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29 Dec, 2023

- Does Competing with the Chinese Communist Party Mean ‘Kicking It When It’s Down?’

- Historic Feats and Enduring Debates: U.S.-India Relations in 2023

- Women Bear the Brunt of Asia’s Climate Failures

- Asian Geopolitics in 2023: A Retrospective (Part 2)

Does Competing with the Chinese Communist Party Mean ‘Kicking It When It’s Down?’

No. It means American must reaffirm our commitment to investing in people, production, partnerships, and protection — and embrace our fundamental political tradition of self-examination and improvement.

Catherine Putz   29 Dec, 2023

–FILE–National flags of China and the United States U.S. are displayed in Ji’nan city, east China’s Shandong province, 14 June 2018.

The China-US trade dispute has not hurt air goods transport, a senior executive at the International Air Transport Association (IATA) said on Thursday (24 January 2019). “We have not seen any changes in the goods transport in the Sino-US aviation market yet,” Alexandre de Juniac, director general and CEO of IATA said at a media briefing on Thursday. He explained that goods such as aluminum and auto parts are transported by shipping not planes, and so far air cargo was stable. But he warned that trade protectionism could be a risk for the aviation market. In a report, IATA predicted that 2019 will be its 10th year of profit, but there will be a 3.7 percent annual increase in cargo in 2019, the slowest pace since 2016. This reflected the weak world trade environment impacted by increasing protectionism, the report said. A new airport in Daxing, south Beijing, is scheduled to open in September. He said that the Chinese government has set a good example in infrastructure construction. But he suggested that the slots in the new airport for all the airlines, no matter from home and overseas players, should be more transparent and flexible to meet demand. Also, how to fully manage the air space in the airports is also the question ahead for the Chinese aviation regulator.

It is a critical time in the United States’ competition with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Reports this month revealed that the population of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is decreasing at an accelerating rate, Moody’s warned it may downgrade the country’s credit rating, and Italy abruptly pulled out of its flagship Belt and Road Initiative. Some may ask, “is now the time to kick the PRC when it’s down?” My answer is no – that has never been what our relationship with China has been about. But this is the time to win our strategic competition by building up our democracy, our economy, and our partnerships across the world.

America has always had an affinity for China. The impact of American culture and ideas in China has been profound and the contributions of countless Chinese Americans have greatly enriched the United States. Our nations fought alongside each other in World War II, and we ensured China would have a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. But the CCP’s rise in 1949 disrupted our relationship, though optimism persisted for future cooperation – or so we thought.

In 2000, we extended full market access through Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status when then-President Bill Clinton, said, “If you believe in a future of greater openness and freedom for the people of China, you ought to be for this agreement.

We were wrong. On the diplomatic front, the CCP never intended to form genuine relationships with us. Instead, Xi Jinping explicitly directed the CCP to act as the “gravediggers of capitalism” and declared that “capitalism will … be destroyed.”

On the economy, we were wrong. The CCP claimed they would embrace “open, market-oriented policies,” but instead they engaged in the widespread theft of intellectual property worth billions of dollars, flooded our market with dumped goods, and caused the destruction of American businesses and jobs.

We were also wrong in our hopes for human rights in the PRC. Instead of fostering “greater openness and freedom” for the Chinese people, they constructed a surveillance state and suppressed Chinese dissidents, Uyghurs, Tibetans, and other minorities.

We must also acknowledge our misjudgment in national security. Contrary to expectations of peaceful integration into its neighborhood, the CCP has embarked on an extensive military buildup and currently threatens Taiwan, the Philippines, and the broader Indo-Pacific region.

In recognizing these mistakes and the resulting strategic competition that has emerged between the United States and the CCP, it is imperative that we take the steps necessary to show the superiority of democracy and free markets to the CCP’s expansionist techno-authoritarianism.

There are four things that America must do to advance our interests and win this competition through what I describe as the four Ps — people, production, partnerships, and protection.

First, if we want to outcompete the CCP, we need invest in people. That means renewing our commitments to education and job training, including K-12 STEM education. We must also repair our broken immigration system to secure and retain high-skilled workers while building on our competitive advantage in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics research.

Secondly, we must make sure America leads in production and manufacturing technologies here at home. The CCP aims to exert control over burgeoning technologies spanning clean energy, artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, and life-saving medicines. We must ensure that the United States, in collaboration with allies and partners, takes the lead in both innovating and manufacturing these technologies. This includes investing in basic research, but also implementing programs like CHIPS for America.

Third, our partnerships are essential. Our allies play an important role in countering the CCP through economic, technological and security collaboration and growth. The CCP’s diplomatic sabotage and disinformation cannot break the rules-based order if we strengthen our global partnerships and coalitions.

Finally, to win the race and revitalize America, we must protect our interests and safeguard our values. Americans are rightly concerned about the CCP’s hacking, IP theft, economic dumping, and human rights abuses. That’s why we need to aggressively use our trade tools to protect ourselves from the CCP’s unfair economic practices and abuses while ensuring that Americans are not investing in companies that are violating human rights and building up the PRC’s military.

As we mind those Ps, we also need to remember one Q: questioning. We must continue the American tradition of questioning our leaders, questioning our direction, questioning the fulfillment of our own ideals. Self-examination is not only fundamental to our differences with the CCP but also to winning our competition with it. As Alexis de Tocqueville wrote nearly 200 years ago, “the greatness of America lies not in being more enlightened than any other nation, but rather in her ability to repair her faults.”

Regardless of the weakened state of the PRC’s economy, the measure of our success will never be about keeping anyone down, but rather how many people we lift. By reaffirming our commitment to investing in people, production, partnerships, and protection while embracing our fundamental political tradition of self-examination, we can win our competition with the CCP while building a bridge to a brighter future for all.

Historic Feats and Enduring Debates: U.S.-India Relations in 2023

The groundwork laid through the engagements in 2023 should provide a solid foundation to build on in 2024 and beyond regardless of election results in both countries.

Catherine Putz   29 Dec, 2023

President Joe Biden greets India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi at a G7 Summit session on Food, Health, Development and Gender with G7 leaders and invited countries and partners, Saturday, May 20, 2023, at the Grand Prince Hotel in Hiroshima, Japan. (Official White House Photo by Adam Schultz)

2023 has been a banner year in the U.S.-India relationship. Two-leader level summits, ground-breaking agreements on defense co-production, a new technological partnership, and coordination on global challenges underscore the growing alignment between both sides in recent years and an investment in the long-term trajectory of the relationship. Yet, lingering debates over misaligned strategic expectations and values versus interests as the basis of ties continue to create friction and may be a test for the relationship as both countries head into elections in 2024.

The Highlights

The inauguration of the U.S.-India initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) in January set the tone for 2023, marked by substantial progress in the defense, diplomatic, economic, and technology domains. iCET discussions signaled a U.S. desire to finally open up avenues for sharing cutting-edge technology with India, a long-held desire in Delhi but one previously denied by Washington due to a broader policy of closely guarding such technologies and doubts about Indian commitment to the relationship. Driven by the need to create a network of capable allies and partners in the face of competition with China, the Biden administration has been laying the foundation for strategic technology collaboration with India, fostering innovation in space, cyber, biotechnology, advanced materials, and rare earth processing technology.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the United States in June 2023 further solidified this burgeoning partnership. Symbolic gestures, such as a joint congressional address by Modi and a state dinner hosted by President Joe Biden, underscored the increasing recognition of India as a top strategic and economic partner for Washington. Crucial agreements emerged, including Micron Technology’s substantial investment in a chip assembly and test plant in Gujarat, collaborative efforts on a joint space mission in 2024, and the launch of the India-U.S. Defense Acceleration Ecosystem (INDUS-X). Prominently, the memorandum of understanding between General Electric and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited to jointly produce fighter jet engines represented a pivotal moment, poised to propel India’s domestic fighter jet manufacturing capabilities. Giving India access to critical American technologies rarely shared with non-allies was also seen as an effort by the United States to allow Delhi to slowly move away from dependence on Russian military supplies.

The G-20 summit in New Delhi in September 2023 provided another opportunity for Modi and Biden to showcase solidarity multilaterally as well as assess the progress of bilateral initiatives. For instance, they co-hosted leaders to expedite investments in high-quality infrastructure projects and economic corridors through the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI). A key highlight was the announcement of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, with participation from key global players. However, the Israel-Hamas conflict which erupted in October has generated uncertainty regarding the corridor’s progress in the near future.

The India-U.S. 2+2 ministerial joint statement in November may not have introduced eye-popping deliverables as compared to the June summit, but the now routine nature of U.S.-India high-level cooperation is noteworthy. The clear throughline in many of the 2+2 announcements was the China challenge — the explicit linking of the Stryker armored vehicle co-production deal to enhancing Indian capability on the border with China is an example. This agreement signifies maturity in the U.S.-India co-production and co-development partnership since combat vehicle cooperation was first suggested by the U.S. under the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) in 2016, though that effort failed to reach fruition. Enhanced U.S.-India military interoperability, evidenced by new liaison officer positions and India’s full membership in the Combined Maritime Forces in Bahrain, further strengthens their strategic alignment.

