinned by a deep understanding of the complex dynamics at play across the Indo-Pacific region.

Q. Can you highlight some key areas of expertise that you expect to bring to the table? How do the services you offer address the unique challenges in the Indo-Pacific?

ZAF: Our key in-house areas of expertise encompass a comprehensive understanding of the geopolitical landscape across the Indo-Pacific including major countries — India, China, Japan, regions of growing significance to the global economy such as Southeast Asia, and important flashpoints in the region — Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula. We specialise in both traditional and non-traditional security issues, ensuring a holistic approach to the multifaceted concerns prevalent in the region. Our competitive advantage extends to a vast network of external experts, many of whom are located in the region with local understanding and insight, whom we can seamlessly integrate into our services as needed. This allows us to provide tailor-made, bespoke solutions that can help zero in on the key opportunities available in the region and directly address the unique challenges faced by our clients in the Indo-Pacific.

Q. How does 9DL contribute to thought leadership in the Indo-Pacific business community?

MK: Our commitment to thought leadership in the Indo-Pacific is manifested through our multifaceted approach to knowledge dissemination. Our blog serves as a platform for original expert commentary and analysis, offering nuanced insights into the ever-evolving dynamics of the region. We delve into geopolitical shifts, technological advancements, economic trends, and social dynamics, providing our audience with a comprehensive understanding of the forces shaping the Indo-Pacific. Our engagement also includes regularly hosted webinars featuring leading experts and policymakers. These discussions, often conducted in collaboration with esteemed institutes and think tanks in the region, serve to bring critical issues to the fore for the general public. By fostering dialogue and sharing diverse perspectives, we contribute to a more informed and connected Indo-Pacific community.

Q. What else can we expect from 9DL in 2024?

ZAF: I am looking forward to expanding our Associates’ Network with local experts who bring first-hand experience and understanding of the Indo-Pacific. I also see immense value in developing local partnerships within the region in addition to the partnerships we have already secured. I believe that it is such people-to-people, or rather expert-to-expert collaboration between Europe and the Indo-Pacific that has thus far ensured that our analysis is thorough and accurate. Our network of experts and partners has seen gradual growth, and the coming year looks equally promising.

MK: I am really excited about launching our newsletter in 2024 - it’s something we’ve wanted to do for a long time. While the articles on our blog offer in-depth analysis of specific issues relevant to the Indo-Pacific, the newsletter is intended to provide an overview of the most important developments in the region to help busy professionals stay informed. As the geopolitical centre of gravity today, the Indo-Pacific is teeming with developments; so we will do the heavy lifting of scanning the news, identifying critical trends, and providing bite-sized thoughtful analysis. Our goal is simple: we make sense of what matters, so you don't have to.

Q. How can we keep up to date with everything 9DL is doing?

DMacS: Well most obviously the easiest thing to do is to follow us on your preferred social media platform! You can find us on Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram, Mastodon, Facebook, Post, and most recently — Bluesky.

Finally, on behalf of the entire team, I would like to thank everyone who has contributed to our work or shared our content over the last year. We wish you happy holidays and look forward to bringing you more insightful content in 2024 — it’s going to be an exciting year.

Resurging monarchist sentiment in Nepal: Challenges to democratic redemption

Resurging monarchist sentiment in Nepal: Challenges to democratic redemption

WRITTEN BY MANISH JUNG PULAMI

21 December 2023

On 23 November 2023, thousands of pro-monarchy protesters took to the streets in Kathmandu, Nepal, demanding the restoration of the monarchy, which was abolished in 2008. The protests were led by two rival groups: the Youth Organisation Nepal (YON), affiliated with the main opposition political party, the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) (CPN-UML), and the Durga Prasai Group, led by businessman Durga Prasai. The YON protesters called for the ouster of the current government led by Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal (also known as Prachanda) and an end to corruption, while the Durga Prasai Group sought the restoration of monarchy and declaration of Nepal as the Hindu Kingdom, which the former group opposes.

The protests turned violent when some demonstrators clashed with the police, who responded with tear gas, water cannons, and rubber bullets. At least 30 people were injured, including five police officers. The protests continued throughout the day, and there were reports of further clashes between protesters and police.

The protests are the latest in a series of pro-monarchy demonstrations that have taken place in Nepal in recent years. They are the outcome of the deep-rooted frustration and disillusionment among the populace, fuelled by perceived failures of the political class, corruption, and a longing for stability and national identity.

Re-examining the role of monarchy in Nepal: A debate rekindled by recent protests

The role of a king in Nepal has long been a subject of debate, with the recent pro-monarchy protests reigniting discussions on the contentious topic. The protesters argue that the monarchy traditionally served as a unifying force in Nepal, potentially offering stability and prosperity to the country through historical narratives of its role in repelling foreign invasions and interventions, which the protestors believe has dwindled since its abolishment. Additionally, they view monarchy as a symbol of national pride and identity, reflecting the strong emotional and nationalistic attachment of Nepalese to their past. The monarchy is viewed as an institution patronising and upholding unique Nepalese art, culture, and traditions, which many perceive to be waning presently.

The pro-monarchy protests are a reminder that Nepal’s democratic journey is far from over. While the monarchy may be a relic of the past, the underlying grievances that fuelled the latest protests remain relevant today.

Thus, the protest is about reclaiming a sense of national pride, a sense of belonging to something bigger than oneself. The monarchy, as an institution, is also revered as a national emblem, perceived as the custodian of Nepalese culture and identity, and a figurehead who stands above the realm of political disputes providing stability amid political turbulences.

The post-2008 period in Nepal has been marred by political instability and corruption, prompting some to view the monarchy as a more effective and neutral form of governance. The sense of dissatisfaction with the implementation of federalism after 2008, marked by ethnic and regional disparities, has fuelled a pro-monarchy sentiment, seen by some as a longing for a potentially more centralised and efficient system. Additionally, socioeconomic concerns such as poverty and unemployment contribute to the belief and hope that a different system will prioritise these issues, driving support for the pro-monarchy movement.

While the exact size and group of the pro-monarchy supporters is unknown, recent protests have drawn in several hundred thousand participants, which suggests a substantial support base. It seems that a diverse group of Nepalese citizens, including right-wing royalists, pro-Hindu activists, youths, older generations, and other individuals frustrated by political instability, have joined the pro-monarchy protests.

Unpacking the resurgence of monarchic sentiments in Nepal

The recent pro-monarchy protests in Nepal manifest deep-rooted discontent and disappointment among the citizens who feel betrayed by their political leaders. Beyond a nostalgic yearning, these sentiments echo a vexed and aggrieved call for stability, unity, and a sense of national identity lost over the past years. The Nepalese people, renowned for their resilience and patience as Gurkhas, are reaching their breaking point. They have witnessed one political crisis after another, with successive governments failing to deliver on their promises and leaving the country mired in poverty, corruption, and instability.

Recent corruption scandals and scams, including the Lalita Niwas Land Scam where hundreds of government officials were charged, the fraudulent Bhutanese Refugee Scam involving former ministers and human rights activists, and the major bust of a Gold Smuggling Scandal incriminating top political leaders – all incidents this year – have further eroded public trust in the government. The revelation that those entrusted with the nation’s well-being were lining their pockets with ill-gotten wealth has struck a deep chord of anger and resentment. The public feels cheated, their hopes for a better future dashed against the rocks of rampant corruption.

Moreover, the failure of federalism which replaced the constitutional monarchy in 2008 due to power imbalances, weak coordination, political interference, and inadequate resources, touted as the panacea for Nepal’s ills, has only added to the frustration. The promised decentralisation of power has failed to materialise, leaving the people at the grassroots level feeling neglected and abandoned. The administrative inefficiencies and a failure to empower local governance structures have diminished the intended benefits of decentralisation. Ongoing struggles with resource distribution, coupled with a perceived lack of transparency and accountability, and the persistence of centralised decision-making with a concentration of power at the central level, contribute to a growing sense that federalism has not delivered on its promises. Also, the entrenched bureaucracy and the failure to distribute the advantages of federalism have contributed to the perception that the system is ineffective in addressing the diverse needs of the population.

The pro-monarchy movement in Nepal gained momentum amidst widespread disillusionment, presenting the monarchy as a symbol of stability and national identity. However, a nuanced understanding of the situation emphasises the need for an enduring and coordinated effort to eliminate corruption and establish effective governance, crucial for rebuilding public trust. The political class must prioritise transparency, accountability, and responsiveness to citizens’ needs, breaking the cycle of disheartenment. Moreover, recognising the multifaceted nature of corruption, a comprehensive strategy including systemic reforms and preventative measures, is vital. The success depends on fostering integrity, instilling ethical values, and building inclusive governance structures. This can set the stage for a more resilient and sustainable democratic future in Nepal.

Political grievances and search for democratic redemption

The recent pro-monarchy protests in Nepal have also reignited debates about the country’s political future and the potential repercussions of the resurgence of monarchist sentiment. While the protests have subsided for now, the protesters’ underlying grievances and their simmering nostalgia for a bygone era could have far-reaching consequences for Nepal’s political landscape. One potential repercussion is a deepening of political instability. The rise of pro-monarchy sentiment could challenge the established republican system and fuel further political division. This could lead to increased political polarisation, making it difficult to forge consensus and implement effective policies.

An actual resurgence of monarchism could reignite ethnic and regional tensions, as different groups may have varying views on the role of the monarchy. Another potential consequence is a setback for Nepal’s democratic journey. The pro-monarchy movement could undermine the democratic gains made since 2008 and erode public trust in democratic institutions and processes. This could lead to a weakening of democratic norms and values, challenging principles such as popular sovereignty, equal representation, civic participation, and the separation of powers, making it more difficult to sustain a truly democratic system in Nepal.

However, the pro-monarchy protests could also serve as a wake-up call for Nepal’s political class. The widespread anguish and disappointment expressed by the protesters highlight the need for a radical change in the way politics is conducted in Nepal. The political parties need to shed their self-serving agendas and focus on addressing the pressing concerns of the people.

To move forward, Nepal’s political pathway should focus on inclusive and participatory governance. This involves strengthening democratic institutions, ensuring meaningful representation of all marginalised groups, and fostering a culture of transparency and accountability. Additionally, Nepal needs to address the root causes of discontent, such as poverty, inequality, and lack of economic opportunities.

The pro-monarchy protests are a reminder that Nepal’s democratic journey is far from over. While the monarchy may be a relic of the past, the underlying grievances that fuelled the latest protests remain relevant today. Only by addressing these grievances and charting a course towards a more inclusive and effective democratic system can Nepal achieve lasting stability and prosperity.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Manish Jung Pulami is a Research Scholar at the Department of International Relations at the South Asian University, New Delhi, India. He was a Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), Sichuan University, China. He is also the author of a book chapter entitled “Nostalgia of Monarchy and Contemporary Right-Wing Politics in Nepal” published in the book Interdisciplinary Reflections on South Asian Transitions: Exploring the Rise of Far Right Ideology (2023). Image credit: Unsplash/Pranish Shrestha (cropped).

Increased engagement with Taiwan needs less rhetoric and more (quiet) action

Increased engagement with Taiwan needs less rhetoric and more (quiet) action

WRITTEN BY DR SIMONA GRANO

20 December 2023

Once a region where China could pursue business relations free from the geopolitical tensions that weigh over its business and trade relations with the US, Europe has grown increasingly suspicious of Beijing in recent years; intensifying discussions on Chinese influence, espionage, and security threats — amplified by Beijing’s aggressive behaviour in the Asia-Pacific region, including in the Taiwan Strait are by now commonplace.

European politicians are trying to strike a better balance between economic and security interests by increasing engagement with Taiwan. However, the best mechanisms for Europe to make such engagement with Taiwan most meaningful have yet to be undertaken. Rather than offering rhetorical support for democracy that plays well at home but fails to meet the magnitude of the challenge to preserve Taiwan’s autonomy, European officials should consider throwing quiet weight behind Taiwan’s concrete participation in international institutions where statehood is not a requirement. Doing so would better showcase to the global audience how Taiwan’s capacity can contribute to universal public goods.

Changes in European attitudes towards Taiwan

Three main events of the past several years have prompted increased engagement with Taiwan in Europe as China’s image is deteriorating in the Old Continent. First, China’s more aggressive behaviour towards neighbouring and far away countries, coupled with its ratcheting rhetoric vis-à-vis Taiwan; second, the COVID-19 pandemic and China’s non-transparent response, which highlighted by contrast Taiwan’s own good management (and the obstacles it faced in sharing its experience at the international level); and finally, the dawning realisation that a globalised world needs stable and open supply chains and that Taiwan, because of its role in the semiconductor industry among other things, plays a key part in maintaining the current order and its stability.

The key question remains to define and push for concrete tools and policies through which Europe can transform its growing solidarity towards Taiwan into a foundational basis of Europe’s China policy, without failing because of hindrances developing out of tight economic dependencies with China.

Taiwan’s importance as a democratic country and as a like-minded nation sharing similar values is growing in Europe and the West; the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which intensified Europe’s consciousness of the possibility of conflict initiated by a great power also increased sympathy for Taiwan’s own situation. In short, there is a growing recognition in Europe of the need to balance economic interests with safeguarding democratic values and human rights.

Such changes are positive — because they contribute to making Taiwan’s plight more visible at the international level — but are mostly symbolic and have no real impact on the island beyond positive image projection. In fact, significant challenges remain and there are few concrete results so far deriving from this increased engagement with the island. The most prominent outcome so far is the increased visibility of the so-called ‘Taiwan Issue’ at the international level.

How to better integrate Taiwan into international networks

Transformations in economic relations could more substantively integrate Taiwan into global networks. In fact, Europe has become more aware of the island’s importance in the global economy after reports estimated that a blockade of the island by China could cost the world over USD 2 trillion in economic losses.

Given Taiwan’s supremacy in the semiconductor industry, the European Union (like the US) is trying to establish closer cooperation to bolster its own chip manufacturing industry. As of 2022, Taiwan has been listed as a partner in the proposed European Chips Act.

Europe should speed up its efforts in the direction of a trade agreement with Taiwan; build resiliency in global semiconductor manufacturing; respond to China’s economic coercion; and diversify supply chains in crucial sectors by placing Taiwan at the centre of such networks. Such measures would not only help Taiwan be more integrated in the international arena but would also have the added value of reducing economic dependence on China.

Finally, Europe and the US should opt for a more ‘under-the-radar’ approach when it comes to Taiwan which would be less self-serving but more effective. Rather than sending parliamentarian delegations to Taiwan to make high-sounding declarations in support of its democracy, they should set in motion a plan which would allow Taiwan to participate and engage in all those international organisations for which statehood is not a sine qua non precondition for membership.

The international community could start by reinstating Taiwan’s right to participate under an ‘observer status’ to the World Health Assembly (WHA), a right that Taiwan already enjoyed from 2008 to 2016 and has since been revoked due to China’s pressure. Taiwan should be allowed to receive information (and share its own expertise) from many agencies such as INTERPOL, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), and the numerous environmental international meetings like the recent COP28, whose primary goals are not political but geared towards global health, security, or the wellbeing of the planet. Politically motivated exclusions (read China’s obstruction) should not be tolerated as these run counter to the stated goals of said associations, that is, to solve global problems by every means possible.

Pushing for more international space is a promising opportunity to use international rules and norms to give Taiwan real concrete benefits. This would slowly help build a Taiwan that is becoming an integral component of international circuits despite its lack of legally acknowledged statehood. Even though supporting Taiwan in institutions where statehood is not a requirement has been a feature of the US’ Taiwan policy, it has not brought substantial results so far. But the times are changing and the ‘Taiwan Issue’ now features much more prominently on the agenda of European countries. European states could help in building a unified front, assisting the US and Taiwan’s efforts in this direction.

Therefore, European countries should be more engaged in supporting Taiwan's meaningful participation in international organisations and fora, particularly in areas where Taiwan's expertise and contributions are recognised, such as public health and climate change. Concretely, this would mean organising campaigns for participation that start well before such international gatherings take place. It would also mean involving stakeholders outside of governmental echelons such as civil society, think tanks, NGOs, the public, and relevant institutions. Such a concerted widespread effort, that spans several sectors and underscores the positive inputs of the island to the global system, would be more effective in achieving increased participation by Taiwan in international fora.

The best way to support Taiwan

Just like Pinocchio’s transformation from a puppet into a real boy entailed a long and painful process, Taiwan has a long road ahead. The most meaningful way of supporting it is through more quiet and substantial engagement with Taipei, rather than through visible but less efficacious acts by random parliamentarians.

The key question remains to define and push for concrete tools and policies through which Europe can transform its growing solidarity towards Taiwan into a foundational basis of Europe’s China policy, without failing because of hindrances developing out of tight economic dependencies with China.

Regarding trade, the EU has understood the gravity of the dangers posed by China. Solving unfair Chinese trade practices and imbalances has been at the forefront of the recent EU-China summit and discussions about de-risking. At the same time, EU leaders cannot fail to raise critical issues with their Chinese counterparts, including safeguarding the current order in the Taiwan Strait. This would mean that going forward the EU needs to become more vocal and speak with one voice when it comes to protecting Taiwan.

Any attempt to change the status quo unilaterally should be met by forceful measures since Taiwan is critical to European and global economic stability and should therefore be treated as a core interest. If Europe fails to send strong signals in this regard, it will be betraying its principles and values.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Dr Simona Grano is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Zurich, with a focus on Chinese and Taiwanese studies. In September 2023 she was nominated Senior Fellow at Asia Society Policy Institute's Center for China Analysis (CCA) in New York. She has held research positions and taught China Studies and Taiwan Studies at Ca' Foscari University of Venice in Italy, at the University of Zurich in Switzerland and National Cheng'chi University in Taiwan. Image credit: Flickr/ 總統府.

BRICS Plus: India’s perspective on the group’s expansion

BRICS Plus: India’s perspective on the group’s expansion

WRITTEN BY RISHMA BANERJEE

19 December 2023

This August, the BRICS summit in South Africa saw the group more than double its original membership, injecting renewed vigour into the initiative. Although a last-minute impasse briefly stalled proceedings, the fact that Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa unanimously agreed to incorporate six new members — Argentina, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates — is diplomatically significant.

Despite initially expressing reservations about the group’s expansion and voicing concerns about the eligibility criteria for new members, India took proactive measures during the summit to shape consensus on the selection of new members. New Delhi has long viewed the bloc as a significant entity, given BRICS’ focus on non-traditional security issues and its alignment with India’s priorities of championing Global South causes and promoting multipolarity in foreign policy. Given the broader context of India’s rivalry with China, and its tightrope act of balancing ties between Russia and the West, New Delhi’s support for the six new members reflects its broader strategic and geopolitical interests.

India’s interest in the new members

India’s support for including Argentina in BRICS is underpinned by New Delhi’s recognition of the South American country’s geopolitical and economic importance. In 2019, India signed a strategic partnership with Argentina, which centred on the important goal of boosting economic ties between the countries, focusing primarily on Argentina’s significant markets in the agricultural, pharmaceutical, and IT sectors. The countries also collaborate on issues such as climate change, sustainable development, and counterterrorism. Therefore, a robust partnership with Buenos Aires also aligns with New Delhi’s broader goal of diversifying strategic partnerships and global influence. With both Brazil and Argentina as BRICS members, it gives the group — and by extension India — much greater visibility in South America.

Given the broader context of India’s rivalry with China, and its tightrope act of balancing ties between Russia and the West, New Delhi’s support for the six new BRICS members reflects its broader strategic and geopolitical interests.

India’s backing of Egypt’s BRICS membership was solidified by the recent revitalisation of bilateral relations, reflected in the strategic partnership signed during Prime Minister Modi’s June visit to Cairo. Egypt is Africa’s second-largest economy and a key member of the African Union (AU), a regional bloc that has been on the radar of India’s recent foreign policy. This is primarily because India wants to counter China’s growing presence in the continent, as well as explore the economic and strategic potential that the continent offers.

In this regard, India also considers Ethiopia as a pivotal African nation, given its role as the seat of the AU. India has consistently supported Ethiopia's positions in international forums, including on issues like the Tigray crisis and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. This alignment stems from India's advocacy for greater African representation in global platforms. New Delhi lobbied hard for the AU’s inclusion in the G20, and the Union’s acceptance as a member of the Group not only reflected growing global interest in Africa but also solidified India’s position as a leader of the Global South. With Egypt and Ethiopia in the BRICS Plus format, India can use this platform as a launchpad for more targeted engagement with African nations.

Including Middle Eastern countries in BRICS likewise aligns with India's growing engagement in the region to further its energy, trade, and broader geopolitical interests. India's foreign policy objectives in the Middle East are exemplified by various strategic partnerships and projects, for example, the I2U2 grouping, which includes India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States, and is aimed at enhancing economic cooperation. Additionally, India is engaged in the development of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multi-mode network of ship, rail, and road routes for moving freight between India, Iran, Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Central Asia, and Europe. These initiatives, alongside the proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC), demonstrate India's commitment to deepening ties and creating new avenues for trade and diplomatic relations across the region.

The expansion of BRICS bolsters India's strategic position, especially in the Middle East — a region pivotal to its interests. First, the Middle East is a key supplier of oil and gas to India and is therefore vital for its energy security. For example, in 2020-21, about 53 per cent of India's oil imports came from the region. Second, the welfare of the large Indian diaspora there, which contributes to India’s economy with its remittances, is crucial. In 2019, remittances from the Gulf countries amounted to over USD 40 billion. Therefore, New Delhi has an interest in maintaining the region’s political stability and is keen to increase its diplomatic presence there.

India's Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with the UAE epitomises its robust engagement with the Gulf region. There are political divergences between New Delhi and Abu Dhabi, as India is seeking strategic autonomy in its relationship with Iran and is adopting a cautious stance towards China's regional ambitions. However, the India-UAE relationship is prospering, buoyed by a high volume of bilateral trade and mutual investments. The UAE serves as a linchpin for India's outreach to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), facilitating access to a collective economic and strategic front. The BRICS platform can amplify this relationship, allowing India to solidify economic ties, secure energy partnerships, and create a diplomatic balance amid varying regional interests, particularly as India navigates the intricacies of Middle Eastern geopolitics.

Despite fluctuations in the India-Iran relationship (due to factors such as the US-India nuclear deal and sanctions on Tehran), their collective vision of their strategic partnership, present in the signed New Delhi Declaration in 2003, remains crucial. Iran's geographical proximity to Central Asia and its borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as India’s interest and stake in the Chabahar Port, make it a highly significant partner for India.

India has also been making steady efforts to cultivate a robust partnership with Saudi Arabia, exemplified by the signing of a strategic partnership in 2010 and the establishment of a Strategic Partnership Council between the two countries. Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s efforts to diversify its foreign policy away from the West positioned it favourably to gain India’s support in its membership bid.

Implications of the BRICS expansion

The inclusion of new members in the BRICS grouping heralds a significant shift in the global economic and geopolitical landscape. The original five BRICS nations already account for a significant portion of the global economic output, surpassing the Group of Seven (G7) nations in terms of combined gross domestic product (GDP). Upon its expansion, BRICS's global GDP share by PPP would climb to 37 per cent, overtaking the G7's 30.7 per cent, while its share in world exports and imports is projected to increase by 3.7 per cent and 3 per cent, respectively. Likewise, the expanded BRICS represents 46 per cent of the world's population. With another 22 formal applications for membership pending, the group could evolve into a formidable alternative to Western-dominated institutions of global governance.

This expansion consolidates the BRICS' presence in key regions, including the Middle East, Africa, and South America, further enhancing its global footprint. With six of the top ten oil-producing nations globally now part of the grouping, BRICS Plus will account for 42 per cent of global oil production. This shift in energy dynamics could have far-reaching implications for global energy markets and geopolitics. Furthermore, although de-dollarisation is not presently on the group’s agenda, the recent summit took tangible steps towards using local currencies in trade. Establishing the BRICS Interbank Cooperation Mechanism and introducing the BRICS Pay digital payment platform, both of which are tailored to accommodate transactions in local currencies, are foundational initiatives for realising this goal. The possibility that a significant portion of global trade could potentially be conducted internally within the BRICS grouping is a source of concern for Western stakeholders.

Looking ahead, India is likely to benefit from the expansion of BRICS — despite it being called a ‘Chinese project’, on account of China being the largest economy with the most robust outreach. The current members maintain cordial, if not friendly, relations with India. Furthermore, many of them also have strong and enduring ties with the US. This balance will help the BRICS to not become a China-led group. India can be comfortable in the knowledge that for now, BRICS Plus can be perceived as a non-Western group but not an anti-West one. Further expansion of the group in the coming years may pose a challenge to this narrative, especially if new members are less inclined towards favourable bilateral relations with India. However, cultivating strong ties with the members now will help cement India’s position in the group, thus enhancing its capacity to influence decisions taken by the group in its favour.

India's historical leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement and its strong ties with the Global South positions it well to navigate a further expansion if it occurs at all. The real challenge instead will be instituting a consensus-based decision-making process within BRICS. With the membership now at 11 countries, this may become more complex as BRICS lacks a proper secretariat. Nevertheless, for now, the BRICS expansion has the potential to advance Indian interests and bolster its influence within a select group of nations that it seeks to deepen relations with.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Rishma Banerjee is a geopolitical research analyst at SratNewsGlobal in Delhi, working on South Asian geopolitics with a focus on Pakistan and human rights issues. With a master’s in political science from Jadavpur University, she specialises in Indian foreign policy, particularly in the context of non-traditional security challenges such as climate and migration. Image credit: Flickr/GovernmentZA.

Democratic resilience – Why Taiwan and Europe must be more ambitious in 2024

Democratic resilience — Why Taiwan and Europe must be more ambitious in 2024

WRITTEN BY DR ZSUZSA ANNA FERENCZY

18 December 2023

2023 was a good year for EU-Taiwan relations: a more assertive and aggressive China has pushed Europe and Taiwan closer. Taiwan’s image as a reliable partner for Europe has been consolidated, and a Taiwan-friendly European discourse has been established. Parliamentary diplomacy, the core avenue for bilateral cooperation, has helped to normalise relations to an extent that seems irreversible in the current context shaped by authoritarian threats — mainly from China and Russia — to which both remain vulnerable. Therefore, it makes sense for Europe and Taiwan to consider each other as partners.

As Taiwan gets ready for its presidential and parliamentary elections in January 2024 and the European Parliament for its own elections in June 2024, it is in the interest of both sides to increase efforts to contribute to each other’s economic and democratic resilience. It will serve them both to invest more in understanding each other’s complex relations with China. Failing to do so will jeopardise what has been achieved in EU-Taiwan relations; China and Russia will be the only beneficiaries of a slowdown.

In the context of abundant, and often coordinated, disinformation and information manipulation coming from Moscow and Beijing as well as their proxies, which is expected to strengthen ahead of the elections, clear and consistent communication on the importance of boosting EU-Taiwan cooperation will be key. Strengthening ongoing cooperation in democratic resilience must therefore remain a priority on the EU-Taiwan bilateral agenda. Will they be ambitious enough in 2024 to do more and better as partners?

Deepening Taiwan-EU ties

At the 4th EU Investment Forum in October, Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen stated that to Europe, Taiwan is a reliable partner, with a proven track record, and that Taiwan looked forward to ensuring the resilience of supply chains through cooperation. In a meeting with a delegation from the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) in July this year, President Tsai expressed hope that Taiwan and the EU could continue deepening cooperation in supply chain resilience, investment, cybersecurity and technological innovation, and strengthen their partnership and unity between democracies.

Taiwan is a frontline democracy, which makes it an indispensable partner for Europe, one it should learn from as it braces for its own elections, with interference and information manipulation expected to increase, in particular from China and Russia.

The AFET visit to Taiwan followed that of the European Parliament’s Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes (INGE) in 2021, and of the Committee on International Trade (INTA) in 2022. This is a clear sign that a tradition has been established — and Taiwan has reciprocated. In June, Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Joseph Wu conducted a European tour with stops in Czechia, Poland, Belgium, and Italy. While in Prague, he met with Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies Markéta Pekarová Adamová and Senate President Milos Vystrcil, both of whom have led efforts to strengthen ties with Taiwan. On his European visit, Wu also met Members of the European Parliament and legislators from Belgium, Luxembourg, and the UK.

These exchanges have secured greater visibility for Taiwan in the EU. Although Taiwan features more prominently in EU discussions on foreign and security policy, and increasingly in the context of talks on economic security, more work is needed to equip and empower European citizens to understand Taiwan’s geostrategic relevance — both in terms of trade and democracy.

As the growing number of parliamentary exchanges testify, this process has started and even amplified in light of Russia’s renewed aggression against Ukraine in February 2022. As this Lithuanian Member of the European Parliament said, defending Taiwan’s democracy “is just as important as defending Ukraine’s”. There is now a much clearer understanding, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic nations, that Taiwan is important for Europe’s effective geostrategic positioning.

Navigating identity politics

Questions remain as to how Europe can move forward — and closer — to Taiwan and translate rhetoric into substance, given the internal fragmentation that continues to shape the EU’s foreign and security policy vis-à-vis Taiwan and China. Taiwan faces challenges in navigating its own EU policy while balancing its special relationship with China.

For Europe, appreciating Taiwan’s complex relationship with China, and how this complexity will shape the outcome of the elections, should guide its efforts to better understand Taiwanese people — and Taiwanese identity. Views across the island diverge on the kind of relationship Taiwan should have with China, which is related to the complex and multilayered Taiwanese identity.

Indeed, the Taiwanese electorate faces a menu of options: a more conciliatory approach towards China under Kuomintang’s (KMT) Hou Yu-ih (侯友宜), a more internationally embraced Taiwan as a sovereign nation under Lai Ching-te (賴清德) and his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), or Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) and his Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) claiming to surpass the green-blue (pro-independence DPP and pro-unification KMT) political divide and creating a new political culture.

Yet, views on the importance of democracy as the essence of Taiwan’s existence do not diverge. Taiwanese people value it, regardless of how they define being Taiwanese or what sort of relationship they prefer with China. In fact, being able to define one’s identity is an important aspect of Taiwan’s identity as a robust democracy. For Taiwan, shielding democracy from disinformation, therefore, means defending its identity, and its very existence. Europe must learn to better appreciate and navigate these dynamics, and understand how questions of identity shape Taiwanese people’s perceptions of China. Europe should also look for inspiration in the Taiwanese people’s resolve to defend democracy from authoritarian threats.

Taiwan has been a target of disinformation campaigns propagated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for decades, seeking to undermine trust in its democracy. Beijing has exploited Taiwan’s openness — based on the respect of fundamental freedoms denied in China — to spread false claims, often generated through content farms, with content alleging to be from Taiwanese citizens, then republished in Taiwanese media. With just a few weeks until the elections, Beijing has doubled down on efforts to increase political polarisation and sow public discord.

As Puma Shen (沈伯洋) of Doublethink Lab explains, CCP-affiliated operatives spend months weaving a narrative into Taiwanese society by generating and sharing fake personal accounts, then spreading disinformation through these channels so that the public believes the narrative, without explaining how such narratives diverge from genuine discussions.

Beijing’s operatives have eagerly pushed narratives that elections are a choice between war and peace, a narrative that Taiwan’s own KMT has embraced as opposed to DPP’s Lai portraying the election as a “choice between democracy and autocracy”. Hacking people’s accounts and using them to spread disinformation via various social media or texting groups are ways Beijing and its proxies operate, according to Shen.

Taiwan’s importance for democratic resilience

Taiwan’s geostrategic importance to Europe’s prosperity and economic security is indisputable. In 2022, Taiwan was the EU’s 12th most important partner for trade in goods and the EU was the largest investor in Taiwan. This is why the 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy noted that “the EU will also pursue its deep trade and investment relationships with partners with whom it does not have trade and investment agreements, such as Taiwan”. In its 2022 resolution on the situation in the Strait of Taiwan, the European Parliament called for the EU to enhance the existing partnership with Taiwan, including by pursuing a resilient supply chain agreement.

Going forward, Europe must also keep in mind Taiwan’s importance to its democratic resilience. Taiwan is a frontline democracy, which makes it an indispensable partner for Europe, one it should learn from as it braces for its own elections, with interference and information manipulation expected to increase, in particular from China and Russia.

Establishing a permanent European Parliament body to monitor and fight foreign interference is among the proposals European legislators put forward in their June 2023 report calling for a coordinated strategy to increase the EU’s resilience to foreign interference and information manipulations and protect the 2024 European elections. The EP has much to learn from Taiwan’s experience of setting up an anti-disinformation mechanism that relies on cooperation and partnerships with civil society organisations. The task force brings together representatives from the government, including education, cybersecurity, and digital affairs.