The Divergences

While shared concern about the China threat is one of the biggest factors drawing the U.S. and India closer, divergences persist. Recent developments suggest a growing appetite in the Indian system for stronger signaling to China on Taiwan. However, Delhi’s not joining in on Quad statements calling out Chinese coercion of Taiwan or uncertainty about India supporting a U.S.-led coalition in a Taiwan contingency, even if limited to allowing its facilities for refueling and maintenance of U.S. warships headed to the conflict zone, still rankles U.S. decisionmakers and may cause frustration over time.

Additionally, as Washington and Delhi surge ahead with strategic collaboration, the question of how they will navigate India’s legacy partnership with Russia looms large. This question is especially relevant as the United States and India consider greater advanced weapons development in the context of India’s still substantial dependence on Russian arms and platforms despite diversification and U.S. concerns about inadvertent exposure of its technology to Russian eyes. While the Biden administration has been largely understanding of India’s neutral stance in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent endorsement of Modi’s policies as the main guarantor of Russia is likely to raise eyebrows in the U.S. Congress and create complications for Biden, especially ahead of the 2024 elections.

The recent filing of charges by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York implicating an Indian government official in an alleged assassination plot directed against Sikh separatist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, a U.S. citizen, has reintroduced the values versus interests debate in the U.S.-India relationship. Delhi has responded to the allegations by setting up an inquiry committee and Modi himself has promised an investigation into the matter, which showcases a proactive approach by Delhi to address Washington’s concerns.  Meanwhile, the Indian government has repeatedly raised alarm this year regarding vandalism of Indian missions in the United States by Sikh separatists.

Nevertheless, the allegation may lead to a reassessment of trust levels between the United States and India and color future diplomatic interactions if and when they occur. If not addressed adequately or if more such allegations emerge, this episode could impact U.S.-India intelligence-sharing and potentially influence how Washington perceives India’s ability to engage in reliable and consistent international cooperation. For now, however, strategic cooperation continues despite these allegations — Washington just announced a U.S.-India-ROK informal technology trilateral and sent one of its largest contingents to an Indian-government sponsored technology dialogue, suggesting both sides are clear-eyed and pragmatic about the China challenge.

A Bright Future Ahead?

As we gaze toward the future, the momentum in U.S.-India relations can be sustained through pragmatic approaches that institutionalize defense collaboration, prioritize economic and people-to-people integration, and address emerging challenges. China’s plans for strategic dominance are likely to persist, necessitating increased alignment between Washington and Delhi. This alignment on the China threat will act as a ballast, further propelling defense ties.

The groundwork laid through the engagements in 2023 should provide a solid foundation to build on in 2024 and beyond regardless of election results in both countries. However, this can occur if the two sides navigate short to medium-term challenges successfully. Washington will likely seek a speedy investigation into and an appropriate conclusion of the Pannun matter. On Delhi’s part, it will likely be watching the U.S.-China dialogue closely, which got some life on the sidelines of the APEC summit last month, and seek assurances from Washington that this will not fundamentally alter the trajectory of U.S.-China competition and U.S. commitment to bolstering allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.

A key ingredient that may help weather any storm in the relationship could be the Indian diaspora spread across the United States. With its talent, innovation, and cultural diversity, the diaspora’s continued efforts could serve as a bridge between the two nations, helping foster connections that extend beyond diplomatic corridors.

Women Bear the Brunt of Asia’s Climate Failures

What does the future hold for the millions of women left to work in Asia’s agriculture sector battling a climate in collapse?

Catherine Putz   29 Dec, 2023

Nuwara Eliya, Sri Lanka – December 8, 2011: Indian women pick in tea leaves with green fields on background. Selective focus on the front woman.

As the world digests the confused legacy of the COP28 summit in the United Arab Emirates, the realities of those on the frontlines of the climate crisis remain muted among the noise of the major polluters and the fossil fuel industry looking to sustain its dominance in global commerce.

Less publicized was the introduction of the Gender-Responsive Just Transitions & Climate Action Partnership as part of the conference’s Gender Equality Day. At the lavish conference hosted at the Dubai Exhibition Center, just 68 states endorsed the intrinsic link between gender equality and just transitions.

This is despite a U.N. Women report released during the conference that predicted that “by 2050, climate change may push up to 158 million more women and girls into poverty and see 236 million more face food insecurity.”

Women disproportionately face the impacts of the climate crisis. A recent UNFPA report cited that the 14 countries most impacted by climate breakdown are also where women and girls are more likely to die in childbirth, marry early, experience gender-based violence or become displaced and homeless by disaster.

The Gender-Responsive Just Transitions & Climate Action Partnership explicitly commits to working to drive gender-responsive just transitions to mitigate and adapt to this reality. Partners have committed to enhancing gender analysis of climate change finance, supporting the collection of sex-disaggregated data, and improving equal employment opportunities.

However, the realization of this vision remains obscured by persisting gender inequalities. According to the UNFAO‘s report on the status of women in agriculture, substantial efforts are yet to be undertaken to prioritize agricultural women’s opportunities, needs, and engagement in agriculture, especially for those in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs).

According to the Global Climate Risk Index 2021, a majority of the world’s most climate-impacted countries are low- and middle-income countries, whose economies are heavily dependent on agriculture and agrifood systems.

Climate change impacts due to extreme weather events and temperature fluctuations have profound impacts on global agricultural practices and crop yields, disrupting traditional growing seasons. Between 2008 and 2018, climate-induced disasters cost $49 billion in Asia alone from a decline in crop and livestock production.

Droughts, floods and heatwaves have become more frequent and intense, directly impeding crop growth, causing soil degradation and jeopardizing agrifood systems, including farming, trading, entrepreneurship, livestock production, water harvesting and irrigation.

Rural populations of South Asia and Southeast Asia, where women dominate the agricultural workforce, have borne the disproportionate impacts of climate shocks.

Climate Crisis, Livelihoods and Gender Disparities

Global agrifood systems play a more important role in the livelihoods of women than men in many agriculture-dependent countries, particularly for young women aged between 15 and 24. For example, in South Asia, 71 percent of women engage in the agrifood sector, compared to 47 percent of men.

In Sri Lanka, elderly women also rely on the agrifood sector when other avenues of income are closed to them. Despite their significant role and contribution, women often confront challenging working conditions and limited economic opportunities due to pervasive gender inequalities.

These inequities fail to recognize women’s roles in both skilled and unskilled labor, issues of land ownership and rights, restricted access to financial resources and the unequal distribution (often unpaid) of domestic care responsibilities.

The impact of climate-induced livelihood loss has also led to men abandoning the land, leaving women behind to grapple with traditional norms and legal frameworks that often discriminate against their access to crucial resources such as land, water, agricultural subsidies, insurance and credit.

These issues are compounded as women continue to face gender-based obstacles to recognition of their leadership, meaningful participation in livelihoods and decision-making processes in formal and informal governance structures, including natural resource management.

In response to the catastrophic climate impacts and ensuing livelihood loss, agricultural households try to cope financially by selling household assets and livestock to generate immediate income or borrow cash at high interest rates from local sources or community networks.

Farmers sometimes turn to multiple high-interest micro-loans for financial relief, resulting in over-indebtedness. Women also engage in unpaid work in exchange for food to feed their families.

Climate, Economic Insecurity and Health

There is a need to understand the gendered impacts of climate change and ensuing economic insecurity on health. Although climate-induced livelihood loss directly impacts everyone’s health, there are important gendered ways in which women’s health is affected.

Given their dependence on outdoor agricultural work, and accounting for physiological differences, heat-related health risks affect women more than men. This has been associated with an increase in pregnancy complications.

As climate impacts increase food scarcity and hunger, and with a lack of government-led food assistance programs, women often prioritize the needs of male family members (viewed as breadwinners), increasing rates of malnutrition and anemia.

Stress-induced livelihood loss also increases mental health issues, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and increasing suicide among male and women farmers.

The infrastructure damage, geographical barriers and poor financial assistance also create significant barriers for women to seek timely and essential healthcare services, including sexual and reproductive health. Women may delay or forego healthcare, resulting in pregnancy complications, miscarriages, unsafe abortions, poor contraceptive use, chronic disease mismanagement and domestic violence.

The economic strain exacerbated by climate disasters often compels agriculture-dependent households to resort to traditional practices such as bride prices and dowries. Studies have found that in countries such as Vietnam and India, economic pressure can force young girls into early marriages, resulting in school drop-outs, teenage pregnancies and increased gender-based violence and femicide.

Beyond Crop Failure: the Way Forward

Women are already at the forefront of just transitions, given their strong engagement in advocacy, social movements, agriculture and building green economies. Ironically the failure to fully recognize women’s leadership, including at the recent COP28, and their integral role in the agrifood sector, women often face systemic barriers that hinder their full participation in shaping sustainable, inclusive, and gender-just transitions.

To build upon the commitments of the Gender-Responsive Just Transitions & Climate Action Partnership, it is imperative to prioritize and recognize the pivotal role of agricultural women.

Women-led initiatives such as Women-Led Climate Resilient Farming (WCRF) models hold promise to reposition and promote women as farmers, leaders and agents of change to empower the health and well-being, food security, livelihoods and natural resources of farming communities.

There is also the pressing need for gender-responsive, gender-just and transformative policies and programs. Such initiatives could encompass needs-based insurance products designed to mitigate climate-related health impacts, along with cash-based assistance programs that have integrated healthcare deliverables.

These measures could specifically target the health and climate vulnerabilities of girls and women, mitigating the unintended consequences of current farming and agricultural practices.

Originally published under Creative Commons by 360info™.

Asian Geopolitics in 2023: A Retrospective (Part 2)

What were the trends, events, and developments in geopolitics that defined the Asia-Pacific in 2023?

Ankit Panda   29 Dec, 2023

South China Sea Southeast Asia

The Diplomat’s Asia Geopolitics podcast hosts Ankit Panda (@nktpnd) and Katie Putz (@LadyPutz) continue their retrospective on geopolitics in Asia in 2023.

Click the play button above to listen. If you’re an iOS or Mac user, you can also subscribe to The Diplomat’s Asia Geopolitics podcast on iTunes here; if you use Windows or Android, you can subscribe on Google Play here, or on Spotify here.

If you like the podcast and have suggestions for content, please leave a review and rating on iTunes and TuneIn. You can contact the host, Ankit Panda, here.

28 Dec, 2023

- India’s Opposition-free Parliament

- What Lies Ahead for Bangladesh

- The Implications of China-Serbia Relations for Kosovo

- Sino-Indian Border Infrastructure in the Indian Defense Ministry’s Year End Review

- Thailand’s Wage Battle: Economic Boost or Competitiveness Concern?

- US Coast Guard’s Role in the Blue Pacific on the Rise

- Why Australia Isn’t Sending a Ship to the Red Sea

India’s Opposition-free Parliament

The Narendra Modi administration suspended 146 opposition members of parliament for demanding answers from the government. Then it pushed through controversial legislation.

Sudha Ramachandran   28 Dec, 2023

Glimpses of the new Parliament Building, in New Delhi

India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government has formally rolled out the era of the “opposition-mukt” (opposition-free) parliament.

At the just-concluded winter session of parliament, 146 opposition MPs from both houses of parliament were suspended for demanding answers from the government.

This is the highest number of suspensions in India’s parliamentary history. About 20 percent of the strength of each house has been suspended. Incidentally, the BJP government used the situation to swiftly pass important legislation, including the three Criminal Law bills without facing any objection from the opposition benches. It also helped to reduce the government’s accountability to parliament with 264 questions raised by the suspended opposition MPs being deleted from the Question Hour in each house.

The Question Hour enables members of parliament to hold the government, i.e. the executive, accountable for its governance and functioning.

The winter session started with high drama in early December, when outspoken Trinamool Congress MP Mahua Moitra was expelled on the grounds of “ethical misconduct,” a charge that she alleged was fabricated for being a fierce critic of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his crony capitalist friend Gautam Adani. This galvanized the entire INDIA opposition bloc of MPs, including former Congress President Sonia Gandhi, to rally behind Moitra, hold a protest march at the statue of Mahatma Gandhi in parliament, and accuse the Modi government of “murdering democracy.”

On December 13, which marked the 22nd anniversary of the horrific attack on the Indian parliament building, there was a major security breach wherein two youths jumped into the chamber of the lower house from the public gallery and released yellow smoke canisters while raising anti-government slogans. They were accompanied by four other protestors outside the house.

Angry at the government’s attempts to downplay the incident, opposition members demanded a statement from Home Minister Amit Shah and the government to allay their concerns. With the government refusing to accede to their demand, non-BJP MPs resorted to protests and sloganeering. This led to adjournments in both houses. Between December 14 and 21, 100 MPs were suspended from the Lok Sabha (the lower house) and 46 from the Rajya Sabha (the upper house).

Reacting to the arbitrary suspensions, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) chief and Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.K. Stalin said: “Is crushing MPs’ freedom of expression the new norm in our Parliament?” Parliament must be a “forum for debate” and not for “silencing the Opposition,” he added.

The arbitrary manner in which the MPs were suspended is evident from the fact that DMK parliamentarian S.R. Parthiban was suspended although he was not present in the house. After he revealed that he was on sick leave, Parthiban’s suspension was revoked.

The incident underscores how far the Modi government is willing to go to silence opposing voices — both within and outside parliament.

The Modi government was quick to utilize the absence of the opposition members to ram through legislation. It included at the last moment legislations of its choice through the Supplementary Agenda. As a norm, each house’s list of business is stipulated in advance so that MPs can prepare themselves on the matter. Only critically important items are notified through the Supplementary Agenda, which is published after the day’s sitting has begun. So not only were newly introduced bills passed but several bills pending from previous sessions were also cleared by notifying it in the Supplementary Agenda. Opposition MPs are supposed to act as the checks and balances on the government, and they often insist on sending bills to Select Parliamentary Committees for detailed scrutiny. The bills that were passed in this session, were passed by voice vote with only MPs of the ruling BJP and its alliance partners present in the house.

Not a single bill was referred to any committee for scrutiny during the current session of parliament. It would not be inaccurate to state that India’s parliament has been reduced to a rubber stamp of the government.

The critical decision to replace the 160-year-old criminal law system of the country was taken in the absence of opposition parliamentarians.

Home Minister Shah hailed the three criminal law bills for replacing British colonial law with a “distinctly Indian imprint.” In a single day, parliament passed the Bharatiya Nyay Samhita replacing the Indian Penal Code, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita replacing the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Bharatiya Sakshya Sanhita replacing the Indian Evidence Act.

Several opposition MPs had critiqued the bills as being unconstitutional. Senior lawyer and MP Kapil Sibal slammed the government for bulldozing the bills and said this would “bring dictatorship.” For instance, terror-related offenses in India are governed by special anti–terror laws such as the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act UAPA. They have been included now as an offense under the new criminal law legislation and their definition has been critiqued for vagueness, prompting Sibal to raise apprehensions over the potential for violation of human rights.

With 303 MPs in the 543-member lower house, the BJP-led government enjoys a brute majority in parliament. This has further enabled the government to get its legislative business done seamlessly with minimal objections.

Incidentally, the government’s highhanded behavior vis-à-vis the opposition MPs has helped cement the INDIA bloc.

Following the state assembly elections last month, there was much bitterness amongst the opposition alliance members with even the future of the bloc being questioned. But when alliance partners were suspended and their voices muzzled in the winter session, it bonded them together more strongly.

At its fourth meeting which was held against the backdrop of these suspensions, the INDIA bloc’s 28 parties passed a resolution declaring the suspensions to be “undemocratic.” Congress President Mallikarjun Kharge lashed out at the “autocratic BJP” for its “suspend, throw out and bulldoze” tactic to destroy democracy.

Significantly, the winter session was the penultimate session of parliament, before the country votes in general elections next year. So it is not surprising that the Modi government was keen to push through its agenda before it faces the voters in 2024. With opposition MPs out of its path, it was able to bulldoze its agenda.

Ironically, when the Modi government inaugurated the new parliament building in May, amid much fanfare, it hailed it as the “temple of democracy.” A few months down the line, it is evident that parliament’s soul had long ago been sucked out.

What Lies Ahead for Bangladesh

There are fears that after the flawed election, the country will descend to totalitarian rule.

Sudha Ramachandran   28 Dec, 2023

Bangladesh Prime Minister and Awami League chief Sheikh Hasina, December 23, 2023.

X/Awami League

https://twitter.com/albd1971/status/1738612103483883834/photo/1

Dhaka University authorities canceled a discussion on recent changes in the national curriculum just hours before it was to take place on December 13 after reportedly receiving a call from a “special place.” The person in charge, a professor at the university, defended the move by saying that the panelists were suspected of discussing things that are “anti-government.” These “cannot be allowed” at the university, he said.

Those familiar with the idea of “thought policing” will find some uncanny similarities to the situation in Bangladesh. This disturbing trend of refusing to listen to any argument but the ones supportive of the regime, that too in the confines of academia, is one of the many symptoms seen in totalitarian regimes.

In a few weeks, Bangladesh will vote in deeply flawed elections. The ruling Awami League (AL) seems set to tighten its authoritarian grip over power in a lopsided election that is being boycotted by the main opposition, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Ahead of the election, there is a palpable fear of the AL taking to totalitarian rule in the months ahead.

Italian polymath, Umberto Eco, who grew up during the time of fascist dictator Mussolini, wrote an essay when he was 10 years old on why Italians should die for Mussolini’s glory and Italy’s immortal destiny. His answer was in the affirmative and he won the first prize in the competition.

This story takes us to Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, who argued that the key difference between autocracy and totalitarianism is that autocracy is defined by prohibitions, i.e., the understandings of what people must not do, whereas totalitarianism includes both prohibitions and imperatives or prescribed behavior i.e. the understandings of not just what they should not do, but also what they should do. So, in addition to the repression in authoritarian states, in totalitarian states, the mobilization of the masses to follow the state’s prescribed behaviors without question is crucial.