In its mission report following its visit to Taiwan in 2021, the INGE urged to establish an EU strategic communications hub in Taipei to bring together specialist expertise on disinformation. It is time for the EU to translate these words into action.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Dr Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy is an Affiliated Scholar at the Department of Political Science of Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Head of the Associates Network at 9DASHLINE, and since 2021 Adjunct Assistant Professor at the National Dong Hwa University in Hualien, Taiwan. Image credit: Flickr/Taiwan Presidential Office.

The Fukushima water release and South Korea: it's complicated

The Fukushima water release and South Korea: It’s complicated

WRITTEN BY YEONSU LEE

15 December 2023

On 13 April 2021, the Japanese government announced its plan to release the treated water from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants (FDNPPs), which had been contaminated during the 2011 disaster. Over the past decade, the radioactively contaminated water has been treated and refined through the Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS) — a pumping and filtration system that eradicates radioactive materials but cannot remove tritium from nuclear-contaminated water. Since the capacities of the tanks storing the water have approached their maximum level, the Japanese government decided to release it into the ocean in 2021.

Japan’s neighbouring countries, China and South Korea, immediately criticised Japan’s plan to release the Fukushima water. Remarkably, the plan to release the water has sparked a complex and heated debate in South Korea, touching on various levels of society. Beyond its environmental and scientific implications, this issue has become a focal point in South Korean domestic politics, highlighting the sharp divide between the governing party and the opposition.

South Korea’s polarised reactions

There is no consensus in South Korea on whether the water is safe enough to be released, with two conflicting opinions on the matter. Although the Korean government has accepted Japan’s plan to release the Fukushima water, politicians, scientists, and citizens continue to raise concerns and criticisms. The opposition, the Democratic Party of Korea, actively expressed their disagreement, citing deep concerns about potential health risks and formed a committee to prevent the release of the water into the ocean. The leader of the opposition party, Lee Jae-Myung, began a hunger strike over the government’s policies. One of the reasons for his indefinite hunger strike was to oppose the release of the Fukushima water from Japan.

Many South Koreans are also concerned about the negative effects of releasing the water, especially the long-term health effects of the radioactive material left in Fukushima. Some scientists highlight the potential hazards from the remaining materials in the Fukushima treated water. They argue that seafood security will be threatened by releasing the Fukushima water into the sea. Particularly, controversy surrounding the dangers of tritium continues because tritium cannot be removed by the treatment process. In this situation, the Korean public fears the negative consequences of releasing the Fukushima water. Indeed, many South Koreans have stockpiled salt due to their fears about the potential negative effects of releasing the Fukushima water. Moreover, a majority of Koreans are hesitant to consume seafood after the release of the water.

Although the South Korean government has accepted Japan’s plan to release the Fukushima water, politicians, scientists, and citizens continue to raise concerns and criticisms.

These reactions do not appear to have a significant and direct impact on South Korea's nuclear energy policy. However, the government announced enhanced radiation tests to allay public fears. This highlights how scientific challenges, public opinion, and policy choices all interact. Even though the immediate impact on policy might not be huge, the fact that the government is taking proactive steps shows they understand how public feeling can influence the decisions they make. It shows how public concerns can play a role in shaping the direction of government policies.

The South Korean government, for its part, has underscored the importance of adhering to 'international' standards and cooperating with Japan on nuclear waste management. This stance has marked a significant departure from the previous South Korean government's position, signalling a notable shift in South Korea-Japan relations. Under President Moon, the South Korea-Japan relationship became stagnant after Japan removed South Korea from its trade whitelist. However, President Yoon began efforts to establish a better relationship with Japan before the controversy over releasing the Fukushima water intensified. Yoon has attempted to improve ties with Japan due to security threats from North Korea and disrupted global supply chains. He resumed summits between South Korea and Japan, tightening cooperation and vowing to develop a better relationship. The issue of releasing the Fukushima water has transcended its scientific and environmental dimensions and has become a matter of political debate in South Korea.

These reactions are notable as, historically, in South Korea, nuclear technology has been understood as a certain and mighty method to develop the country’s economy and its status in international society. This positive attitude towards nuclear technology has tended to neglect nuclear safety issues and the potential dangers of radioactive materials. Even though anti-nuclear movements gained public attention after South Korea became a democracy, anti-nuclear activists have not been able to provide an alternative tool for replacing nuclear technology for national development. Also, although the Fukushima water release is primarily a scientific challenge, it has raised different understandings of security concerns in South Korea.

The governing party and opposition party have incompatible opinions about releasing the Fukushima water, which seems to reflect different understandings of the potential risk from the release. The current government views the risk as significantly low, while the opposition party focuses on international laws, environmental impacts, and human rights. According to the South Korean government, the Fukushima water has met the international standards to be released into the ocean. In contrast, the opposition party worries about the potential hazards of radioactive materials. Despite the same scientific reports from Japan and the IAEA, the two parties show different perceptions of insecurity related to the Fukushima water release.

Framing nuclear technology in South Korea: a hope or risk?

South Koreans show conflicting opinions about nuclear technology because it has played a significant role in the country’s politics and economy. After the liberation from Japan, there was a consensus in Korean society that science and technology were necessary to secure its survival and to become a wealthy country. In this situation, then-President Rhee expressed interest in developing nuclear weapons for technological progress and national defence in the Cold War era. After the Korean War, the South Korean government sought to develop nuclear technology for national reconstruction while competing with North Korea. More recently, President Moon implemented a nuclear power phase-out policy that aims to halt the use of nuclear power plants. However, he has also shown an interest in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines. Economically, Yoon’s administration is eager to export South Korea’s nuclear power plants.

Before the Fukushima disaster, South Korea’s nuclear reactors provided approximately 40 per cent of the national electricity capacity. Moreover, the government planned to increase Korea’s nuclear capacity up to 56 per cent by the year 2020. The Fukushima disaster has not affected the Korean nuclear programme, although the government has emphasised safety factors. However, the Korean public’s attitudes towards nuclear technology are not uniformly favourable and tend to vary based on positive or negative events. As a result, although the South Korean government’s position on nuclear technology has been consistent, public opinion tends to emphasise its disadvantages when a negative nuclear event, such as the Fukushima accident, occurs.

Given the widespread concerns regarding the Fukushima water among South Koreans, the issue will likely remain important in domestic politics. The key scientific issue in the Fukushima water release is the potential harmfulness of tritium, which cannot be fully eliminated by the ALPS treatment. While the South Korean government has officially announced the water’s minimal impacts, the opposition party and civic groups are still severely concerned about its long-term effects on humans and seafood. With these two conflicting views, Koreans are explicitly expressing their frustration with the current administration’s response, and the opposition party will likely raise more doubts about the Yoon administration’s political capacity. However, the Fukushima water release is unlikely to affect popular preference for nuclear technology more broadly. Indeed, recent polls indicate significant support among South Koreans for pursuing nuclear armament.

The future of nuclear technology in South Korea

Due to unknown and uncertain risks, the Fukushima water release has raised diverse nuclear-related concerns in South Korea. Nuclear technology, in particular, has been considered a pivotal method in South Korean politics and economic development. Therefore, most nuclear-related challenges are not only purely scientific but also political in the South Korean context. Beyond its scientific dimensions, the controversy surrounding the water release underscores the deeply rooted political nature of nuclear-related challenges in South Korea. As the government's decision to agree to the discharge faces opposition and public protests, it is clear that the nuclear issue cannot be a purely technical matter but a socio-political issue that stirs emotions, ideological divisions, and differing visions for the nation's future. The continuous debate about the Fukushima water release emphasises the necessity for thoughtful approaches that go beyond the scientific aspects of nuclear challenges, recognising the intricate socio-political context within which these issues unfold.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Yeonsu Lee is a PhD candidate researching nuclear-related issues and security in Northeast Asia at the University of Leeds. Image credit: Flickr/IAEA Imagebank.

Australia-China relations: Where to now?

Australia-China relations: Where to now?

WRITTEN BY ELENA COLLINSON

14 December 2023

After seven years marked by bullying and heavy-handed tactics by Beijing, episodes of diplomatic inelegance by Canberra, and the asperity of mutual criticism, Australia-China relations have tentatively shifted to a more normalised state.

This was exemplified by Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s visit to China in November 2023, meeting President Xi Jinping and other senior members of the Chinese leadership. Albanese and Xi issued a statement on joint outcomes, which placed a floor of sorts under the bilateral relationship. The question now is whether this newfound civility can translate to much beyond a delicate rapprochement.

The state of play

The bilateral relationship had been under strain since late 2016, with difficulties becoming particularly acute during the COVID-19 pandemic. In April 2020, the Australian government called for an independent, international inquiry into the origins and spread of COVID-19, honing in on China’s response to the virus, with then Prime Minister Scott Morrison pushing at the same time for ‘weapons-inspector’-like powers to be given to the World Health Organisation. This was followed by a steady stream of economic punishment meted out by Beijing from May 2020, targeting Australian exports such as barley, wine, coal, timber, lobster, cotton, education, and more.

In July 2021, the Chinese Foreign Ministry acknowledged that Beijing was wielding the economic relationship with Australia as a tool to communicate political dissatisfaction. High-level dialogue between the nations was frozen, despite some attempts by Canberra to restart talks, and references by either side to the countries’ comprehensive strategic partnership effectively disappeared from political rhetoric. Beijing also appeared to target Australian citizens as political tensions simmered, detaining Yang Hengjun and Cheng Lei. Australian representatives described their cases as arbitrary detention.

After seven years marked by bullying and heavy-handed tactics by Beijing, episodes of diplomatic inelegance by Canberra, and the asperity of mutual criticism, Australia-China relations have tentatively shifted to a more normalised state.

Since the Labor government’s victory at the Australian federal election in May 2022, however, both nations have worked to move relations to a more even footing. High-level political exchange is back in full flight and there has been notable improvement on the bilateral trade front. China lifted its tariffs of 80.5 per cent on Australian barley with Australia in parallel discontinuing its legal proceedings on the matter at the World Trade Organisation (WTO). It also returned Australia to its Approved Destination Status list, permitting the resumption of group tours, and allowed Australian timber back after having subjected it to informal restrictions.

Most recently, Beijing agreed to commence a five-month review of its tariffs of up to 220 per cent on Australian wine, with Australia agreeing to suspend its WTO case on the matter while the review is underway. Australia’s Anti-Dumping Commission around the same time made a preliminary recommendation to allow tariffs on China-made wind towers to expire in April next year, one of the goods categories that China is currently disputing at the WTO.

Other points of friction have also been addressed. Cheng Lei, an Australian citizen who had been detained for more than three years, was released and returned to Australia. Chinese company Landbridge’s 99-year lease of Port of Darwin, opposed by the Australian Labor Party since its signing in 2015, has been left to continue, with the Australian government stating it had accepted advice not to cancel or vary the lease following review by its security agencies.

But these developments essentially only return relations to early 2016 settings, before tensions took firm root but after Australian optimism on China had faded. An examination of government rhetoric shows a divergence between the nations concerning the paths on which they are trying to nudge the bilateral relationship.

The view from Beijing

Changes in Beijing’s rhetoric vis-à-vis Australia were evident from the second half of last year. In a meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2022, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his Australian counterpart Penny Wong that Australia and China should “meet each other halfway”, a marked shift away from the previously robust insistence that the onus was entirely on Australia to triage the bilateral relationship. During the latter half of the Morrison government’s tenure (2018-2022), Chinese Foreign Ministry officials had repeatedly stated that “the root cause” for the Australia-China tensions was “Australia's repeated wrong acts and remarks”, asserting, “Let him who tied the bell on the tiger take it off. One's fault should be amended by oneself”.

In December 2022, the Chinese government started to move beyond calling for relationship ‘repair’ to seeking out relationship ‘progression’. In a message celebrating the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Australia and China, Xi stated that China was “ready to advance relations”. Wang re-emphasised the sentiment in July this year, describing Australia-China relations as having “stabilised, improved and developed”. Beijing’s eye to the future was given its clearest depiction during Albanese’s November meetings with the Chinese leadership. Xi spoke of “embracing a new 50 years in China-Australia relations”, emphasising that it was important both nations keep their comprehensive strategic partnership “moving forward”, while Chairman of the National People’s Congress Zhao Leji described the relationship as being at “a new starting point”.

Beijing has also toned down its tendency to lash Canberra for each perceived transgression. Consider, for example, its response to former prime ministers Scott Morrison and Tony Abbott’s visits to Taiwan, which took place two years apart. Abbott’s remarks during his 2021 trip were the subject of a formal protest by China’s Foreign Ministry. He was lambasted by China’s embassy in Canberra as a “failed and pitiful politician”. Morrison’s trip in November this year, on the other hand, was subject to distinctly quieter treatment, with Beijing’s public response to the visit limited to a characterisation of the trip as a “serious concern” by China’s ambassador to Australia during an appearance at a forum for business executives.

Beijing has attributed the shift in its dealings with Canberra to the change in government following the 2022 Australian federal election. Against the backdrop of simmering tensions with Washington and its attempts to stare down an economic crisis, however, it is clear that it is in its interests to inject some stability into relations with a resource-rich US ally.

The view from Canberra

For its part, the Albanese government has eschewed the loose talk of war that its conservative predecessor had embraced. While it has not shied away from delivering frank assessments of the security issues posed by Beijing’s growing military might, underlining the fact that China does not see itself as a “status-quo power”, it has opted to predominantly register concerns through diplomatic channels as opposed to public posturing. Consistency and predictability have been key to the Albanese government’s approach, with ministerial talking points on China carefully stage-managed since its federal election victory.

However, Australian representatives remain distinctly more reticent than their Chinese counterparts in terms of where they see the relationship as ultimately heading. Soon after assuming the prime ministership, Albanese stated that there was “a long way to go. It will be a problematic relationship”. The Australian government has hewn to “stabilisation” as its aim in terms of China relations. A stabilised relationship, according to Albanese, is one in which “there are no impediments to trade” and a “more regular exchange of ministerial dialogue”. He described it as “a place where there are no surprises”.

The Australian prime minister, following his meeting with Xi, stated that the nations remain in the process of building a “constructive” relationship. A week before, Wong emphasised the importance of engagement as a means of providing the capacity to navigate differences, stating — as she has repeatedly done in the past — that Australia was “not going back to where we were 20 years ago in terms of our relationship with China. China has changed and our relationship has changed”.

Limits to a ‘no surprises’ relationship

Even the relatively modest articulated intent to create a relationship of “no surprises” with China has its limits. For example, on 14 November, Australian navy divers were injured after a Chinese warship subjected them to sonar pulses, merely one week after the Australian prime minister’s warm reception in China.

As such, a pervasive wariness and unease colours Australia’s approach to the relationship. Much of the capability foreseen by Australia’s Defence Strategic Review in April, as well as the essence of the AUKUS trilateral security partnership, gives expression to what Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles terms “impactful projection” — the ability to “hold an adversary at risk” much further from Australian shores. Moreover, in a recent speech in Seoul, Marles called for the strengthening of a collective effort to deter conflict in the Taiwan Strait, saying, “[We] cannot be passive bystanders”. Australia has also begun joint patrols with the Philippines in the South China Sea against the backdrop of heightened tensions with Beijing in the contested waters.

Non-kinetic threats, such as malicious cyber activities are similarly a sticking point. Australia’s recently released Cyber Threat Report named China as a major state backer of cybercrime against Australian companies and critical infrastructure. Chinese state-sponsored actors have been testing Australia’s digital fences for years, but activity has markedly increased in frequency, scale, and sophistication. Earlier this year, Five Eyes nations — the intelligence-sharing grouping comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and the US — issued a joint cybersecurity advisory on cyber-attacks by a Chinese state-sponsored actor, a rare public, and coordinated, attribution.

On the economic front, de-risking is a major focus for Canberra given its recent experience with Beijing’s tendency to use trade as a lever to pursue its strategic aims. While the Australian government has reportedly concluded that decoupling from China is not feasible, it remains focused on trade diversification and bolstering supply chain resilience. Indeed, moves to reduce China’s dominance in critical minerals processing are currently underway. While Trade Minister Don Farrell has treated the matter with rhetorical care, stating on the sidelines of the APEC summit in San Francisco on 16 November that the government “would not propose any changes in respect to [Chinese investment]”, its actions this year have tended towards favouring restriction on Chinese investment in the sector. Australia and the US are also taking steps towards closer cooperation on critical minerals, a key focus of Albanese’s October visit to Washington.