What does this conceptual distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes tell us about Bangladesh?

In Bangladesh, criticizing Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, even on social media, is often criminalized. Her father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh’s founding father, is considered the “eternal sovereign” and immune to criticism. A new law that replaced the draconian Digital Security Act provides for a 5-year jail sentence and $90,000 in fines for anyone who criticizes Hasina’s father or the regime’s version of the “spirit of the Liberation War.”

But beyond the repressive measures, there is an ongoing effort to mobilize a new society of submissive masses. Like the 10-year-old Umberto Eco, children of Bangladesh are obliged to participate in competitions — essays, drawings, recitations — on the life and contributions of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman each year, and the winners receive books about him as prizes.

It is mandatory for every school and college to organize these competitions and senior education officials must ensure that they happen. One such official order from the education ministry reads (Section 2.4): “The relevant authorities of the educational institutions will monitor whether the educational institutions are adopting the activities-programs and observing them accordingly.” Besides, in 2022, the government issued a gazette declaring “Joy Bangla” (Victory to Bangla), the ruling party’s political slogan, as the national slogan that students have to chant after the daily assemblies at educational institutions.

The Bangladeshi state is not only restricting dissenting voices but also prescribing behaviors for its people. Professor Arild Engelsen Ruud of the University of Oslo has explained the growth of a civil religion based on the cult of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who is considered a sacred entity. The slightest indication of defamation of his image can activate the entire state machinery against anyone who defames him. This serves the interest of the ruling party and is a part of a power game, according to Ruud.

So is the AL a totalitarian party, and if yes, what is its role? Political scientist C. W. Cassinelli’s analysis of totalitarian parties provides answers to both questions.

Cassinelli has argued that while a totalitarian regime’s primary goal is the maximization of power over as many aspects of the lives of as many people as possible, it does not necessarily need a party to do so as agencies of state can serve the purpose. Instead, the role of parties in totalitarian states is to create a facade for totalitarian leaders, who cannot be held accountable by any organization, obscuring the real structure of power and the mechanisms of the state agencies.

The case of Shamsuzzaman, a journalist with the Bengali language daily Prothom Alo, who was arrested for reporting about the high cost of living in Bangladesh in March 2023, is illustrative. The journalist was picked up by law enforcers at 4 a.m. on March 29 from his home after a leader of AL’s youth wing filed a case against him two hours earlier. He was produced at court after 30 hours.

Bangladesh’s Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal later justified the late-night action of police against the journalist within two hours of the filing of case claiming that police only followed legal procedures since a case was filed against the journalist. Subsequently, Prime Minister Hasina declared Prothom Alo the “enemy of the people” for reporting the high food inflation in the country.

And thus, while the state does what needs to be done, the party creates a facade for the regime.

It is widely accepted that Bangladesh is an “electoral autocracy” and has plunged into authoritarianism. The global civic space watchdog Civicus has downgraded the country’s rating to “closed.”

Meanwhile, recent developments in Bangladesh suggest that the state is holding the most vulnerable sections of society — elderly citizens, persons with disabilities, and marginalized communities — hostage, as AL leaders are repeatedly threatening to block their stipends if they do not vote for AL candidates. The fear that after the election Bangladesh might turn into a full-fledged totalitarian state is deepening.

The Implications of China-Serbia Relations for Kosovo

Pristina is clearly with the U.S. and EU, while Serbia has partnered with China and Russia to dispute the goal of fully recognized independence.

Catherine Putz   28 Dec, 2023

waving colorful flag of china and national flag of serbia. macro

When Kosovo declared independence in 2008, it marked the beginning of diplomatic efforts by Serbia to dispute Kosovo’s statehood, leading Belgrade to establish unexpected partnerships with countries around the globe.

Out of those efforts, and with the new agenda of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to extend its global outreach, came the partnership between Serbia and China. Today, 15 years after the separation from Serbia, Kosovo finds that its independence is still an object of interest – not only to the parties directly involved but also to great powers trying to fortify their positions on the question of territorial integrity and sovereignty.

The official position of Belgrade regarding Kosovo’s status, defined by United Nations Resolution 1244, is that Kosovo is not an independent country. The institutionalized process of dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina is led under the framework of the European Union and supported by the United States. However, Serbia has turned to partners in Moscow and Beijing to ensure that, if nothing else, Kosovo will not become a member of the United Nations, and that those partners will be ready to use their U.N. Security Council veto right to prevent that from happening.

With the Russian invasion of  Ukraine in February of 2022, having Russia as a partner has become more of a liability. Serbia, a country with EU membership candidate status, has not followed European countries and transatlantic partners in formally distancing itself from Russia. But, at least unofficially, Belgrade has turned to other partners in order to foster strategic interests, including the dispute over Kosovo’s independence.

Under these circumstances, the principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty have started playing a more significant role in the communications coming out of the meetings between Serbian and Chinese officials.

During the Third Belt and Road Forum in October 2023, Chinese President Xi Jinping said, after a meeting with Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, that Serbia was “an ironclad friend” of China. Xi also noted that “China firmly supports Serbia in safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity,” and stands ready to strengthen strategic synergy with Serbia and to translate “the traditional friendship between the two countries into more practical cooperation results.”

For Kosovo, the strength of the China-Serbia relationship is yet another obstacle to achieving full international recognition. The partnership between Serbia and China might not be at the top of the list of issues burdening the Kosovars, but it could have great relevance, especially for the aspirations of Kosovo to join the United Nations one day.

According to a former minister of foreign affairs of Kosovo, “the only way for Kosovo to impose itself successfully in Brussels or Berlin is as a solution, not as a problem.” Recently, however, the government in Pristina has increasingly been seen as a challenging partner by officials in Brussels and Washington.

A preference for Euro-Atlantic integration has played a significant role in the politics of Pristina. Pristina is clearly with the West, and the fact that Serbia has partnered with the East to dispute the goal of fully recognized independence has not lessened Kosovo’s dedication to European integration.

However, in recent years, Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic consensus has faced challenges due to the rise of populism. A former senior government official from Kosovo said, “Everyone likes the idea of membership in the EU, but no one cares about the obligations that come with the process. For example, Kosovo lost four years in the border demarcation with Montenegro.” On several occasions, representatives from both the U.S. government and the EU have publicly criticized the Kosovo government’s positions, citing a lack of coordination with the United States and European Union.

The stagnation of the process for normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, facilitated by the EU and supported by the U.S., has compounded challenges in the Western Balkans. According to Agon Maliqi, EU policy toward the region, often described as being on autopilot and characterized as “containment” for the past decade, has intensified these challenges.

Maliqi argued that the absence of a clear EU perspective has played a significant role in the escalation of ethnic border issues and heightened security concerns, particularly for NATO. From Kosovo’s perspective, an ineffective EU is welcomed by China, because this situation presents an opportunity for China to position itself as a more “capable and reliable” partner. Notably, in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there has been a discernible positive shift in the EU’s approach to the Western Balkans, particularly with regard to the enlargement perspective.

Cooperation between China and Kosovo remains almost non-existent. Technically, China has not recognized Kosovo as an independent country and has not involved it in the regional cooperation platform that gathers countries from Central and Eastern Europe. Although China keeps a representative office in Pristina, diplomatic relations have not developed. If it weren’t for Beijing’s relationship with Belgrade, China would not be a topic that most Kosovars think or care about.

However, even if Serbia had not developed such strong ties with China, Beijing’s position on the topic of territorial integrity would still be an issue. The de facto independent status of Taiwan and Beijing’s ambitions for unification are the main reasons that China sends such a strong message on territorial integrity and considers Serbia to be a partner facing similar problems.

Kosovo has understood that there is not much hope when it comes to cooperation with Beijing, so after some initial hesitance, cooperation slowly developed with Taipei. The Kosovo-Taiwan Friendship Group was proposed by the Kosovan Assembly’s Committee on Foreign Affairs and Diaspora following a proposal from members of the Assembly from the Self-Determination Movement. The inaugural meeting of this group was held in December 2021 online, with the participation of 39 legislators from Taiwan’s two major political parties. Blerta Deliu-Kodra, a member of Kosovo’s Assembly and also a member of the Kosovo-Taiwan Friendship Group, said that the establishment of the group is important for opening bilateral relations between Kosovo and Taiwan as two democracies.

The most important development in Kosovo-Taiwan Cooperation was the March 2023 visit by an eight-member delegation from the Kosovo Assembly to Taipei, led by former Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti,  which included a meeting with President Tsai Ing-wen. During this meeting, Hoti said that Kosovo fully understands Taiwan’s position, and that Taiwan should consider Kosovo a friend in the Balkans, adding that the country is ready to serve as a hub for Taiwan in the region.

The rationale behind Kosovo’s outreach to Taiwan becomes clearer in Hoti’s statement. By considering Taiwan a friend in the Balkans, he implies that this relationship is not solely symbolic but carries strategic significance. As Kosovo navigates its path on the global stage, the alliance with Taiwan emerges as a strategic move, contributing to its diplomatic diversification.

Kosovo’s position on China will continue to be defined by the relationship between Beijing and Belgrade, especially if the EU-facilitated normalization dialogue process does not produce any results and Serbia continues to dispute the country’s independence.  Only if Serbia’s position on Kosovo changes, and the normalization process produces results, might the Chinese position on Kosovo change.

This article was produced as part of the Spheres of Influence Uncovered project, implemented by n-ost, BIRN, Anhor, and JAM News, with financial support from the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).

Sino-Indian Border Infrastructure in the Indian Defense Ministry’s Year End Review

Given the state of bilateral relations between India and China, New Delhi is doubling down on its efforts regarding strategic border infrastructure.

Catherine Putz   28 Dec, 2023

https://depositphotos.com/photo/india-map-9111102.html

The Indian Ministry of Defense released its Year End Review 2023 a few days ago. The review provides a state of play on areas under its purview including defense production and exports, major defense acquisitions, border infrastructure, and individual service updates from the Indian army, navy and air force.

Much of what India is attempting to do in the defense realm has to do with China and its growing military prowess. However, a look at past year-end reviews demonstrates that it is not always so overt in doing so. In this regard, the Year End Review for 2020 was an exception, as there was a special emphasis on China’s aggressive behavior. The review came only a few months after the Galwan clash, in which India lost 20 soldiers, so this is maybe not so surprising. But since then, it appears that India has gone on to do a more general review that scans all the major developments concerning the Indian Ministry of Defense.

Even though there was no specific mention of China in this year’s review, the construction of border infrastructure along the India-China border is accelerating and there is a detailed appraisal of the current status in the review. This is important given that India and China are still locked in a conflict with a total of around 150,000 troops standing by on both sides of the border. Many commentators have suggested that it was the infrastructure race that led to the Chinese actions in 2020.

Upgraded infrastructure comes with enormous benefits, from better trade to commercial prospects. It’s also a critical enabler for applying military power. In the case of India and China, there has been an evident military imbalance as far as defense platforms, military units, and the physical infrastructure. China’s focus on building modern state-of-the-art infrastructure across the border and in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) has had an important bearing in terms of its ability to get troops to the border. The extensive road network in Tibet as well as the rail links that China has developed in these areas have facilitated troop mobilization by road and rail in a short time span. Further, China’s establishment of oil and logistic depots all along the border areas says a lot about the advanced infrastructure capabilities that China has put in place, which in turn put India at a significant disadvantage.

The Indian side continues to face limitations when it comes to troop mobility and logistics supply to forward areas because of the relatively poorer state of infrastructure on its side of the border. Infrastructure development on the Indian side has picked up pace in recent years, but the Indian military still faces many constraints. In October, in a study on the state of the Sino-Indian border infrastructure John Swartz provided a detailed account of the improvements to date. Swartz writes that “the increased number of tunnels and bridges also signals far more investment, operational capacity, and technical capability, while independently adding to the quality of the road system.” He added that as far as air forces are concerned, India has enjoyed topography-induced “strategic advantage” (which allows India to launch aircraft at full capacity) and therefore even with a smaller budget, India’s position is not badly placed. However, the rail connectivity in the border areas presents a rather bleak picture, with Swartz arguing that there exists “a large asymmetry.”

The 2023 review notes that the Indian Defense Minister dedicated a total of 118 infrastructure projects led by the Border Roads Organization (BRO), although this is across the country and not limited to Sino-Indian border areas alone. In September, the minister unveiled 90 projects across 11 states and union territories. Of the 90 projects, a large number of them belong to the Sino-Indian border areas including 36 in Arunachal Pradesh; 26 in Ladakh; 11 in Jammu & Kashmir; five in Mizoram; three in Himachal Pradesh; two each in Sikkim, Uttarakhand and West Bengal and one in Nagaland. Across different sectors along the Sino-Indian border, notable projects included the Nechiphu Tunnel in Arunachal Pradesh;  as well as two airfields, two helipads, 22 roads and 63 bridges. In January 2023, 28 infrastructure projects were kicked off at an event at Siyom Bridge on Along-Yingkiong road in Arunachal Pradesh. These projects included 22 bridges, including Siyom bridge; three roads and three other projects in seven border states or union territories of the Northern and North-Eastern regions, comprising of eight projects in Ladakh; five in Arunachal Pradesh; four in Jammu and Kashmir; three each in Sikkim, Punjab and Uttarakhand and two in Rajasthan. The review claimed that the BRO was able to complete these strategically vital projects in record time, most of them within a single working season using the best available technology.

As for the scale of work, the review stated that 601 kms of roads have been finished during the year. The review added that extensive work has been done “on India-China Border Roads and all other Op-Critical Roads along the Northern Borders.” This includes critical roads such as Nimu-Padam Darcha road, Gunji-Kutti-Jolingkong road, Balipara- Chardwar-Tawang road, TCC-Taksing road, TCC-Maza road that are proceeding at an accelerated pace. Some of the major road projects that are at varying stages of work, with some nearing completion in the coming months include: Raqni-Ustad-Pharkiyan Gali road and Srinagar-Baramulla-Uri road in Jammu and Kashmir; alternate connecting road to DBO road in Ladakh as well as the Chushul-Dungti-Fukche-Demchok road; and in Uttarakhand, the Gunii-Kutti-Jollingkong road, a road in the Ghatiabagarh-Lakhanpur-Lipulekh Pass, and Nyu Sobla-Tidang road. The government also set up three telemedicine nodes, including two in Ladakh and one in Mizoram this year. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Home Affairs has approved the construction of four roads, a total of 255 kms, in Arunachal Pradesh under Project Arunank.

As for tunnels, the BRO has undertaken work on 20 tunnels, 10 of which are under construction and 10 in the planning stage. The BRO will soon begin working on the 4.1 km Shinku La Tunnel on the Nimu-Padam-Darcha road in Ladakh, with aims to complete it by December 2025, according to Union Minister Anurag Thakur who detailed the Cabinet decision. When completed, this will be the highest tunnel in the world at an altitude of 15,855 ft, and will provide better connectivity irrespective of weather to the border areas around Ladakh. Another important tunnel project currently underway is the Sela tunnel on Balipara-Chariduar-Tawang Road in Arunachal Pradesh which involves two tunnels of twin tube configuration. The review notes that this can reduce the travel distance by more than 8 kms and bring down travel time by an hour, and most importantly it will establish all-weather connectivity to Tawang. This tunnel, when completed, will possibly break another record in terms of being the longest bi-lane highway tunnel in the world at an altitude of 13,800 feet. There is also the 260-meter Kandi Tunnel in Jammu and Kashmir, strengthening connectivity between Jammu and Poonch that was completed in October. Some of the key bridges in the border areas include a permanent bridge over the Shyok River in Ladakh which was completed in March. During the year, a total of 3,179 meters of bridges were developed.

All of this has been possible with better financial allocation and a sharper focus from the government following on from the increasingly adversarial nature of ties between India and China. According to the review, the BRO’s budget has come to “a record high of Rs 12,340 crore in FY 2022-23 with a 100% jump in the funds allocated under GS Capital Head over the preceding two years which now stands at Rs 5,000 crore.”

Given the state of bilateral relations between India and China, New Delhi is doubling down on its efforts regarding strategic border infrastructure. In fact, since the Galwan conflict began in the summer of 2020, infrastructure development has received a strategic push to get troops and military supplies positioned near border areas. India’s push comes in the wake of China’s two-decade-long push from the late 1980s to construct state-of-the-art infrastructure across Tibet and the Sino-Indian border areas. India’s defensive approach to infrastructure development changed only in the late 2000s after seeing China’s modern road and railway networks and what they meant in the context of the Sino-Indian border conflict.

Thailand’s Wage Battle: Economic Boost or Competitiveness Concern?

Deliberation over incremental increases to Thailand’s minimum wage underscores a delicate balance between the imperative for fair compensation and the necessity to preserve economic competitiveness.

Catherine Putz   28 Dec, 2023

close up of thai money

On December 26, 2023, the Thai Cabinet approved a 2.37 percent hike in the minimum wage, sparking a nuanced discussion about its economic implications and associated concerns regarding competitiveness. As Thailand navigates this contentious issue, a forward-looking strategy involves comprehensive long-term planning to adapt to evolving economic landscapes.

Beyond numerical figures, the debate centers on the imminent increase in the minimum wage. The decision to raise it in January, with the possibility of further increases in March, triggers discussions about the potential economic upswing versus reservations about competitiveness. This development occurs as the ruling Pheu Thai Party advocates for a substantial increase, pledging to elevate the daily minimum wage to 400 baht ($11.66). However, concerns arise over repercussions for specific sectors contending with borrowing costs and an economy lagging behind Thailand’s regional counterparts.

Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, who is also Thailand’s finance minister, is a key proponent of the wage adjustments, and has argued that the decision is a matter of conscience, emphasizing a perspective beyond legalities. Srettha’s stance reflects a nuanced understanding that wages involve a deeper engagement with the ethical dimensions of life, underscoring the complexity of the issue.