On the current facts, substantive advancement of the Australia-China relationship is necessarily constrained. The gap between Canberra and Beijing’s articulated intentions for the direction of the relationship is made insurmountable by strategic reality. A broad maintenance of current settings, with some room for movement, is likely to be the best-case scenario.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Elena Collinson is head of analysis at the Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney. Image credit: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

EU-China Summit: A relationship stuck in time

EU-China Summit:

A relationship

stuck in time

WRITTEN BY DR FRANCESCA GHIRETTI

13 December 2023

When reading China’s account of Xi Jinping’s meeting with Charles Michel and Ursula von der Leyen during the EU-China Summit on 7-8 December, one cannot but feel that time froze or even went backwards and that none of the issues that the EU and China have faced in the past years, if not months, ever happened. Holding the first in-person summit since 2019 is an important achievement, and the EU has been able to express some important concerns to Xi Jinping directly; however, the words — especially from China — demonstrate Beijing still views the EU mostly as an economic partner.

EU – China economic complementarity

The part of the Chinese account that displays the highest degree of detachment from reality comes in paragraph four and opens with “there is a high degree of complementarity between the Chinese and EU economies”. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs probably meant that despite its best efforts, China remains an export-driven economy with an issue of oversupply, and the EU remains the largest trading block. But that is where the complementarity stops if it can even be called so.

Instead, the reality is a lack of complementarity and growing competition between the EU and China’s economies. The examples are countless. The recent anti-subsidy case launched by the European Commission against Chinese battery electric vehicles (BEV) perfectly exemplifies the lack of complementarity between the two economies. China’s BEV production is growing exponentially, threatening the automotive sector in Europe, which is itself an accomplice to the success of the Chinese companies. This presents a serious point of contention, as the European automotive industry is fundamental to the EU’s economy, accounting for 6.1 per cent of employment in the EU and more than 7 per cent of the EU’s GDP.

The lack of progress on key points for the EU is hardly surprising and, in all likelihood, it was not the intended scope of the summit nor does it take away from the importance of the summit itself.

The paragraph from the Chinese account proceeds with a list that elaborates China’s view of the EU as a “key partner for economic and trade cooperation, [..] preferred partner for key science and technology collaboration […] [and] trustworthy partner for industrial and supply chain cooperation” — words that might have rung more true during the last in-person summit in 2019 but feel misplaced in 2023. Much has happened since then: there has been a pandemic which led the Commission and EU member states to reconsider the resilience of their supply chains; China increasingly exercised economic coercion against the EU by hitting Lithuania, the EU, and its member states with strengthened foreign investments screening and export controls; the Commission published a toolkit to “mitigate foreign interference in research and innovation”, and recently also adopted a list of ten critical technologies, to mention a few.

In June, the European Commission and the High Representative jointly published the EU Economic Security Strategy. Although neither the strategy nor the measures in it officially target China, unofficially, they all pay special attention to China as a major concern for the EU’s economic security. The economic security strategy is thus in great dissonance with China’s outdated account, with the most notable anachronism not laying in the optimistic tone, but in the areas for collaboration selected, which, to different degrees, have all been the focus of the EU’s economic security approach.

A relationship based on respect for the international rules-based order

On the EU’s side, the readout reflects the underwhelming nature of the summit that matched already low expectations. As usual, grievances were expressed, and unilateral requests were made without much progress. The need for a more level economic playing field and the issue of the trade surplus are a leitmotif of EU-China summits. The former will simply not see much progress and the latter separately received a resounding dismissal by Wang Lutong, China’s foreign ministry director general. The consistent lack of validation of the EU’s concerns stands out even more loudly against China’s description of the EU as a key economic and trade partner.

The list of topics discussed during the summit included Russia’s war in Ukraine and related EU sanctions, the Middle East, climate and health, human rights, and growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait and the East and South China Seas. No progress was expected in any of these areas before the summit and no progress was achieved.

Remarkably, Michel’s words about the summit and the relationship between the EU and China were not less detached from reality than those in the Chinese document: “The EU and China have a shared interest in a stable and constructive relationship based on respect for the international rules-based order”. China speaks, also in the readout, of multipolarism and engaging more in the G20 and UN, but it does not mention the rules-based international order once. One thing that by now even the high ranks in the consilium should know is that China does not buy into the rules-based order. For Beijing, the rules-based order is American or Western-made and does not conform to China’s needs. In part, the term brings back memories of the 2019 summit, where in a Joint Statement, the EU and China agreed to “firmly support the rules-based multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core”. But even then, the rules-based framework was applied to a very narrow element: trade.

Partner or counterpart?

The mere fact that the first in-person summit between the EU and China since 2019 took place is an achievement and that this happened after the high-level dialogues restarted speaks to a normalisation of the diplomatic relationship — a positive and welcome development. To have a venue where the two actors can express their positions and concerns face-to-face has become more important amid growing tensions. The lack of progress on key points for the EU is hardly surprising and, in all likelihood, it was not the intended scope of the summit nor does it take away from the importance of the summit itself.

But the summit is somehow weakened by the detachment from reality of some of the phrases used to describe the relationship, which turn it into a showcasing of pre-prepared statements. For China, this is a regular modus operandi, and it is hardly surprising that Beijing would highlight as ongoing a very positive economic relationship that no longer exists between the two actors because that is what matters the most to Beijing. For the EU, and the consilium specifically, the decision to say that China respects the international rules-based order may echo a larger issue: the difficulty of reflecting the EU’s changed approach to China in its official language.

That difficulty goes beyond the summit and is well represented in the resilience of the three-pronged approach that describes China as a partner, competitor, and systemic rival. The three terms, adopted in 2019 and reconfirmed in the European Council Conclusions on 30 June, keep surviving despite the increasing difficulty of identifying any partnerships between the EU and China. Perhaps ‘counterpart’ would be a more fitting term than ‘partner’, and maybe it is time to bridge the gap between the reality of the relationship and the words we use to describe it.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Dr Francesca Ghiretti is a Senior Geoeconomics Analyst at the Adarga Research Institute. She obtained her PhD from the Centre for Grand Strategy, War Studies, King’s College London where her thesis received the Outstanding Thesis Award. Previously, Francesca worked as analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) where she covered economic security, EU-China relations, UK-China relations and the BRI. Image credit: © Council of the European Union, 2023.

BIMSTEC revival: A compelling alternative to the BRI in the Bay of Bengal

BIMSTEC Revival: A Compelling Alternative to the BRI in the Bay of Bengal

WRITTEN BY EVE REGISTER

1 December 2023

With the sixth BIMSTEC summit scheduled to take place in Thailand in 2024, international media has turned its attention to the grouping to discuss its future prospects. BIMSTEC is a regional organisation comprised of member countries from both South and South East Asia. The grouping aims to increase connectivity both within and between these two regions. Although BIMSTEC countries account for nearly 22 per cent of the world’s population, they are located in one of the least integrated regions in the world. Through the proposal of increased regional cooperation, BIMSTEC intends to bring greater peace and prosperity to the Bay of Bengal region. Over the last year, BIMSTEC member states also appear to have renewed their commitment to the initiative. Various conferences and group meetings have taken place over the last few months, including a consultation convened by the Indian External Affairs Minister last week to discuss deepening India’s role in BIMSTEC, which together reflect the member nations’ aspiration to elevate the group’s efficacy and productivity.

The Thailand summit is of particular significance as it will be the first summit to take place just a year after the last. The five previous BIMSTEC summits have taken place four years apart on average, making this year’s summit an indication of member nations’ aspiration to elevate the group’s efficacy and productivity.

Until recently, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has been the primary multilateral body in the region. The increasingly strained relations between member countries India and Pakistan, however, have had a detrimental impact on the group’s productivity. Summit Meetings have completely stopped since the Uri terror attack and the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan. SAARC has since been described as "in a state of coma: neither dead nor fully alive". This current impasse necessitates the emergence of a new grouping to resume and bolster multilateral cooperation in the region.

It will be important for BIMSTEC to learn from the mistakes of the BRI if it is to work as a viable alternative for countries in the Bay of Bengal region.

Although BIMSTEC is a grouping with great promise that has the potential to rise to this challenge, it has had very little visibility over the last two decades. When the organisation was first established, they planned to hold summits every two years but in the first 20 years, only three summits were held. When BIMSTEC was established it was decided that its senior officials would meet twice a year, but these meetings were suspended seven times between 2014 and 2017. As a result, it has been difficult for the group to get projects off the ground. Member nations signed a Free Trade Agreement back in 2004 but it is still yet to be fully implemented. The agreement has the potential to revolutionise trade in the region, one economic analysis report concluded it is likely to "generate significant welfare gains for its members". While member nations have a number of similarly dynamic initiatives in the pipeline, BIMSTEC will require increased funding and the reform of its internal infrastructure to ensure these initiatives materialise.

Potential alternative to the BRI

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been one of the leading projects to expand global connectivity in recent years. However, links are increasingly being made between BRI borrowing arrangements and subsequent economic problems faced by member countries. The BRI held its third forum last month and saw a significant downturn in the attendance of national leaders, dropping from 37 attending the 2019 forum to only 24 this year. BIMSTEC and BRI member Sri Lanka has experienced its worst economic crisis since the country’s independence, exacerbated by unmanageable debt repayments to China and the temporary loss of its Hambantota Port as a consequence of defaulting on these repayments. As the long-term repercussions of BRI engagement continue to be illuminated, it becomes increasingly important to find viable alternatives and BIMSTEC could present this opportunity. Although BIMSTEC and the BRI are by nature different ventures, the former a regional grouping and the latter a project with a global scope, in the Bay of Bengal region BIMSTEC can be considered an alternative to the BRI as it also aims to build local infrastructure and support economic growth, but has the sustainable development of its member countries as a fundamental priority.

A key aspect of BIMSTEC that sets it apart from the BRI is that its relationships are based on interlinkages and interdependence. These aspects work in combination with the group’s underpinning principle of the equality of all members, meaning no single member is granted any greater role or power in the relationship. Interdependence is founded upon mutual trust and is key to keeping all members accountable. The BRI tends to create an over-dependence on the benefactor, who holds the power in the relationship and has no equal to ensure accountability.

It is also notable that in BIMSTEC’s charter, one of the first priorities outlined is the bloc’s commitment to its landlocked member countries — Bhutan and Nepal. The charter states the importance of "recognizing the special needs and circumstances of the least developed and landlocked developing countries in the region and underlining the necessity to provide meaningful support to their development process". The landlocked countries in the grouping have the greatest dependency on fellow members, who can provide them with access to vital trade routes that then connect these countries to regional and global markets.

The fact that the most dependent countries in the grouping are given such priority in the charter indicates the group’s commitment to ensuring equitable development and that the members with the greatest needs receive the necessary support to achieve greater economic stability. BIMSTEC has already identified boosting its intra-regional trade as one of the best ways to support the economies of these landlocked countries and has since been working on Motor Vehicle Agreements to better facilitate passenger and motor travel between member countries. Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that BIMSTEC was working on the ‘early conclusion’ of such agreements, which indicates that the grouping is also prioritising these countries in practice.

Determination to progress

Alongside these solid foundations, the grouping has also shown commitment to reform in recent months. This year they published a series of documents, including the ‘Rules of Procedure for Core BIMSTEC Mechanisms’, which aimed at tackling efficiency problems with their current organisational structure. As most relations in the region have historically been bilateral, these inner mechanisms are crucial in aiding the transition to effective multilateral dialogue. BIMSTEC has also discussed implementing a dispute-resolution mechanism to prevent inter-member or national conflicts from hindering their operational capacities, as it has done with SAARC.

A BIMSTEC delegation has recently met with the ASEAN Secretariat in Indonesia to learn about the organisation’s mechanisms and see how their best practices can be integrated into BIMSTEC’s own infrastructure. As BIMSTEC includes members from South East Asia, the meetings were also intended to explore the possibility of the two groupings working together in future to reinforce collaboration between South and South East Asia. The desire to work with and learn from other multilateral bodies is another promising aspect of BIMSTEC’s development strategy.

Learning from the BRI’s mistakes

It will be important for BIMSTEC to learn from the mistakes of the BRI if it is to work as a viable alternative for countries in the Bay of Bengal region. One key aspect that will be crucial for the grouping to focus on is the environmental sustainability of its projects. A study carried out by the Collective on Chinese Financing and Investments, Human Rights and the Environment analysed 26 different BRI projects across Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. They found that BRI-funded infrastructure had contributed to both deforestation and water pollution. Pollutants found included cyanide, metabisulfite, and peroxide and the study also detected disruption to local watersheds that led to flooding, or droughts in other cases. It appears that administrators of certain BRI projects have not conducted or implemented the necessary risk assessments to ensure the safety of their infrastructure and that the affected member countries have paid the price for this failure. BIMSTEC is already working with climate change strategy specialists to help develop their policies and it will be essential for the grouping to continue and further this engagement with experts to ensure each of their initiatives are designed with the preservation of the environment as a primary focus.

It will also be important for BIMSTEC initiatives to be devised and implemented with a policy of transparency. The BRI has been criticised for its lack of transparency with loans to BRI members, notably in the cases of Sri Lanka and Zambia where this confidentiality hindered both countries’ ability to effectively restructure their debt repayments. This transparency will also be essential to encourage the involvement of other international institutions with BIMSTEC’s projects, as these institutions tend to require a level of openness before they decide to become involved.

In order for BIMSTEC to develop and adopt these progressive strategies, however, it is crucial the grouping receives both guidance and funding from key actors already established in the region. The Quad, a minilateral forum invested in the Indo-Pacific, could present this opportunity. The grouping has recently been looking to expand its role from a security focus to working on more economic development projects. As increased economic stability directly correlates with enhanced national security, investment in these projects will also further serve the Quad’s security goals. Members of the Quad have already shown motivation to pursue economic development initiatives similar to those of BIMSTEC, by investing in projects such as the Blue Dot Network, which aims at ‘improving standards of infrastructure investment’ in the Indo-Pacific. Such initiatives also aim to reduce the dependency of countries in the region on China by providing an alternative to the BRI. BIMSTEC and the Quad therefore seem well-positioned to embark upon future collaboration.

It is clear that BIMSTEC has great potential for enhancing the connectivity and prosperity of the Bay of Bengal region. Its principle of interdependence and demonstrated commitment to its most economically vulnerable member countries suggests sincere dedication to the equitable development the region requires. As certain nations in the region have started to withdraw from BRI agreements, including Bangladesh’s decision to scrap their Sonadia deep-sea port project, they are actively seeking alternative avenues for investment. Now is the perfect time for BIMSTEC to rise to the challenge.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Eve Register is a research fellow at the Asia-Pacific Foundation and part of NATO DEEP’s Global Threats Advisory Group. Image credit: Picabay/Claudenil.

Manila is shopping, not re-aligning

Manila is shopping,

not re-aligning

WRITTEN BY DRAKE LONG

7 December 2023

In November the Philippines announced the high-profile cancellation of several key infrastructure projects included under China’s mammoth worldwide investment initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). What observers of the region have honed in on is the termination of three ambitious rail links in particular: the Subic-Clark freight railway, the Calamba-Bicol commuter rail line, and an inter-city Mindanao railway.

For some, this could look like the death knell for the BRI in the Philippines. It creates the perception that Manila is pivoting away from Beijing’s influence after the bearhug of the Duterte years and is now ‘re-aligning’ closer to other countries.

Yet that is not necessarily true. If one takes their attention off the BRI branding and looks at Chinese infrastructure investment more broadly, it is abundantly clear that Manila fits into a regional pattern of using Chinese interest to play investors off of one another, reshuffling the money behind major infrastructure projects to their advantage. In other words, Malacanang is shopping around for better options.

Rather than celebrating each time a country publicly cancels a Chinese project, the US, Australia, the EU, and other nations competing for influence at the expense of Beijing should keep in mind the wider picture — Manila and other capitals like it are shopping around for alternatives.

Even after the termination of the railway deals, there is still roughly USD 12 billion worth of Chinese investment in the Philippines, BRI-branded or not, according to the China Global Investment tracker. Not all of those projects are going to be cancelled, and at the same time as Malacanang is re-evaluating past BRI projects, it is also inking new investment deals, just not under the BRI brand. At the beginning of 2023, Manila signed an additional memorandum of understanding with Beijing, resetting the terms for BRI projects in-country, and it is still actively courting the BRI for some infrastructure projects.

Furthermore, the shift away from Chinese funding for these three rail projects is less abrupt than one might think: in his election campaign, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. had already sent signals that one of his first policies in office would be a conscious effort to revisit infrastructure deals the Duterte administration had started, and all three projects were stropped right after Marcos’ inauguration.

What the latest announcement instead does is reignite interest from other possible investors — the Ministry of Transportation stated it was looking at Japanese, South Korean, and Indian financing to replace China’s effort.

Shopping for investors

Contrary to the ‘debt-trap’ narrative surrounding the BRI, regional governments in South and Southeast Asia have proved exceedingly savvy at renegotiating China’s infrastructure deals, or using Chinese interest as leverage to attract other investors. If one looks beyond the Philippines, for example, one would see that Vanuatu, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Vietnam have all seen an influx of interest from Western economies into long-neglected infrastructure projects — right after initial high-profile Chinese investment had fallen through. Both Sri Lanka and Laos, two highly indebted countries, have secured debt relief and debt restructuring arrangements from Beijing.

At the crux of this is an understanding in regional capitals about two key things. First, countries such as the Philippines desperately need new, expansive infrastructure, but primarily in ‘frontier market’ areas of their economy that Western and Japanese firms would not normally invest in.

The Asian Development Bank recently assessed that the ASEAN region requires roughly USD 1.2 trillion in infrastructure investment by 2030 to keep up its current rate of economic growth. For the BIMP subgrouping of countries (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines), the infrastructure deficit in rural, isolated, or less-developed parts of their territory is especially acute. The Philippines, for example, has pledged to consistently boost infrastructure investment in Mindanao by five to six per cent annually and is touting its improved investment climate. But it has traditionally been shunned by outside investors due to its status as one of the poorest parts of the country and, up until recently, a conflict zone.

Second, at a certain point, Chinese companies’ onerous investments become Beijing’s headache. Because China’s overseas construction efforts are primarily done by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), Beijing literally cannot afford debtor countries defaulting. In Laos’ case, it deferred loan repayments to Beijing twice already — staving off financial collapse largely by betting that Beijing would not allow it to happen. Relatedly, China spent nearly USD 240 billion bailing out its BRI projects and companies that proved unprofitable or came close to bankruptcy between 2008-2021, according to a recent study published this year.

There will almost always be a level of government intervention to keep these investments solvent. Even the most debt-soaked Southeast Asian capitals know this and therefore, anticipate renegotiation. Manila is no exception.

The saga of Subic Bay is the most illustrative precedent for what the Marcos administration is doing now. In 2019, the mere suggestion that a Chinese company could buy out Subic Bay’s massive shipyard — a strategically located former US naval base — drove a combination of US capital and Australian shipbuilders to swoop in and offer better terms. Manila ultimately approved a bid from an American firm last year, explicitly citing the Biden administration’s involvement as being key to the deal’s success. Since then, the Subic facility has directly supported the annual US-Philippine bilateral exercise, the Balikatan, with logistical support. Before the threat of Chinese investment, Western private sector interest in Subic Bay was essentially nil.

What other options?

For the US and other like-minded countries, there is a lesson to be drawn from this. One could interpret Manila’s cancellation of some Chinese-backed deals as signalling that it is shopping around for additional investors. While this may be true, it does not preclude the Philippines from seeking out Chinese investment again, either. Manila’s attitude is not related to an ideological swing between a ‘Beijing’ camp and a ‘Western democracy’ camp but rather a pragmatic approach to economic priorities. In short, if the US and its partners cannot come up with the money Manila needs, it will revisit its options with China.

The US has made a concerted effort to show it is materially and politically invested in Southeast Asia, especially in its alliance with the Philippines. However, Southeast Asian governments are seeking an expanded US footprint in the region of a non-military nature as well.

US Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro recently articulated a new policy of ‘maritime statecraft’, getting to the essence of what many countries like Manila want: a regionally-focused foreign policy that focuses on employing military means for favourable non-military outcomes, such as economic investment, commercial diplomacy, and seaborne trade. Military cooperation in the traditional sense, while appreciated, does not align with regional capitals’ policy priorities of consistent, equitable economic growth and trade. Yet, to make maritime statecraft work, the US and other like-minded countries will need to continue pushing the limits of what they normally offer as infrastructure investment and consulting in countries like the Philippines. They will need to replace China’s role as a lender and financier of more riskier projects.

Rather than celebrating each time a country publicly cancels a Chinese project, the US, Australia, the EU, and other nations competing for influence at the expense of Beijing should keep in mind the wider picture — Manila and other capitals like it are shopping around for alternatives. However, they are neither giving up on filling their investment deficit nor are they willing to trade away economic growth for platitudes. There is only an opportunity to wean the Philippines off Chinese investment insofar as countries like the US are willing to replace it.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Drake Long is a Non-Resident Fellow with the Brute Krulak Center on Innovation & Future Warfare, Marine Corps University. He is also a Pacific Forum Young Leader and a frequent writer on US-Southeast Asia relations, having been published in The Diplomat, 9DASHLINE, 1945 Magazine, and the Center for International Maritime Security. He is currently writing a book on deep seabed mining and international seabed issues. His views do not reflect the opinion of any of his employers, the United States government, or the Department of Defense. Image credit: Unsplash/Mara Rivera.

Southeast Asia’s security partnerships stronger and more diverse at the end of 2023

Southeast Asia’s security partnerships stronger and more diverse at the end of 2023

WRITTEN BY HUNTER MARSTON

5 December 2023

Concerns about intensifying Sino-US tensions and a recent meeting between US President Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping on the sidelines of APEC in San Francisco have dominated international media coverage in recent weeks. Beneath the superficial focus on great power rivalry, however, two trends will shape regional security beyond 2023.

First, Southeast Asian states have more options than commonly understood when it comes to regional security partners, as exemplified by Japan’s new Official Security Assistance (OSA) framework. Second, intra-regional security links have proliferated as regional states have deepened strategic trust with each other to avoid taking sides in US-China competition.

Both trends reflect the broader preference for hedging, which will persist for the foreseeable future despite growing concerns about the security threat from China as well as uncertainty regarding the United States’ long-term commitment to the region, fuelled by populist politics in the run-up to the 2024 election.

Japan’s expanding security role in Southeast Asia

In August, the Philippines began discussing a reciprocal access agreement with Japan’s Self-Defence Forces during a visit by Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to Manila. During Kishida’s visit, the two sides agreed to the first-ever transfer of defence technology, including coastal radar equipment worth USD 4 million, under Tokyo’s recently launched OSA framework. The two leaders also called for increased trilateral cooperation with the United States and rejected “unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force”, in a not-so-thinly veiled jab at China’s actions within Philippine territorial waters.

Though divided by competing interests and entrenched divisions over how to respond to internal crises like the ongoing conflict in Myanmar, Southeast Asia has more options today and as a result greater confidence to set the regional agenda and dictate terms to the great powers.

In recent months, Chinese maritime militia and coast guard vessels have harassed Manila’s efforts to resupply a deteriorating naval ship, the BRP Sierra Madre, which the Philippines deliberately ran aground to assert its sovereignty claims against China in 1999. The new Japanese technology will boost the Philippines’ ability to monitor activities within its vast archipelagic waters, which has challenged Manila’s defence capabilities for decades, especially in light of long-running separatist movements in the country’s south.

Japan has emerged as a critical partner of choice for Southeast Asian countries, particularly in its efforts to build maritime and coast guard capacity for frontline states in the South China Sea, including the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam.

Like the Philippines, Vietnam is also a major recipient of Japanese maritime capacity-building assistance, agreeing to a USD 348.2 million loan from Japan’s International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to deliver six patrol vessels by 2025.

Strengthening strategic diversification

Vietnam and the Philippines’ active defence diplomacy are part of a wider trend of strategic diversification taking shape across Southeast Asia. Japan’s enhanced security role as well as the Biden administration’s efforts to shore up shaky alliances and defence commitments to allies like the Philippines have bolstered regional confidence in light of China’s provocative behaviour in the South China Sea.

Frustrated by the glacial pace of negotiations between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to conclude a code of conduct (COC) in the South China Sea, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam have recently begun talks of their own to settle overlapping maritime disputes. A COC would significantly enhance the three claimants’ bargaining position vis-à-vis China.

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has also signalled his willingness to work with extra-regional partners including members of the Quad. In August, the Philippines Navy held quadrilateral exercises with counterparts from the United States, Australia, and Japan.

The Philippines is not the only one expanding its network of defence partners in response to China’s increasing use of coercion to assert its maritime claims against smaller states. Last month Indonesia elevated its relationship with the United States to a comprehensive strategic partnership. Vietnam also upgraded its partnership with the United States to the comprehensive strategic level in September during a visit by President Biden to Hanoi.

The move followed an announcement the previous month that Vietnam would upgrade its partnership with Singapore to the same level, while Hanoi has also signalled its intention to do the same with Australia and Indonesia in recent months. The rapid expansion of Hanoi’s list of security partners showcases its foreign policy doctrine of “multilateralisation and diversification”.

More options in an uncertain future

Partnering with Japan and expanding security cooperation amongst other regional countries helps Southeast Asian states avoid the perception that they are siding with either the United States or China in escalating great power competition. Such diversification has given ASEAN states the wherewithal to conduct joint military exercises with China near disputed waters in the South China Sea, previously a thorny proposition.

For the last three decades since the end of the Cold War, Southeast Asian countries have been relatively comfortable operating on two separate planes: they looked to the United States to uphold regional security, essential to the free flow of commerce and ideas, even as they benefited from the economic opportunities afforded by hitching their wagons to China’s rise. However, given Beijing’s increasing willingness to use military heft and economic coercion to achieve its strategic goals, and in light of growing doubts about Washington’s long-term commitment to the region — in large part fuelled by concerns of a second Trump presidency — that simple division between security and economics has broken down. Washington’s current aversion to economic statecraft and Southeast Asia’s eagerness for trade deals as well as infrastructure investment needs further complicate the breakdown between the two planes.

This muddled picture also makes traditional hedging between the United States and China more difficult, as Southeast Asian countries find they have to make uncomfortable choices on issues ranging from supply chain security to 5G technology and reciprocal access agreements. Fortunately, the current multipolar order which prevails in Asia provides regional states with more options than narrow takes on US-China rivalry commonly suggest.

As a result, Southeast Asia’s future is unlikely to resemble its past or reflect the dilemmas that confronted the region throughout the unipolar era of the 1990s and 2000s at the height of US power. Rather, Southeast Asian states will continue to avoid difficult binary choices by hedging with a range of strategic partners, including Japan, and Australia, as well as one another. The latter may be the most consequential addition to the regional order. Though divided by competing interests and entrenched divisions over how to respond to internal crises like the ongoing conflict in Myanmar, Southeast Asia has more options today and as a result greater confidence to set the regional agenda and dictate terms to the great powers.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Hunter Marston is an Associate with 9DASHLINE, a PhD candidate at the Australian National University, and an Adjunct Research Fellow at La Trobe Asia. Image credit: Flickr/US Indo-Pacific Command.

NZ: Maori foreign policy to manage increasingly challenging relationship with China

NZ: Maori foreign policy to manage increasingly challenging relationship with China

WRITTEN BY BONNIE HOLSTER AND NICHOLAS ROSS SMITH

27 October 2023

In early 2021, Aotearoa New Zealand’s Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta introduced a kaupapa Maori (Maori collective vision) foreign policy based on tikanga Maori (Maori customary practices and behaviours) principles: manaakitanga (hospitality), whanaungatanga (kinship), mahi tahi or kotahitanga (unity), and kaitiakitanga (steward/guardianship, in terms of intergenerational wellbeing). While it was clear that the Pacific was the focal point of this new foreign policy concept, perhaps surprisingly, New Zealand’s relationship with China has also fallen under the Maori foreign policy umbrella.

For New Zealand, China is undoubtedly the most challenging relationship at the moment. The current geopolitical situation in the Indo-Pacific region, underpinned by the deteriorating Sino-American relationship, has led many to suggest that New Zealand’s existing China strategy is becoming less realistic. However, under the scope of a Maori foreign policy, it is argued that China will continue to be viewed as a partner with which New Zealand can maintain a constructive relationship.

The kaupapa Maori foreign policy framework and China

New Zealand has been cognisant of the challenges emerging in the Indo-Pacific. Its experimenting with a Maori foreign policy should be seen, in part, as an effort to solidify its long-held ‘independent foreign policy’ identity which has, albeit inconsistently, dominated New Zealand’s self-perceived international role since the 1980s. But, beyond geopolitics, while including tikanga Maori in its foreign policy framework may seem unorthodox and quite revolutionary, adopting a Maori values-based approach is a natural progression in New Zealand’s government policy development.

Beyond the changing language of New Zealand’s strategic communications, its experimentation with a kaupapa Maori foreign policy has the potential to be transformative.

Public policymaking in New Zealand has been making incremental shifts towards a policy informed by a te ao Maori (Maori worldview) lens for some time, albeit predominantly within its domestic settings. In the last two decades, policymakers have begun to consider the rights and interests of Maori in terms of New Zealand’s international treaty obligations. Promoting tikanga Maori at the highest diplomatic level is unprecedented, given this framework forms part of New Zealand’s overall foreign policy approach and is not confined simply to Maori.

While the Pacific is the clear focal point of New Zealand’s kaupapa Maori foreign policy, China too has (somewhat surprisingly) fallen under this umbrella. This is particularly intriguing because New Zealand has yet to use kaupapa Maori foreign policy with its oldest friends and allies from the Anglosphere, sticking to the more conventional approach that has characterised these relationships for more than 50 years.

New Zealand and China have had a blossoming relationship over the last two decades. New Zealand was the first developed country to sign a free trade agreement in 2008, as well as the first to recognise China as a market economy. Over time, China has become New Zealand’s most important trading partner, and despite issues emerging in relation to China’s treatment of the Uyghurs, the Hong Kong protests, and concerns around China’s growing assertiveness in the Pacific region, the Sino-New Zealand relationship is routinely characterised as a “mature” one. Recently, Xi Jinping even went as far as calling New Zealand a friend.

However, the increasing geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific are prompting the nations caught in the middle to re-evaluate their relationships with both the US and China, and New Zealand is no exception. New Zealand’s traditional Anglosphere partners, such as Australia and Canada, have opted to take stronger stances against China. In contrast, New Zealand has at times provided more measured responses to China’s actions or refrained from responding at all. As a result, New Zealand has come under significant pressure from its traditional partners, who have found New Zealand’s actions confusing at best.

Taniwha and the dragon allegory

One of the key aspects of New Zealand’s efforts to use a kaupapa Maori framework in its interactions with China can be seen in the strategic communicative language that has been pushed in recent years. Shortly after Mahuta announced her concept for how New Zealand could adopt a tikanga-based foreign policy, she introduced an indigenous allegory — the “Taniwha and the Dragon” — as a metaphorical depiction of the New Zealand-China relationship. Referring to the Taniwha as symbolising “a sense of guardianship for our people and our land and a strong belief in self”, she saw “the Taniwha and the Dragon as symbols of the strength of our particular customs, traditions and values, that aren’t always the same, but need to be maintained and respected”.

This is not the first time that this metaphor has been employed. Maori Affairs Minister Dr Pita Sharples also referred to the taniwha and the dragon, but this was only used to symbolise Maori-Chinese economic relations. Mahuta used the metaphor to characterise the relationship at a national level. Elevating this metaphor to the highest diplomatic level was an interesting development and a sign of the evolution of New Zealand’s foreign policy towards infusing te ao Maori principles more broadly.

Of the core tikanga originally emphasised by Mahuta, manaakitanga has become arguably the most emphasised tikanga with regard to China. Manaakitanga is regarded as a “core Maori value” that combines the root word mana (“power, prestige, authority”) with aki (“reciprocal action”). This principle has been used to try and solidify New Zealand’s relationship with China as one in which New Zealand remains hospitable and open to dialogue — emerging issues notwithstanding.

Tikanga Maori as a foreign policy tool

Beyond the changing language of New Zealand’s strategic communications, its experimentation with a kaupapa Maori foreign policy has the potential to be transformative. Te ao Maori has a significantly different ontological (concepts and theories of reality) and epistemological (concepts and theories of what can be known) base than the dominant Western-centric way of seeing the world. The most notable difference is that te ao Maori concepts of reality and knowledge are not anthropocentric (like Western concepts). Christine Winter uses the notion of ‘entanglements’ to describe the te ao Maori stance: “human with human, human with nonhuman, nonhuman with human, human and nonhuman with transcendent. It does not conceive of an individual sitting outside of the entanglement, nor somewhere along a continuum of individual to community”. Therefore, this is a highly relational view of things.