Srettha sheds light on ongoing considerations regarding the minimum wage increase. He has highlighted the need to establish a committee to assess wages on a provincial and occupational basis, ensuring fairness and alignment with economic realities. Over the past nine years, the minimum wage has only seen a 12 percent increase, leaving many feeling dissatisfied and financially constrained. Srettha’s acknowledgment of public sentiment reveals a government attuned to citizens’ concerns. Despite this, he underscored that the prime minister lacks the authority to pressure employers into raising the minimum wage, emphasizing the need for understanding, empathy, and dialogue in addressing wage matters.

While the recent cabinet approval marks a significant step in addressing labor force concerns with a modest increase in minimum wages, attention now turns to the ongoing efforts of the wage committee. Scheduled to reconvene on January 17, the committee aims to delve deeper into the issue, contemplating the establishment of a subcommittee tasked with considering rates of pay for various occupations. This move signifies a commitment to a more nuanced and comprehensive approach, acknowledging that different sectors may require distinct wage structures.

Notably, there are 17 minimum wage rates across the country, tailored to accommodate diverse cost-of-living and economic conditions in specific provinces. This decentralized approach recognizes varied economic landscapes within Thailand, emphasizing that a uniform solution may not be suitable for ensuring fair and sustainable wage policies. The recently adjusted minimum wages, spanning from 330 to 370 baht, represent a measured increase. Nevertheless, as certain sectors grapple with borrowing costs and the nation falls behind regional counterparts economically, concerns arise regarding the potential impact on Thailand’s overall competitiveness.

To better understand economic disparities and their impact on the minimum wage issue, it’s essential to examine specific regional economic data, including indicators like GDP growth, unemployment rates, and industry performance across provinces. Highlighting sector-specific challenges and their connection to varying borrowing costs provides concrete examples of disparities. Additionally, a comparative analysis with regional peers will offer valuable insights into how other countries manage minimum wage adjustments and navigate economic competitiveness.

Government spokesman Chai Wacharonke provided insights into the cabinet’s decision to increase the minimum wage, emphasizing that the approved minimal increase aligns with the recommendations of the wage committee. Despite the modest nature of the wage hike, Chai Wacharonke noted the labor minister’s proactive approach by announcing the intention to form a subcommittee. This subcommittee, which includes representatives from key economic sectors, is tasked with reassessing the minimum wages by the end of March. The passage underscores a forward-looking perspective, indicating the government’s commitment to ongoing dialogue and adjustment in recognition of the dynamic and evolving nature of economic conditions. This approach reflects a balanced strategy, acknowledging the need for continuous assessment and adaptation in wage-related decisions while considering the broader economic landscape.

However, the potential impact on Thailand’s economic competitiveness remains a significant concern. As some sectors grapple with rising borrowing costs and the nation lags behind regional peers, the wage issue takes on added significance. The concern is not merely about meeting the immediate needs of the workforce but ensuring that such measures do not inadvertently hamper the nation’s ability to compete on the global stage.

The tripartite wage committee’s involvement of representatives from the Commerce Ministry, the National Economic and Social Development Council, the Bank of Thailand, and the Ministry of Tourism and Sports in the subcommittee underscores a recognition of the interconnectedness of economic factors. This collaborative effort aims to strike a balance between addressing the legitimate concerns of the labor force and safeguarding the nation’s economic competitiveness.

Thailand’s economic landscape is marked by diverse sectors, each facing unique challenges. Some industries may indeed feel the pinch of increased labor costs, especially in the context of escalating borrowing costs and economic stagnation relative to regional peers. However, it is crucial to recognize that a well-compensated and satisfied workforce can contribute to increased productivity and consumer spending, potentially offsetting the immediate challenges faced by certain sectors.

In a nutshell, deliberation over incremental increases to Thailand’s minimum wage underscores a delicate balance between the imperative for fair compensation, ethical considerations, and the necessity to preserve economic competitiveness. The government’s decision to incrementally raise minimum wages reflects a commitment to addressing labor force concerns through ongoing dialogue and collaboration, exemplified by the formation of a subcommittee inclusive of key economic stakeholders. The diverse economic landscapes within Thailand, as evidenced by 17 tailored minimum wage rates, highlight the nuanced approach needed for sustainable wage policies. While the measured wage increase aims to satisfy public sentiment, concerns persist, particularly regarding the potential impact on certain sectors grappling with rising borrowing costs and the nation’s economic competitiveness vis-à-vis regional peers. This analysis emphasizes the need for continuous assessment and adaptation in wage-related decisions, recognizing the interconnectedness of economic factors and aiming for a balanced strategy that fosters both economic growth and social well-being.

US Coast Guard’s Role in the Blue Pacific on the Rise

The United States has reinforced its presence in Oceania through the permanent deployment of a new U.S. Coast Guard cutter to the region.

Catherine Putz   28 Dec, 2023

Coast Guard Cutter Harriet Lane arrived at its new home port at Joint Base Pearl Harbor Hickam in Honolulu, Dec. 13, 2023. Harriet Lane, commissioned in 1984, is a 270-foot medium endurance cutter now homeported in Honolulu to support Coast Guard missions in the Pacific region. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Ryan Fisher)

USCGC Harriet Lane (WMEC-903) arrived at its new homeport at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam in Hawai’i on December 13 following a 36-day transit from the U.S. East Coast. The medium endurance cutter, which entered service nearly 40 years ago, recently completed a 15-month life extension program in Maryland.

According to the Coast Guard, while Harriet Lane will engage with a range of “Indo-Pacific partners,” it will particularly focus on engaging with the states of Oceania. Earlier this year Vice Admiral Andrew Tiongson, commander of the Coast Guard in the Pacific, told USNI News that he wanted the cutter to be “aligned with what’s happening in the Blue Pacific” and that its operations should “start” there.

The Coast Guard has taken on a prominent role in the region as part of the U.S. response to strategic competition with the People’s Republic of China. Unlike other U.S. commitments to the region, which have fallen victim to political deadlock in Washington, the Coast Guard has been able to respond relatively rapidly to the evolving strategic landscape.

In 2021, the Coast Guard commissioned three new fast response cutters in Guam. The 46m (154 ft) cutters, which replaced three older 34m (110 ft) Island-class patrol boats, have quickly proven their worth with long-duration deployments in the region. In recognition of the enhanced “expeditionary” capabilities offered by the new cutters, the Coast Guard renamed its Guam outpost U.S. Coast Guard Forces Micronesia/Sector Guam in early 2021.

While fast response cutters are designed to operate within 200 nautical miles (370 kilometers) of their homeport for no more than five days, U.S Coast Guard Forces Micronesia/Sector Guam has regularly pushed them beyond that, with one vessel undertaking a record-breaking 43-day, 8,000nm patrol in 2022.

The Coast Guard has also deployed seagoing buoy tenders, fast response, and national security cutters based in Hawai’i to the region. While endurance isn’t an issue for the national security cutters, they’ve only been able to make irregular deployments to the region, largely due to demand for them in and around Asia.

This has resulted in most U.S. patrols in the region being undertaken by the Coast Guard’s fast response cutters as well as seagoing buoy tenders. Due to the relatively short endurance of these types, long-duration patrols are only possible with the support of regional countries that elect to provide refueling and resupply services. When that support isn’t available, either due to geography or countries denying access to the Coast Guard, it can limit the Coast Guard’s ability to operate in the region.

In comparison, Harriet Lane and its Famous-class sister ships are capable of performing long-duration independent deployments at ranges over 3,800 nautical miles (~7000 kilometers) for more than two months. Harriet Lane is also equipped with a flight deck and hangar, which allows it to embark either an MH-60J or an MH-65 helicopter, if the Coast Guard has the aircraft available. This is a vital capability for Pacific deployments, as many regional governments lack specialty rotary-wing capabilities.

An MH-65 Dolphin Helicopter rests on the deck of the Coast Guard Cutter Harriet Lane during a 71-day patrol in 2021 when the cutter was homeported in Portsmouth, Va. Credit: U.S. Coast Guard.

The cutter’s size also has other benefits. With a crew of around 100 people, it has more hands available to perform the manual labor associated with humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HADR) tasks.

While the deployment of Harriet Lane is a welcome addition to the U.S. Coast Guard presence in the Pacific, it’s far from a decisive one. While the cutter recently completed a life extension program, it’s still more than 30 years old, and the Congressional Research Service (CRS) has previously found that “habitability concerns” are a “fact of life” aboard ships of the class. This reflects a broader challenge facing the Coast Guard which, in the face of budget cuts and lackluster recruiting numbers, has been forced to cannibalize cutters to maintain critical capabilities. While these cuts have not yet impacted the service’s regional mission in the Pacific, it remains a distinct possibility going forward.

Why Australia Isn’t Sending a Ship to the Red Sea

In rejecting a request to send a vessel to join Operation Prosperity Guardian, a U.S.-led military operation, Canberra has made a calculation that its focus needs to be closer to home.