When considering foreign policymaking, such a relational stance does not see individual actors as the key building blocks of international relations. Rather, “actors-in-relations” are the key aspect. Relationships are the things that matter, which might explain why New Zealand has been keen to maintain its relationship with China despite the emerging challenges. This is unlike Australia, for instance, which has adopted a more conventional Western-centric approach, such as balancing China by moving closer to the United States.

More deeply adopting a relational approach guided by te ao Maori presents numerous possibilities for New Zealand. While it is so far mainly used to refer to New Zealand’s relations with China and the Pacific, this does not preclude using tikanga Maori to build relationships with other nations (such as manaakitanga). It could be strategically used to shape future engagements with the US and other states, particularly in any collaborative efforts under the Pacific Reset.

A look to the future

However, we have to acknowledge the difficulty that New Zealand faces in promoting what might be misconstrued as a middle-of-the-road foreign policy approach. The growing fragility of the geopolitical situation between China and the US may serve as an indication that the space within which New Zealand can retain its independent and/or Maori foreign policy stance is steadily diminishing. Further to this, it is too early to determine the extent to which this experimentation with a Maori foreign policy is to do with Mahuta’s position as foreign minister rather than being a more organic evolution brought about by the deepening role of te ao Maori in New Zealand’s governance and policymaking. The imminent change in government in New Zealand and concomitant appointment of a new foreign minister will be an obvious litmus test. But as incoming Prime Minister Christopher Luxon said in a recent election debate, “successive governments, and parties, had taken a bipartisan approach to foreign affairs”. To that end, while New Zealand’s embrace of a Maori foreign policy might become less overt under a National government, it is unlikely to be completely abandoned.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biographies

Bonnie Holster is a Master of International Trade Student at Te Herenga Waka - Victoria University of Wellington. She is of Maori descent and has ancestral/tribal connections with the iwi (tribes) of Ngati Tuwharetoa, Ngati Whakaue, and Ngati Rangiwewehi.

Dr Nicholas Ross Smith is a Senior Research Fellow at the University of Canterbury’s National Centre for Research on Europe. His main research areas include geopolitics in Eastern Europe, EU foreign policy, Russian foreign policy, democratisation, and geoeconomics in an emerging multipolar world. He is the current academic lead of the EU in the Indo-Pacific (EUIP) Jean Monnet Network. Image credit: Flickr/US Department of State.

Movement on climate mobilities: developments from the Pacific Islands Forum

Movement on

climate mobilities: Developments from the Pacific Islands Forum

WRITTEN BY LIAM MOORE

29 November 2023

As the 52nd Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) drew to a close in Rarotonga, Cook Islands, on 10 November, it was clear that climate change had again been one of the main points of discussion and contestation. What was especially significant about this meeting was the range of world-leading agreements that were reached on climate mobility issues — both within and bilaterally on the fringes of the forum. In particular, attention should be directed towards the Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility, as well as the Falepili Union treaty between Australia and Tuvalu. These agreements will have far-reaching implications for both domestic and regional politics in the Pacific — although the nature of the framework means it is up to states to ensure these ideas are adopted and implemented.

The PIF is an annual meeting of the leaders of Pacific states, for the purpose of developing collective responses to regional issues. This year’s meeting also offered these leaders an opportunity to collaborate and plan for the upcoming COP28 meeting that will be held in Dubai in December. In addition to Pacific state leaders, there was a strong international presence at the meeting, with the new head of the International Organisation for Migration, Amy Pope, attending alongside senior envoys from the United States, China, India, the United Kingdom, Germany, Singapore, Japan, and others. In total, 21 countries sent representatives as Forum Dialogue Partners (not including representatives from non-government organisations).

Movements in climate mobility

This year, climate-related issues and resolutions dominated the traditional Forum Communique. This included the leaders welcoming and endorsing the Implementation Plan for the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. The strategy has an entire section dedicated to climate change and disasters, including their effects on human mobility — including “relocation migration and displacement”. Other headline issues included the endorsement of the Declaration on the Establishment of the Pacific Resilience Facility, commitments to implement the Paris Agreement and transition away from fossil fuel usage, aspirations for a just and equitable transition to a fossil fuel-free Pacific, and calls for development partners to provide “substantially greater levels of climate finance, technology and capacity to accelerate decarbonisation in the Blue Pacific”.

While alarmist reports of massive numbers of people potentially fleeing across borders because of climate change are incorrect and misunderstand the dynamics of migration, mobility — both within and between states — is a reality in the Pacific.

One of the most significant developments was the endorsement of the Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility, a ‘global first’ agreement that “aims to provide practical guidance to governments planning for and managing climate mobility”. Jane McAdam, who was involved in drafting an early version of the framework, said the hope is that it will inspire the establishment of “other concrete mobility mechanisms to ensure Pacific peoples have dignified pathways to move when they wish, as well as support and assistance to remain in place when possible”.

While alarmist reports of massive numbers of people potentially fleeing across borders because of climate change are incorrect and misunderstand the dynamics of migration, mobility — both within and between states — is a reality in the Pacific. Thousands of people are displaced by hazards and disasters in the region every year. Fiji has conducted several planned state-led relocations already, and this all exists against the background of a long history of adaptive and cyclical mobility across the Pacific. The foreword of the framework reflects this reality, noting that, as irreversible changes are occurring in the region, Pacific states must now adopt “a proactive and planned approach to climate mobility”. This is what the framework sets out, “to guide Pacific Islands Forum governments, communities, non-state actors and partners in ensuring rights-based and people-centred movement in the context of climate change”.

Planned relocations are an area of particular interest in the framework and the region more broadly. Three Pacific states now have domestic policies that directly deal with climate-related planned relocations — Fiji, Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands. The framework reflects similar principles established in these policies and repeats that planned relocations will only be used as a “last resort” when all other alternatives have been exhausted.

A novel development, however, is that the framework calls for regional collaboration on cross-border relocations and for regional planned relocation guidelines to be developed in consultation with affected member states and communities. While historical relocations in other contexts have occurred across borders in the Pacific, climate-related relocations have generally been seen as domestic issues of internal displacement to be solved by domestic solutions. This framework raises the potential for Pacific states to cooperate to relocate displaced or vulnerable communities across state boundaries if required.

Linked to this, the discussion of cross-border displacement calls on states to “expand policies and practices concerning humanitarian admission and stay […] in the context of climate change and related hazards and disasters”. Part of this includes exploring opportunities for longer-term stays in host states. This further suggests that the future of humanitarian cross-border mobility for those affected by climate change lies not in refugee-style asylum protections but in other forms of complementary protection or valid migration pathways. While the number of people displaced across borders will be significantly less than the number of those who move within states, those who leave their states will still require solutions to be made available.

The shift towards pursuing alternative migration pathways is reflected in the section of the framework that focuses on people who stay in place. Within this section, leaders call for establishing migration pathways, as “enabling some of our people to move may allow others to stay at home”. This is mainly focused on working visas that help migrants to support their families and communities at home. Recently published research has found that, while labour mobility schemes have faced valid criticisms, they seem to have “brought net positive impacts”, and “are widely perceived as beneficial” in Pacific states.

In a move that surprised many observers, Australia announced a new special visa category as part of a bilateral Falepili Union treaty with Tuvalu on the sidelines of the PIF. This would allow 280 Tuvaluans per year to live, work, and study in Australia. While some have legitimately criticised the deal as an instrumental use of a small Pacific state to achieve geopolitical goals — in particular, attempting to counter growing Chinese influence in the region — it is important to note that this is something the leaders of Tuvalu had been requesting for some time. Requests concerning the issue had previously been sent to Australian officials in 2001 and 2006 but were denied at the time. This time, there are contrasting reports over whether Tuvalu or Australia initiated the agreement and there is evidence that communities were not consulted before the treaty was signed.

Despite these concerns and the clear issues of impinging on Tuvaluan sovereignty and agency — the degree of which has also been contested by Tuvaluan Prime Minister Kausea Natano and Finance Minister Seve Paeniu since the agreement was announced — the deal is still an important step in facilitating voluntary adaptive mobility options. On its own, it is not a solution, nor a justification to avoid Australia’s emission reduction responsibilities, but enabling more people to have a choice over what their future looks like is a positive development.

What this means for Pacific states and the region

The implications of the Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility and the Falepili Union treaty for Pacific states are twofold. At the first level, it encourages states to develop domestic-level policies to manage climate mobilities within their borders. Examples of these already exist in Fiji, Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands, so it is likely that other states will follow their lead and adopt similar policies. New Zealand is also in the process of developing a domestic-facing policy. Having a large regional actor like New Zealand follow suit will encourage other states to fulfil their commitments under the new framework and push forward on developing domestic-level policy on climate mobilities.

Regionally, however, the second implication and major outstanding concern is how to manage movement between countries better. Although other countries such as New Zealand and the United States have agreements with select Pacific states, these are broadly related to migration and residency and do not consider climate change issues directly. The issue with pathways like this and other existing labour mobility schemes is that they are often limited in scope, and those who reside outside these states are extremely limited in their mobility options. Therefore, the Falepili Union treaty is unique in that it is the first bilateral agreement to facilitate climate mobility.

The Tuvalu-Australia agreement is an example of how to develop more accessible migration pathways moving forward — despite concerns with the attached security conditions. Climate mobilities can best be managed when opportunities are created for people to make their own decisions about their communities’ futures. Most people in places like Tuvalu wish to stay on the islands and even those who move often reject the label of a ‘climate migrant’ or ‘climate refugee’. Those who do move do so as an adaptive process, in pursuit of increased opportunities for work or education. This suggests that future provisions for cross-border mobility should broadly reflect the structure of the Falepili treaty and include permanent migration options, as well as temporary and cyclical mobility options offering labour and education opportunities. However, facilitating mobility does not exempt states from increasing mitigation efforts. Adaptation and mitigation must exist in concert with each other, and migration as adaptation must not come at the cost of in-situ adaptation or mitigation efforts; nor should mobility pathways have to be traded for sovereignty or security deals.

The Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility and the Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union treaty are world-firsts in the development of climate mobility. However, they are only the required first steps. More domestic and regional agreements on climate mitigation, adaptation, and migration are required. Alongside the development of these policies, measures must be put in place to ensure they are effectively implemented in practice. The relative success of these measures will likely determine whether those faced with the prospect of moving will have a choice in what their mobility looks like and whether they will be able to find durable solutions.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Liam Moore has a Bachelor of Arts (Honours) and recently submitted his PhD in International Relations at the University of Wollongong, Australia. The dissertation examines how states in the Pacific are responding to issues of climate mobilities, displacement, and relocation in novel ways. Liam has a strong background in research on norm theory, climate change, and human mobility — particularly in the context of Pacific Island states. Image credit: Flickr/US Embassy.

Italy and the Indo-Pacific: towards an Italian Indo-Pacific strategy

Italy and the

Indo-Pacific: towards an Italian Indo-Pacific strategy

WRITTEN BY DR GABRIELE ABBONDANZA

9 November 2023

The Indo-Pacific has rapidly become the geopolitical and geoeconomic epicentre of the world. Home to approximately two-thirds of the global population, gross domestic product, and maritime trade, it also harbours some of the world’s most significant existing or potential flashpoints (Taiwan, East and South China Seas, and the Korean Peninsula), as well as three prominent choke points which are crucial for global maritime trade (the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Strait of Malacca).

It is, therefore, unsurprising that a growing number of states and institutions have gradually focused on this macro-region, chiefly comprising the US and its allies, and Indo-Pacific nations themselves. Europe joined this debate late, although it has attempted to make up for lost time over the past five years. A recent special issue with the International Political Science Review (IPSR) — the first of its kind — has shed light on this developing branch of European foreign policy. It showed that this common effort is driven not only by France, the UK, Germany, the EU, and other countries with formal policies but also by other significant players which do not have formal strategies yet, thus displaying an emerging European approach to the Indo-Pacific.

Italy, in particular, is a prominent example of an influential country with substantial relations with — and interests in — this region which has yet to produce an Indo-Pacific strategy. The first-ever academic research on this subject, as well as some notable developments such as a new Indo-Pacific committee within the Italian parliament and new naval deployments to this region, demonstrate that Rome is rapidly developing its approach to the Indo-Pacific through economic, strategic, and normative means, and it might delineate and publish an official Indo-Pacific strategy in the short- to mid-term.

Italy’s quiet pivot to the Indo-Pacific

Despite a quieter approach compared to France, the UK, and Germany, and notwithstanding common notions of its Mediterranean-focused foreign policy (especially in the so-called ‘Enlarged Mediterranean’, or Mediterraneo Allargato, which extends to the Indian Ocean), Italy has gradually pivoted to the Indo-Pacific over the past 15 years, and more decidedly so in the past five years.

All things considered, it seems evident that Italy is ready to develop and issue a formal Indo-Pacific strategy that considers national, European, and Indo-Pacific interests as vital components of a strategic whole.

In economic terms, a trade assessment with United Nations data shows that Rome has increased its exchanges with the region’s ten largest trading nations by about 16 per cent over the last 10 years. Even more remarkably, it has increased its defence procurement by almost 45 per cent in the same timeframe — chiefly thanks to the export of warships, aircraft, armoured vehicles, and sensors, according to SIPRI data.

From a strategic perspective, Italy has emphasised its active support of the rules-based order and international law more plainly than some European partners already possessing official Indo-Pacific strategies. For example, it deployed its Carabiniere frigate for an Indo-Pacific tour in 2017, it has joined and led several European and NATO missions in the Indian Ocean (the western Indo-Pacific) throughout the years, and it just ended the Indo-Pacific mission of its Morosini offshore patrol vessel (OPV), which also exercised freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and joined multilateral exercises with Indo-Pacific partners, among other examples. Moreover, the possible deployment of the Cavour carrier strike group in 2024 is currently under discussion.

Normatively and diplomatically, Rome has gradually stepped up its bilateral and regional relations over the past few years. Guided by key principles such as the primacy of international law, common prosperity, and multilateralism, it has concluded a noticeable number of development and strategic partnerships with key Indo-Pacific states and institutions.

In chronological order, these include China (in 2004, when Beijing was not yet openly challenging the international order), the Pacific Island Forum (PIF), Vietnam, South Korea, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), an Italian-Indian-Japanese trilateral, Japan (boosted by the Global Combat Air Programme), and India (with a specific leadership role within India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative).

Italy’s potential Indo-Pacific strategy

It is, therefore, clear that, despite the absence of a formal policy, Rome has increasingly engaged with the Indo-Pacific through high-level economic, security, and normative-diplomatic initiatives. After all, Italy remains the world’s eighth largest economy and the seventh largest manufacturing nation while retaining top-ten soft and hard power capabilities and membership to key international fora (the EU, G7, G20, NATO Quint, and many others). Additionally, its economy displays remarkable complementarity with many Indo-Pacific ones, which adds to the mutual benefits resulting from closer ties.

In light of this, Italy has finally started to engage in public discussions concerning an official strategy for the Indo-Pacific, which is necessary for three main reasons. First, such a document would encapsulate and streamline the country’s recent efforts, thus strengthening current and future endeavours. Second, it would signal its cooperative and multilateral approach to both allies and regional partners. And third, it would serve as a strategic compass for future governments, irrespective of their political affiliation or foreign policy priorities, thus cementing the country’s Indo-Pacific posture.

Additionally, the Italian parliament, specifically its Chamber of Deputies, recently formed a permanent Indo-Pacific committee. Conceived and chaired by The Hon. Paolo Formentini (Lega party), and supported by representatives of other political parties, such as The Hon. Lia Quartapelle Procopio (Democratic Party), its goal is to advise the parliament on the subject of a potential national strategy.

In the inaugural testimony of this parliamentary committee, I recommended the formulation of an Italian Indo-Pacific strategy based not only on the country’s national interests but also those of its European and North American allies and Indo-Pacific partners. In particular, I emphasised the importance of key concepts such as the primacy of international law, a multilateral and cooperative approach, the promotion of regional stability, respect for the region’s many and diverse viewpoints, ASEAN’s centrality, the tackling of shared challenges, and common prosperity, among others.

This parliamentary testimony also outlined a risk-benefit analysis, with the risks chiefly being the potential “strategic distraction” due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and rising instability in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) region, neither of which have managed to curb Rome’s Indo-Pacific engagement so far. Conversely, benefits are the tangible economic, strategic, and normative-diplomatic developments that, however, remain underdeveloped and would, therefore, benefit from a formal strategy protracted through time. The analysis concluded that the advantages of an Italian Indo-Pacific strategy outweigh the risks.

The parliament’s Indo-Pacific committee is currently in the process of inviting additional experts from various fields, who will all contribute to the production of a formal recommendation to be presented to the parliament in June 2024. During the coming months, other related initiatives will take place, including a public event hosted on 21 November 2023 by the Italian Senate, thanks to the institutional hospitality of Sen. Francesco Giacobbe, in which experts from other institutions will join me in further emphasising the importance of Italy’s relations with the Indo-Pacific.

All things considered, it seems evident that Italy is ready to develop and issue a formal Indo-Pacific strategy that considers national, European, and Indo-Pacific interests as vital components of a strategic whole. These interests stem from acknowledging that common challenges, shared goals, and untapped cooperation potential are impressive and keep growing. Moreover, the necessity of a formal strategy is warranted by the three points mentioned earlier.

Finally, and even though the time is ripe for such a strategy, it ought to be emphasised that whether Rome will finally issue an Italian strategy for the Indo-Pacific is not solely dependent on the formal advice of the Indo-Pacific committee, however important that is. It is also a matter of political expediency since the establishment of this policy is ultimately the government’s prerogative. As the Italian administration now faces significant domestic and international challenges, there cannot be any certainty in terms of timing. The premises are remarkably favourable, but only time will tell when Italy will embark on this crucial path like many of its allies and Indo-Pacific partners.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Dr Gabriele Abbondanza is an international relations expert at the University of Madrid (UCM, Spain), the University of Sydney (USYD, Australia), and the Italian Institute of International Affairs (IAI, Italy). Further information is available here. Image credit: Flickr/Ministero Difesa.

How the UK supports regional order in the Indo-Pacific

How the UK supports regional order in the Indo-Pacific

WRITTEN BY DR THOMAS WILKINS

30 November 2023

Besides France, the UK is the only European country with the necessary global reach to project power into the Indo-Pacific. While Paris makes great play of its Indian and Pacific Ocean overseas territories, affording it the status of a ‘resident power’, London emphasises its formidable array of partnerships and minilateral engagements within the region. While France promulgated a formal “Indo-Pacific Strategy” document in 2018, Britain has not followed suit; however, elements of an informal “Indo-Pacific strategy” are contained within the 2021 Integrated Review (IR) and the 2023 Integrated Review Refresh (IRR). France’s ability to leverage its Indo-Pacific Strategy in tandem with the 2021 EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific gives it a further advantage and greater prominence. From this vantage point, France’s role in the Indo-Pacific has attracted significant attention. Yet, despite its detachment from the EU, Britain is still well-equipped to make significant contributions to regional security and has both the resources and relationships to potentially make a difference.

Britain’s controversial and acrimonious departure from the EU in 2020 spurred efforts among policy-makers to redefine the role of the country, originally under the mantra of “Global Britain”. Given the residual ambition and ability to play a global role, attention quickly turned to the Indo-Pacific region as a stage on which the UK was determined to make a (re-)appearance. With the IR enunciating Britain’s official strategic outlook on the Indo-Pacific, British aims in the region are clearly defined. Succinctly, these boil down to three overlapping objectives. The first is to tap into the region’s economic potential to stimulate economic growth and prosperity at home. The second is to contribute towards maintaining security and strategic stability in a region fraught with geopolitical risk since any crisis there will have global repercussions. The third is to reinforce the concept of a “liberal international order” by underwriting the international law and norms and supporting democratic regimes in the region.

British levers of power

It is well understood that Britain is no longer the global superpower of yesteryear. However, it still retains significant national power resources and capabilities to exert influence in the Indo-Pacific. The strategic aims to be implemented are relatively well-aligned with the assets it has available, and London has no intent to reshape the balance of power, which will be decided by the most consequential local actors. Britain aims to apply a mix of its “hard” and “soft” power assets as part of an “integrated” approach that includes emphasis on national “resiliency”. With a GDP of USD 3.13 trillion and a defence budget of USD 68 billion, anchored in a strong Science and Technology base, the UK remains a major power. These power resources, however, are concentrated in northern Europe and therefore difficult to bring to bear in full further afield. Nevertheless, the Royal Navy has still demonstrated the ability to deploy a Carrier Strike Group in Indo-Pacific waters in 2021 and may do so again in the mid-future. In the interim, its standing presence is much more modest, with the local stationing of offshore patrol vessels, plus regular participation in multilateral military exercises. Britain is also a significant economic actor in the region, with many FTAs, considerable FDI inflow, and financial networks, and it disperses a substantial amount of Official Development Assistance. These national resources and capabilities, whilst not comparable to those available to countries like the US, China, Japan, and India, do afford it the ability to exercise some influence, and to be considered a valuable ‘over the horizon’ partner to regional states.

“Networks and grids”

British officials have repeatedly made clear that the country has no intention to play a fully independent role in the Indo-Pacific but rather engage with and support regional allies and partners. This is where what UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly calls “networks and grids” comes into service as one of the key props of London’s regional ambitions. Britain’s engagement with close allies and partners, plus its involvement in key minilateral and multilateral institutions in the region, potentially puts it ahead of France in terms of its overall regional impact.

Despite dangers closer to home and straitened finances, London does appear to be committed to the region, even if the implementation of some aspects of its new strategic approach remains patchy.

As a firm ally of the US, London is in general alignment with Washington’s aim to create a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ order that promotes international law and norms, free and fair trade, economic connectivity and prosperity, and counteracts coercive activities that undermine the status quo. Amongst its many close security partners, its bilateral strategic partnerships with Canberra, Tokyo, and Singapore stand out. The UK participates in the Australian-hosted TALISMAN SABRE military exercises and maintains a wide array of defence consultations and exchanges with Canberra. The UK-Japan Strategic Partnership, formed in 2020, has accelerated rapidly with multiple defence agreements and bilateral military exercises in place. Singapore hosts the British Defence Singapore Support Unit, as well as serving as a hub for British development finance.

What greatly enhances these bilateral connections is the UK’s membership of related “minilateral” institutions. In the case of Australia and the US, the Trilateral AUKUS Partnership destined to supply Australia and the UK with next-generation nuclear-powered submarines and related collaboration on Critical and Emerging Technologies is perhaps emblematic of Britain’s leveraging of regional partnerships. This is accompanied by the agreement to work on next-generation warplanes with Japan (and Italy) under the Global Combat Aircraft Programme. The UK also works with both countries and others through the development-focused minilateral Partnership for the Blue Pacific. The defence connection with Singapore and Australia is also manifest in the long-standing Five Power Defence Arrangements, along with New Zealand and Malaysia. These minilaterals draw together a range of strong bilateral relationships as well as magnify them. In addition to being a member of practically every global multilateral institution, including a UN Permanent Security Council and Five Eyes member, London has a place at the table as an ASEAN Dialogue Partner, the Pacific Islands Forum, and seeks accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement toward Transpacific Partnership.

Working against the grain of those in the EU who might seek to ostracise a Brexit-Britain, other European states, in recognition of the UK’s value as a partner in the Indo-Pacific, are keen to cooperate in achieving their own aims in the region. For example, Italy is also a member of the Global Combat Aircraft Programme and is currently forging its own “Indo-Pacific strategy”, and France is exploring the option of co-deploying Carrier Strike Groups in the future.

A sustainable approach?

As the Sunak government seeks to reposition itself in a more contested and volatile security landscape, it has undertaken to play a meaningful role in supporting regional order in the Indo-Pacific through a variety of means. Notwithstanding its obvious focus on the northern European security situation, where Russia is its primary ‘threat’, and ongoing economic constraints, Britain’s engagement is largely welcomed by both its regional partners and other European co-travellers including France, Germany, Italy, and the EU itself. The UK cannot shape the regional balance alone, but its contributions to a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ order are widely, if not universally (China), appreciated.

When Britain’s current economic woes are factored in, the challenge for the UK will be in materially delivering on its promise that the Indo-Pacific “Tilt” is indeed a “permanent” policy shift. Despite dangers closer to home and straitened finances, London does appear to be committed to the region, even if the implementation of some aspects of its new strategic approach remains patchy. To overcome limited attention and resource constraints Britain will have to seek out opportunities for collaboration with European and regional partners to capitalise on its much-touted “networks and grids”.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform. Nor do they represent the official positions of the institutions with which the author is affiliated.

Author biography

Dr Thomas Wilkins is an Associate Professor in International Security at the University of Sydney and a Visiting Scholar at the National Graduate Institute of Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo. He is affiliated as a Non-Resident Senior Fellow with the Pacific Forum, Australian Strategic Policy Institute and Japan Institute for International Affairs. He was previously a Visiting Fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Japan and received his Doctorate from the University of Birmingham, UK. His research interests include Alliances/alignments and regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific, Australian and Japanese security policy, and “Middle Power” theory. Image credit: Flickr/ Official US Navy.

Inconvenient truth — Young and unemployed in China

Inconvenient truth

— Young and unemployed in China

WRITTEN BY ANAND P. KRISHNAN

24 November 2023

Almost a year ago, urban protests — dubbed the ‘A4’ or ‘white paper’ protests — gave vent to people’s exasperations and compelled the Government of the People’s Republic of China to roll back the tough zero-COVID policy that had been in place for more than two years. However, China’s post-pandemic recovery has been anything but easy. Factors that have considerably slowed down the economy include lower consumer spending; an imbalance between consumption and investment; a slump in the real estate sector; troughs and crests in production; and stringent US restrictions on technology transfer to Chinese entities.

Regulatory crackdowns in the tech sector, which have affected investor confidence, have not helped matters either. Aside from debates on how long the slowdown will persist, there are other concerns for the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) to be worried about. Remarkably, these are equally valid for the country’s southern neighbour, India, whose government also has to grapple with these issues in its post-COVID recovery.

Demand versus supply — youth unemployment crisis

The chief of these concerns in China is the considerable rise in unemployment, more specifically, among youth aged between 16 and 24. Oscillating between 18-20 per cent over the last few years, including during the zero-COVID policy era, it has risen to 21 per cent in 2023. Even as speculation that the numbers were higher than the official figures was rife, China’s National Bureau of Statistics decided to stop publishing unemployment statistics citing the need for their ‘further enhancement and optimization’. Rather than acknowledge the inconvenient truth of the employment crisis as the first step in trying to resolve the crisis, the highly image-conscious Party-state’s response has been to shoot the messenger. It is also worth mentioning the small matter of Chinese leaders themselves having had trust issues with the country’s economic data in the past.

Clearly, unemployment captures the anxieties and disillusionment of youth on both sides of the Himalayan Gap. By the same count, there are no easy solutions for either government to manage, if not completely resolve, this crisis.

While millions graduate from the country’s universities every year (about 9.09 million in 2021, 10.76 million in 2022, and 11.58 million in 2023), there are not enough well-paying jobs to absorb them. Despite the Party-state’s avowed prioritisation of ‘employment first’, supply is outstripping demand with many graduates from elite universities being forced to abandon their career dreams in the big cities, and forced to turn to lower-paid work in more remote areas. The uncertainties emerging out of the Party-state’s regulatory crackdowns on the private sector last year also forced companies to announce massive layoffs, as well as the further lowering of their hiring quotas.

Additionally, the increasing number of Chinese graduates from foreign universities returning home and seeking employment further complicates the existing crisis. Students in education abroad are similarly anxious since jobs at home are no longer guaranteed. Improved university education within China — which increases the level of competition between students — in combination with employers gradually becoming less enamoured by foreign degrees form another concern that complicates the market.

The focus on graduates and their struggles in the job market, however, provides only a partial picture of this precarious situation. There are significant sections of youth between the age of 16-24 who — after nine years of compulsory education — do not get into the university system, or even into high school. Many either discontinue pursuing higher education altogether or enrol into technical/vocational education. These young people get into manufacturing or service sectors, becoming part of the blue-collar workforce — who are the backbone of China’s economic success story. A tight squeeze on their employment amplifies the crisis’ magnitude. The desperation for finding jobs is such that graduates are venturing into livestream sales and ride-hailing services, leading to overcapacity. Unsurprisingly, social media has been a space for the youth to vent their anxieties, in spite of the Party-state’s censorship measures.

Response of the (unenthusiastic) Party-state

The first step to solving any problem is to acknowledge its existence. However, going by the decision to stop publishing unemployment data, the Party-state is demonstrating that it is inclined to underplay the crisis. In fact, over the years, it has replaced the term unemployment with ‘waiting for employment’ in the official discourse — and more recently, has popularised the notion of flexible employment — to give a positive spin to the crisis and to ensure that no contradictions emerge in the popular narrative.

Given the structural basis for the economic downturn — within which unemployment forms a subset — resolving the crisis requires meaningful fiscal reforms. It warrants raising wages, increasing investments into social protection (pensions and medical insurance), higher welfare spending, and making efforts to create more jobs. However, differences within the CPC, such as competing interests of different interest groups and local officials, constrain policy solutions and fiscal reforms. Notwithstanding the rhetoric on ‘Common Prosperity’ over the last two years, Xi Jinping has maintained that welfarism breeds laziness and, therefore, is not advocating for redistributive interventions by the state. His New Deal outlines self-improvement and individual transformation through hard work and selfless dedication — in effect, ‘lifting oneself by the bootstraps’. Young Chinese citizens are therefore seen as merely human capital, required to power the country’s high-quality development.

Given the nature of the present crisis, disillusionment among Chinese youth, which heightened during the pandemic, is unlikely to abate. The hypercompetitive culture of overwork — encapsulated by the term, ‘involution’ (neijuan) — has faced pushback from young people, through the popularisation of ideas such as ‘Lying Flat’ (tang ping) and ‘Let it Rot’ (bai lan), signifying their passive resistance. Although Xi has been highly critical of ‘Lying Flat’, the CPC has yet to craft an effective response. This is largely because unlike other forms of protests which can be met with either concessions or repression, it is difficult to discipline and thwart this type of resistance.

A chord that connects China and India

China and India are two of the most populous countries in the world, with fast-growing economies and seeking to influence global politics. Despite differences in their political and social systems, there are interesting points of convergence between China and India — especially in the role of the state and the economic transition through pro-market reforms, in their interface with global phenomena like globalisation, or even in state-society relations. In this context, unemployment is a socio-economic challenge confronting the two countries.

In fact, unemployment remains the most pressing concern among 15-34 year olds in India. Recent data also suggests that the post-COVID unemployment rate among graduates under 25 years old is around 42 per cent, while it is around 21 per cent for those who have completed higher secondary school education. On top of these statistics, what further connects India and China for policymakers and the government is the tone-deaf valourisation of hard work and moral education on selfless dedication — especially by corporate leaders, like Jack Ma and Narayana Murthy. Such fixation with productivity while shearing off the social character of labour reinforces the neoliberal calculation that prioritises extraction of human value in return for material benefits.

Clearly, unemployment captures the anxieties and disillusionment of youth on both sides of the Himalayan Gap. By the same count, there are no easy solutions for either government to manage, if not completely resolve, this crisis.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Anand P. Krishnan is a Fellow at the Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar Institution of Eminence, Delhi National Capital Region, and a Visiting Associate Fellow at the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi. His research focuses on labour regimes in China and India, especially the convergences in them. Previously, he was a Visiting Faculty at the National Law School of India University, Bengaluru. He has also been a Non-Resident Fellow at the India China Institute, The New School for Social Research, New York City, and a Visiting Fellow, at the Harvard-Yenching Institute, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Image credit: Unsplash/Alan W.

Building a safe shared future for the People’s Republic of China

Building a safe shared future for the People’s Republic of China

WRITTEN BY DR SARI ARHO HAVRÉN

8 November 2023

Much has been written in recent years about China’s challenge to the existing global order and Xi’s vision for the world. But what exactly is this alternative that Beijing is offering? Back in 2013, Xi Jinping called for building a community with a shared future for mankind. This conceptual framework embodies the idea of a new international order that reflects the governing principles of the People’s Republic of China under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Now, a decade later, Beijing has formally released its proposal for a novel global order, titled Proposal of the People's Republic of China on the Reform and Development of Global Governance.

The conceptualisation of a new global order is not solely attributable to Xi Jinping but dates back to at least as early as 1997 when the leaders of China and Russia formalised their aspirations through the Joint Declaration on the Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order. This document, some twenty-six years ago, openly articulated the desire to change the existing global order, and — while not naming it directly — replace the role of the United States in it. It further delineated their shared strategy of gravitating towards the global south to facilitate this transformation, ultimately pursuing the strategic objectives of China and Russia, although their interests were not and are not entirely congruent. Recently, Xi Jinping’s ‘friend without limits’, Russian President Vladimir Putin, promoted this emerging new world order in October 2023 during his address at the Valdai think tank’s event in Sochi.