Catherine Putz   28 Dec, 2023

(L-r) HMAS Toowoomba sailors Petty Officer Electronic Warfare Peter Sutton and Able Seaman Combat Systems Operator Finn Jackson wave goodbye to the Philippine Navy ship BRP Gregorio del Pilar on completion of the inaugural Maritime Cooperative Activity during a regional presence deployment. *** Local Caption *** The Maritime Cooperative Activity in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Philippines, from 25-27 November 2023, included Philippine Navy vessels BRP Gregorio del Pilar and BRP Davao Del Sur, Royal Australian Navy frigate HMAS Toowoomba, five Philippine Air Force aircraft, and a Royal Australian Air Force P-8A maritime surveillance aircraft.

The Maritime Cooperative Activity demonstrated a shared commitment to regional security and defence partnerships, delivered on a key commitment made by leaders when they announced the elevation of our relationship to a Strategic Partnership in September 2023; and underlined both countries commitment to exercising freedom of navigation and overflight consistent with international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Australia takes its international responsibilities seriously, yet as a middle power, it is limited in its resources to contribute to every aspect of insecurity. It needs to make choices based on its own interests and where it can be most helpful. This is the calculation the Australian government has made in refusing a request to send vessels to join Operation Prosperity Guardian – the mission to prevent further attacks by Houthi militia in Yemen on shipping lanes in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

It doesn’t help that insecurity is on the rise. The Houthi attacks are symbolic of a more chaotic world emerging. Instead of major shocks to the international system, a series of smaller system failures are occurring. These compound and eat away at previously reliable structures. For Australia, this means making often difficult choices about what issues are of greatest importance.

Australia’s Defence Strategic Review released earlier this year reaffirmed that the northeast Indian Ocean was considered part of Australia’s “immediate region,” which may be where Australia has decided to focus its attention. The country’s participation in the invasion of Iraq two decades ago may have chastened Canberra to be wary of straying too far from home.

Yet when it comes to threats to trade, there are different calculations that need to be made. Rather than being divided up into sectors, the Indian Ocean and its connecting waterways should be understood as a single strategic zone. One that transports a number of goods vital to Australia’s normal functioning, in particular oil. While over half of Australia’s oil imports are refined in Singapore, a large percentage of this oil is sourced from the Middle East.

In rejecting the request to join Operation Prosperity Guardian, Canberra has made the calculation that its focus needs to be on China’s changing of conditions in the South China Sea. This may seem like a rational calculation to make. This is clearly Canberra’s most pressing concern, and there are enough other countries invested in the attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden to provide the hardware necessary to address the problem. Australia’s contribution would be welcome, but not a decisive factor.

Yet another way of understanding this is not just through what hardware can achieve which objectives, but what efforts can deter further attempts at disrupting rules and norms. If we have entered into a period of persistent challenges to good order, how can such a period be overcome? And what are the necessary actions a country like Australia needs to take to help reestablish greater order?

It may seem like Australia should have sent a vessel to participate in Operation Prosperity Guardian to signal its intent and demonstrate its understanding that the system as a whole is under stress, as each point of attack weakens the structure overall. But this effort is a more nebulous approach, and may not factor in the full calculations Canberra is making in regard to what it sees as the most substantial threats to global order.

Yet even this may not be so simple. If China is Australia’s primary concern then for Canberra understanding how Beijing interprets its actions is critical. Does China see a multi-national force in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden as evidence that countries are willing to work together to defend rules and norms and this will lead to Beijing thinking twice about further breaking of the rules? Or does it see Australia’s decision to contain its resources to its own region as a sign that Australia is serious about preventing further rule-breaking in the South China Sea?

It could be either. Ideally, Australia would have the resources to commit to both, but a decision has been made that it doesn’t. This would no doubt have been a difficult decision to make, especially given Australia’s critical partnership with the United States, which is leading Operation Prosperity Guardian. But with limited resources, there are always going to be trade-offs and this is clearly an issue where Canberra feels too spread thin.

The hope for Australia will be that the attacks on container ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden can be subdued quickly through the responses of those that have dedicated assets to the region. The longer these incidents persist the more other forces bent on destabilization will feel emboldened to challenge rules and norms, whether there be non-state or state actors. If not, an age of instability may lead to much more difficult trade-offs being made in Canberra.

27 Dec, 2023

- Enthusiasm Marks Filing of Nominations for Elections in Pakistan

- Why Early Retirement of Coal Power is Faltering in Southeast Asia

- India’s Space Program in 2023: Taking Stock

- The Delimitation of Pakistan’s Democracy

Enthusiasm Marks Filing of Nominations for Elections in Pakistan

The number of people who have applied to contest the upcoming elections has increased by 33 percent over that in the 2018 election.

Sudha Ramachandran   27 Dec, 2023

Pakistan People’s Party leaders wave at supporters at an election rally, December 12, 2023.

X/Bilawal Bhutto Zardari

https://twitter.com/BBhuttoZardari/status/1734624364887498902/photo/1

After months of uncertainty over whether and when elections will be held, Pakistan’s political scene is buzzing with excitement. The country will vote on February 8 in elections to the National Assembly and four provincial legislatures.

Last week, the process took a significant step forward when political parties and politicians rushed to file their nomination papers.

The Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) has begun scrutinizing approximately 28,000 candidates, who have filed their papers to contest the upcoming elections. This is a 33 percent increase over the 21,425 candidates who applied to contest the 2018 polls.

With over 7,000 male and 500 female candidates submitting papers for National Assembly seats, it is evident that the gender balance remains heavily skewed in favor of men.

A staggering 17,000 nominations have been filed for seats in the provincial assemblies of Punjab, Sind, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Nearly 1,500 nomination papers have been received by the ECP for seats reserved for women and non-Muslims in parliament.

Around 400 non-Muslims have submitted their nomination papers to contest in the provincial assembly elections. Of the reserved seats for minorities in the provincial assemblies, 361 men and 32 women have submitted their papers. Similarly, for the National Assembly, the numbers stand at 140 men and 10 women respectively.

Several former premiers are contesting from multiple constituencies in the National Assembly election. Former Prime Minister and founder of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) Imran Khan has submitted nomination papers from Mianwali, Lahore and Islamabad constituencies, while Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and a three-time prime minister, is seeking re-election from Lahore and Mansehra. Similarly, former Foreign Minister and head of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) Bilawal Bhutto Zardari is running from constituencies in Larkana and Lahore. Outgoing Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif is running for a seat in the national parliament from Punjab’s capital, Lahore.

The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), which has previously claimed unfair treatment at the hands of the ECP has shown enthusiasm for participation in the elections. It has filed the maximum number of candidates. This unexpected turn of events signals that parties are keen to participate in the democratic process.

Despite speculation and rumors about potential delays, both the caretaker government and the ECP have reiterated their commitment to conducting elections on time. The ECP also appears to be making efforts to ensure that the electoral process has a semblance of credibility. Recent reports suggest that the ECP is going to be very tough in its scrutiny of nomination papers, taking steps to maintain transparency and fairness in the upcoming elections.

To strengthen its efforts, the ECP has set up a special center to coordinate with various government bodies, including the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), National Accountability Bureau (NAB), State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), and National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA). This collaboration aims to determine the eligibility of candidates by thoroughly examining their financial records, criminal history, and other relevant information.

It is anticipated that due to this rigorous scrutiny process, hundreds of aspirants might fail to meet the criteria set by the ECP and consequently be disqualified from contesting in the elections. While this could dash the aspirations of several candidates, the ECP appears committed to allowing only eligible individuals to run for office.

To maintain transparency, it has even gone as far as ordering the removal of key officials such as the Inspector General Islamabad and the Deputy Commissioner Islamabad due to their alleged connections with certain political leaders. Moreover, the ECP has also taken notice of complaints raised by political parties such as PTI regarding the alleged lack of a “level playing field” and ordered an inquiry into suspected irregularities.

The upcoming elections in Pakistan hold immense significance as they have the potential to shape the future of the country. Key institutions, including the military, recognize the importance of having an elected government in office for effective engagement with the world, particularly regarding financial matters. Stability is crucial for Pakistan at this critical juncture, and these elections have the potential to offer a pathway towards achieving it. However, it is essential that the electoral process unfolds smoothly and without any controversies. This includes ensuring that all parties involved feel included and not sidelined.

By ensuring a fair and inclusive electoral process, Pakistan can pave the way for a transparent and accountable government that represents the aspirations of its people. It is through such democratic processes that the nation can forge ahead with regard to development. Pakistan has had a difficult few years in terms of maintaining political stability in the face of an unstable economy. The last thing Pakistan needs is for the elections to spark yet another wave of unrest.

Why Early Retirement of Coal Power is Faltering in Southeast Asia

If the goal is to reduce emissions by shutting coal plants down early without breaking contracts, then someone needs to pay.

Catherine Putz   27 Dec, 2023

Coal plant Indonesia

For the last several years, clean energy transitions have often positioned early retirement of coal-fired power plants as part of larger decarbonization efforts. Coal power plants operate for decades; so if they can be shut them before the end of their anticipated economic lives it will reduce emissions while clearing out space for more investment in renewable energy.