China has already made considerable progress in planting the seeds of an international order that would make the future safe for its one-party rule at home by insulating it from outside threats.

For the Chinese Communist Party, success in planting a global order that mirrors the goals and core interests of the Party is pivotal for three reasons. First, it will make the world safe for the one-party rule at home, immunising it against external influences or transnational movements, such as the spread of so-called ‘colour revolutions’, that might seek to challenge the prevailing political equilibrium. Second, it serves the Communist Party’s decades-old strategy to replace the US’ role in the global order and drive the US into isolation across the seas. Finally, establishing a ‘secure’ global order serves as an indispensable precursor to realising the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese state by 2049, positioning China as the preeminent global power.

China is not the torch bearer of the multipolar order

While some voices continue to counter the notion that Xi has a grand strategic plan for changing the global order, and others question China’s actual capacity to effectuate such a transformation, it is imperative to acknowledge that China has already made decisive and successful steps in pursuing its objective — and achieved considerable wins. The recent proposition concerning the novel global order states how the community with a shared future for mankind has “grown from an idea to action and a vision to reality” (emphasis added).

Beijing’s stepping stone to a ‘new era’ is multipolarity. Various countries and regional blocs aspiring to foster a multipolar world often confuse Beijing’s wording with that of their own strategic interests. Multipolarity serves as an aspirational architectural framework for actors confronting the challenges of diminishing global influence. This notably includes the European Union, Russia, Germany, and France, all of whom seek to revitalise their global standing. Concurrently, it is appealing for emerging powers like India, Brazil, and others who harbour ambitions of bolstering their own influence on the global stage.

All of them want to believe that a multipolar world is what China genuinely advocates, and that, with China’s weight, they stand to reap significant advantages from its realisation. During this period of protracted systemic instability, China adeptly leverages the principle of multipolarity to strategically allure ‘swing states’ under its clout. It offers a needed ideational base to attract the global south to its side by offering itself as a powerful counterbalancing force against the United States. In consonance with Xi Jinping’s guiding ideology, the Chinese government has been offering building blocks to establish this new order — which is sold as a multipolar one but is in essence advancing an order that primarily fosters the goals of the Chinese Communist Party.

As early as 2013, Xi Jinping linked the Belt and Road Initiative as a key pillar in propelling mankind toward a ‘shared future’. Since then, Xi in conjunction with the Party has introduced a series of supplementary components aimed at advancing the overarching objective of changing the global order. These components encompassed three distinct initiatives, namely those focused on global development, global security, and global civilisation. Collectively, these pillars and initiatives have been bundled together in Beijing’s official September 2023 proposal for a new global order. Prominent Chinese officials, including Fu Cong, the Chinese Ambassador to the European Union, have strongly encouraged others to study this proposal “to better understand the significance of the vision”.

China’s proposal for a new global order – So what?

China’s September blueprint does not shy away from stating that it provides a solution for common challenges. In reiterating the foundational pillars and principles of Xi Jinping’s paradigm for global governance, the proposal introduces novel nuances and concurrently solidifies Beijing’s position on some issues, most notably Russia’s war against Ukraine, which remains simply a crisis in Beijing’s books.

China’s perspective regarding the root cause of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine remains unchanged. This is reflected by its implicit alignment with Russia, arguing that the European security architecture does not accommodate the security concerns of all parties. The finger points once again towards the United States and a ‘Cold War mentality’ that is fed by ‘ganging up’ parties. In a similar vein, China’s approach towards the Palestinian issue reiterates its enduring commitment to a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders. Following the brutal Hamas attack on Israel, the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s official statement aligned meticulously with the position articulated in its proposal for global governance. Similar to 2021 — when Israel bombed Gaza and Beijing singled out Israel — in October 2023, China refrained from condemning Hamas’ actions but has called out those of Israel.

The recent proposal indicates a possible potential departure from its nuclear policy dating back to 1964 in one aspect. The nuclear policy explicitly outlines that China would neither be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances nor threaten to use them against non-nuclear-weapon states. While the principled stance against the use of nuclear weapons was reaffirmed as late as August 2023, it has been omitted from the new global governance proposal. This raises questions about whether China has indeed changed its nuclear posture along with abandoning its minimum deterrent strategy by increasing its count of nuclear weapons with unprecedented speed.

China’s severe domestic economic situation radiates into its aspiration to reform global governance. Beijing is working hard to enhance its international economic security and facilitate access to critical resources, including advanced technology, semiconductors, materials, and the preservation of supply chain resilience, all of which are of paramount significance to its economic viability. The major pillar for advancing its economic goals is encapsulated within the Global Development Initiative (GDI). Similarly, China has successfully advanced its goals in the United Nations by adopting a multifaceted approach encompassing personnel deployment, financial contributions, shaping the language of official documentation, and aligning votes. It is now building upon this success and proposing synergy between the GDI and the UN Development Agenda to achieve interconnected development. The prospective merging of the GDI into the UN’s agenda represents yet another strategic triumph in the promotion of China’s leadership within the global order operating under the auspices of the United Nations.

Unsurprisingly, the proposal ardently advocates free trade and promoting open scientific and technological domains, while concurrently taking a staunch stance against protectionism. Beijing also underscores the necessity of respecting the distinct development paths of different nations, implicitly suggesting that China should be allowed to build its own economic security system without being obstructed from accessing vital resources.

New frontiers – China’s vision for the future

An emerging realm in which Beijing is vying to take a leading role is technology governance. In the October 2023 Belt and Road Forum, China drew directly from its proposal blueprint and introduced another building block of its new global order, known as the Global AI Governance Initiative — a framework for regulating and managing Artificial Intelligence (AI). The proposal is as vague and ambivalent as China’s initiatives typically are, leaving space for Beijing to explore options, navigate, and exploit the evolving shifts that are taking place in international relations. Nonetheless, the Global AI Governance Initiative serves as a foundational platform for disseminating China’s preferred narratives and positioning them as the paradigmatic standard. This is done by asserting that AI technology should not be exploited for the purposes of manipulating public opinion, spreading disinformation, or intervening in other countries’ internal affairs. In addition, the Initiative underscores the importance of controllability, a concept which in the form of stringent censorship, could potentially place Beijing at a disadvantage in global competition in the absence of universally accepted global regulations that could level the playing field to China’s advantage.

The other new frontiers of global governance highlighted within China’s proposal are the deep sea, polar regions, outer space, cyberspace, and digital technology. Make no mistake, these are the areas Beijing has set its eyes on, and as forthcoming major conferences and big fora unfold, new global initiatives — pillars of China-led global order — will surely follow. China has already made considerable progress in planting the seeds of an international order that would make the future safe for its one-party rule at home by insulating it from outside threats. Simultaneously, however, it faces escalating resistance, particularly from Western democracies, which find themselves increasingly at odds with China’s global aspirations.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Dr Sari Arho Havrén is a RUSI Associate Fellow based in Brussels. She specialises in China’s foreign relations, China foresight, and great power competition. She is also a visiting scholar at the University of Helsinki. A certified futurist, she previously lived in mainland China and Hong Kong for 15 years, working in private and public sectors, including in Chinese organisations. Image credit: Wikimedia/Kremlin.

In Conversation with Vincent Brussee

13 November 2023

9DASHLINE recently had the pleasure of speaking with Vincent Brussee about his new book Social Credit: The Warring States of China’s Emerging Data Empire.

Drawing on a rich body of empirical evidence, the book offers one of the first comprehensive assessments of the People’s Republic of China’s infamous ‘Social Credit System’ — from its fragmented implementation to its implications for both human rights and the market order. Separating fact from fiction, the book is an invaluable resource for anyone interested in technology, governance, and surveillance in China and beyond.

It seems that China has become the country we all love to hate. However, you suggest that a lot of what we outsiders know about China is rife with misinformation. In this regard, you characterise the Social Credit System (SCS) as “maybe one of the most widely misunderstood phenomena of the 21st century”. Could you briefly explain what the SCS is, and why China is so misunderstood today?

VB: Even China’s government would not be able to tell you what the SCS is or is supposed to become. If you were to ask one hundred government officials these questions, half of them would not know and the other half would each tell you something completely different. This makes the system deeply messy and easy to misunderstand.

What most elements commonly lumped together under ‘social credit’ share is the goal to help enforce legal obligations — e.g., loan repayments, judicial verdicts, and regulations — in China’s market economy. Authorities do so by establishing basic data-sharing mechanisms across government units and punitive mechanisms (the infamous ‘blacklists’). Yet, this involves no elaborate scoring, and there is no mass evaluation of individual behaviour. Nor is it actually a ‘system’. It is more like a fragmented collection of databases as well as carrots and sticks that authorities can use as they see fit.

As I critique these misunderstandings, China is certainly not misunderstood in all domains. This is a narrative the Chinese Communist Party likes to propagate to essentially gaslight critics of its policies. We know very well how repressive surveillance can be in China. But not everything in China is about policing dissent. You cannot run a country of 1.4 billion people through repression alone — at least if you want the country to be more than merely a more populous version of North Korea.

This is essentially where the SCS narratives went wrong. A few analysts speculatively interpreted a tremendously broad and vague policy document from this limited perspective and conflated it with fringe and quirky experiments. This led to a snowball of ‘Chinese Whispers’, the game where a message is whispered from one person to another until the message becomes unrecognisably garbled along the way. Because it confirmed our biases of surveillance in China, no one stopped to question it — even otherwise renowned China experts. It undoubtedly did not help that no one in China really understood what was happening either.

You write that there is good reason to believe the Chinese leadership would not even be interested in a social credit score. How can we say this with such certainty?

VB: A score that aims to capture everything a person ever does into a single metric simply would not work. Imagine owning a restaurant subject to a simple score, measuring how well you pay your taxes and the hygiene in your restaurant. If you always pay your taxes perfectly but the kitchen’s hygiene is appalling, you might expect a middling aggregate — say, 500 out of 1,000 points. Such a score would tell neither the tax authorities nor the food inspector anything useful because neither factor is middling as the score suggests. In other words, by combining too many unrelated factors into one metric, you turn big data into dumb data.

This is not to imply that quantification of behaviour does not exist in China. Its police would certainly be interested in predictive algorithms to assess whether someone would start a protest. Some cities have started giving points for ‘civilised behaviour’ like donating blood that can be exchanged for small perks. And in every Chinese restaurant, you will find a letter-based grade that expresses its hygiene standards. The lesson, however, is that it is pointless to merge all of these together into one mega system.

Moreover, the risk of backlash might outweigh the gains in control a similar system might bring. During the pandemic, the ‘white-paper protests’ showed how arbitrary use of state power (i.e., large-scale forced quarantines) could yield more resistance, not less. Authorities already have a wide range of covert tools at their disposal to deal with acute threats to the state. So why would they bring the full suite of repressive tools down on everyone through a ‘social credit score’ when most of these people do not even pose a threat to the state? A ‘social credit score’ would suddenly make surveillance omnipresent in people’s lives, which in many cases only increases resistance rather than suppressing it.

Has the COVID-19 pandemic and its domestic management by the Chinese government further slowed down or revitalised the implementation of the SCS?

VB: The COVID-19 pandemic was something of a reset for the SCS. Around the turn of the decade, it became clear that many officials had abused the system. That is to say, they saw the SCS as a ‘super police’ that could address any problem they faced. Jaywalking, quarrelling with neighbours, or eating on the subway? “Just call it ‘untrustworthy conduct’ and add the culprits to a blacklist,” they seemed to think. Many officials seemed unconcerned with the proportionality and legality of these punishments, let alone their relationship with the concept of ‘credit’ more fundamentally. This is also how many myths emerged. Observers looked at these quirky local initiatives, sometimes mere ideas, and presented them as national policy.

These issues were brought to the limelight during the pandemic. Some cities threatened citizens who did not wear masks properly or failed to get tested with blacklisting. Other citizens were at risk of punishment because they could not repay their loans due to lockdowns. Everyone — including China’s government — suddenly seemed to realise something had to change, as the development was starting to threaten the legitimacy and efficacy of the system.

Therefore, authorities released a myriad of new policies during the pandemic to restrict the scope of ‘social credit’ — making sure officials could not punish citizens for anything but severe (and, in many cases, intentional) transgressions of legal obligations. These required dozens, if not hundreds, of local SCS initiatives to be amended or abolished altogether. This development cannot solely be attributed to the pandemic — similar concerns had existed before — but the pandemic certainly accelerated the official response.

You caution that there is a risk of framing practices in China as completely alien, even if they have deep roots in global practices. What do you mean by this, and what can we do to prevent this?

VB: Mainstream discussions of social credit seem to imply that something like that could never happen ‘here in the West’, positing China as some ‘exotic’ dystopia. Yet, we do not need to buy into conspiracies of a supposed World Economic Forum-sponsored “global social credit score” or engage in whataboutisms to whitewash surveillance in China to acknowledge the parallels between the SCS and Western practices.

Blacklists as we know them today are an American invention, and so are credit scores. One of the SCS’s founding figures was inspired by the screening of credit scores in the United States, lauding how “people with poor credit cannot get a job anymore”. The SCS has taken these ideas and expanded them massively, making them much more problematic, but the principles remain analogous.

Most of the issues we have seen in the context of the SCS are due to legal norms surrounding the use of blacklists remaining in their infancy — not because of some big bad AI. This allowed officials to abuse it, penalising citizens over negligible transgressions. Such challenges should not sound alien to us at all, as witnessed in the recent case of a Dutch tax fraud blacklist that wrongfully targeted tens of thousands of citizens.

In hyping up exotified threats like a ‘social credit score’, I am afraid that we might miss more immediate issues about government surveillance that do not involve scary scores or AI. We certainly need good regulation on AI. Still, I believe the solution should begin with safeguards that apply irrespective of the technological nature. Buzzwords will come and go, while transparency and accountability in complex systems are required everywhere.

You explain that the Chinese government is currently in the process of setting up a system called the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) credit risk classification — a top-down data-driven mechanism assessing the compliance risk a company poses to China’s market economy. What is the significance of this mechanism and what future implications does it hold for businesses in China?

VB: This new SCS initiative could significantly amplify compliance headaches for companies. It aims to quantify both the risk that a company breaks a law or regulation and the potential harm to society because of such a violation. In other words, a company producing food and medicine would be classified as higher risk than one producing classical music. A company with a spotless compliance record would be lower risk than one run by a 19-year-old with countless violations behind their name. For this, the SAMR not only aims to use ‘hard’ indicators such as past compliance records. It is also exploring how social media discussions of your company or the age of your CEO might be used as data.

Although it will not lead to automatic punishments, the consequences of a poor classification could still be serious. Every company in China, including foreign ones, will be subject to it. Poor classifications will lead to intensified inspections. Everything you aim to do as a company could be put under a microscope. At that point, things inspectors might have previously ignored could suddenly become subject to serious scrutiny. I suspect this is where the SCS is headed going forward, although things currently remain in the pilot stage.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Vincent Brussee is a PhD Candidate at Leiden University. In addition to writing extensively on the Social Credit System, his current research focuses on the application of data science to Chinese policy analysis. Previously, he was an Analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS).

Table of Contents

9DASHLINE: 22 Dec, 2023

All articles

In Brief: The team behind 9DASHLINE

Resurging monarchist sentiment in Nepal: Challenges to democratic redemption

Increased engagement with Taiwan needs less rhetoric and more (quiet) action

BRICS Plus: India’s perspective on the group’s expansion

Democratic resilience – Why Taiwan and Europe must be more ambitious in 2024

The Fukushima water release and South Korea: it's complicated

Australia-China relations: Where to now?

EU-China Summit: A relationship stuck in time

BIMSTEC revival: A compelling alternative to the BRI in the Bay of Bengal

Manila is shopping, not re-aligning

Southeast Asia’s security partnerships stronger and more diverse at the end of 2023

NZ: Maori foreign policy to manage increasingly challenging relationship with China

Movement on climate mobilities: developments from the Pacific Islands Forum

Italy and the Indo-Pacific: towards an Italian Indo-Pacific strategy

How the UK supports regional order in the Indo-Pacific

Inconvenient truth — Young and unemployed in China

Building a safe shared future for the People’s Republic of China

In Conversation with Vincent Brussee