In theory, it is a fine idea. In practice, there are numerous obstacles to implementation, and high-profile clean energy initiatives, such as Indonesia’s Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP), are only now coming to terms with them. The reality is that the early retirement of coal-fired power is, for what should have been obvious reasons, proving to be very difficult.

When private developers enter a market like Indonesia or Vietnam and build coal-fired power plants, they typically do so only after signing a long-term contract with the local utility first. These contracts can run for 25 years or longer, and they guarantee the utility will buy electricity from the developer at a fixed price over a certain period of time.

If a government wants to retire a coal-fired power plant before the end of its useful life, it needs to change the terms of this contract first. Otherwise, why would the management, investors and lenders that have potentially sunk billions of dollars into a project with the expectation that it will run and generate returns for 25 years agree to shut it down early?

Electric utilities can simply break the contracts and change the terms unilaterally. But governments in emerging markets are especially keen to avoid this option as they fear it will deter future investment if they become known as a place that doesn’t honor contracts.

That means in order to change the terms of the contracts, shareholders and the management of coal-fired power plants need to be offered a sufficiently attractive incentive to shut down early. The Asian Development Bank created a facility called the Energy Transition Mechanism or ETM to do just that.

From the get-go, it was very unclear how this would actually work. One option was for the ETM to refinance the debt of privately owned coal power plants at a lower rate of interest. Lower interest payments would increase operating income, meaning shareholders could be paid back on an accelerated schedule and would then agree to shutter the plant early. In Indonesia, where the state-owned electric utility PLN owns and operates a large fleet of coal-fired power plants, an idea was floated to simply compensate PLN in exchange for shutting down some of its coal capacity.

But when the investment roadmap was unveiled for Indonesia’s JETP, which is a $20 billion fund from foreign partners earmarked for clean energy investment, early retirement of coal-fired power plants was almost entirely missing. As it turned out, almost none of the foreign partners and lenders in the JETP were willing to do what was required to make these deals happen. Many countries have specified that financial commitments made under the JETP cannot be used for the early retirement of coal power. PLN’s proposal to close down 4,000 MW of coal capacity within seven years was basically rejected and the ETM is currently negotiating to retire two coal-fired power plants (one owned by PLN, one by private developers) with a combined capacity of 1,700 MW. If everything goes according to plan, the plants will cease operations in 2037 just a few years ahead of schedule. That hardly seems like a game-changer.

So why did this idea falter? The obvious answer is that if utilities are unwilling to unilaterally break contracts with owners and management of coal-fired power plants, then in order to induce early closure someone needs to buy them out. Cloak it in whatever language you want about just transitions and emissions reduction, but the bottom line is these entities are motivated by profit and they expect a certain return on their investment. If the goal is to reduce emissions by shutting them down early without breaking the contract, someone needs to pay.

When confronted with this reality, hardly anybody wanted to pay. Many lenders balked because it is politically unpalatable to be seen doling out money to owners of coal-fired power plants. And while there may have been disagreement about how PLN was valuing its assets when determining compensation, the real head-scratcher here is that whoever came up with this idea of retiring coal-fired power plants early appears to have fundamentally misunderstood what they were proposing and what it would take to translate the idea into reality.

India’s Space Program in 2023: Taking Stock

2023 witnessed some rather game-changing updates to India’s space vision.

Catherine Putz   27 Dec, 2023

India Southeast Asia globe Sunset over East Asia region on planet Earth viewed from space with Sun and stars in the background. Elements of this image furnished by NASA.

India’s space program has dominated the news cycle since its Chandrayaan 3 lunar landing on the Southern hemisphere of the Moon on August 23, 2023. The ability to build an end-to-end space logistics capability, with a low-key budget of $75 million — that included the rocket launch, propulsion system, lunar lander and rover — caught the imagination of the world, specifically emerging nations in space, looking to build their own space programs in a sustainable manner.

Since then, India has announced its Chandrayaan 4 mission, which aims to land on the far side of the Moon and bring back lunar samples. India’s Aditya 1 mission, aimed at understanding the Sun’s corona is on its way to park on the halo orbit, at Earth-Sun Lagrange point 1. India announced an official space policy in 2023, identifying the key institutions that will regulate its private space sector and made its position on the utilization and ownership of space resources clear. The Indian Air Force (IAF) has submitted a proposal to rename the IAF as the “Indian Air and Space Forces,” highlighting a shift in strategic thinking within India about the importance of space for national security purposes. This effort is part of Space Vision 2047, the centennial year celebration of India’s independence (1947) from British colonial rule.

This article offers an analysis across four different factors that highlight the current and future focus of India’s space program. These include policy and institutions — both civil and military — space capabilities and missions, international partnerships, and the future space policy vision.

Policy and Institutions, Civil and Military

In 2023, India announced its official space policy. As per that space policy document, the focus of India’s space program is to develop and support its commercial space sector. Toward this end, India has clarified that the Department of Space, under the Prime Minister’s Office, is the main policymaking and implementation body, while the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) is going to focus on research and development. The New Space India Ltd (NSIL), established in 2019, is responsible for “commercialising space technologies and platforms created through public expenditure.” The Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Center (IN-SPACe) will function as the single-window authorization center for both public and private sector space activities.

India has taken several key decisions in regard to its national security space sector. In 2019, India set up the Defense Space Agency (India’s version of a space force) and the Defense Space Research Organization. This year, the IAF submitted a proposal to rename itself as the Air and Space Forces, aiming to develop not only space-based precision, navigation, timing (PNT) and intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) but also capacities for space traffic management, space situational awareness, and space weather prediction. In this, IAF is seeking collaboration with ISRO, the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), IN-SPACe, and India’s private space sector.

This move is part of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s announcement of “MissionDefSpace” in October 2022, which called for private sector space companies to apply for 75 defense space challenges for indigenous development. In a Defense Space Symposium organized by the Indian Space Association in April 2023, India’s Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan stated that “the very nature of warfare is on the cusp of major transformation and what is being witnessed is militarization of space and steady progress towards weaponisation… the aim for all of us should be towards developing dual-use platforms with special focus towards incorporating cutting-edge technology and we must expand our NAVIC constellation, provide agile space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and ensure secure satellite-assisted communications.” The IAF issued its Air Force Doctrine in 2023, in which it identified space as vital for both tactics and strategy, tactics being ISR, PNT, military communication, nuclear command and control, missile tracking, electronic warfare, battle management and training, to strategic guidance informed by deterrence, compellence, offense and defense.

Space Capabilities and Missions

India is building toward reusable space capabilities. In April 2023, ISRO successfully tested a Reusable Launch Vehicle Autonomous Landing Mission (RLV LEX). This can be described as the Indian version of a space plane. ISRO aims to utilize this reusable technology with ISRO’s fleet of rocket launchers, thus meeting India’s 2025 goal of accomplishing reusable launch. India is working on a Reusable Launch Vehicle Technology Demonstrator (RLV-TD). ISRO states “the winged RLV-TD has been configured to act as a flying test bed to evaluate various technologies, namely, hypersonic flight, autonomous landing and powered cruise flight. In [the] future, this vehicle will be scaled up to become the first stage of India’s reusable two stage orbital launch vehicle.”

The Indian Prime Minister’s Office released a space roadmap announcing the Chandrayaan 4 mission in 2024, a space station by 2028, and a manned mission to the Moon by 2040. India’s space station will be at an altitude of 120 kms to 140 kms in Low Earth Orbit. India’s lunar program now includes a technology build-up phase between 2023-2028, a lunar reach-out phase (2028-2040), and a lunar base envisioned between 2040-2047. ISRO is working on the research design of a radioisotope heater (RHUs) that will help manage the major temperature variations on the Moon as part of Chandrayaan 4. The Chandrayaan 5, 6, and 7 missions will be within the lunar reach-out phase. From Chandrayaan 6 onward, India will start to build lunar habitats, followed by Chandrayaan 7 aimed at lunar infrastructure building.

As per ISRO Chairperson, S. Somanath, “2040 is 17 years away and that’s a good time to develop technologies to send humans to the Moon. Our work on the proposed space station too is progressing aggressively and we should be able to have the first unit ready by 2028.”

India is also developing a human-rated launch vehicle for its Gaganyaan human spaceflight mission. This will include building capacities like life support, bioastronautics, crew training and human rating and certification. ISRO’s Somanath said on December 13, 2023 that India will be developing its own environmental control and life support system (ECLSS). India has announced a second Mars Mission (2030) to study the Mars atmosphere. This mission will carry a Mars orbit dust experiment (MODEX), a radio occultation (RO) experiment, an energetic ion spectrometer (EIS) and a Langmuir probe and electric field experiment (LPEX). In 2031, India plans to launch the Sukhrayaan 1 mission to Venus.

International Partnerships

2023 signaled strategic shifts in India’s international partnerships. India made a clear signal of its strategic intent when it joined the U.S.-initiated Artemis Accords. India remains the only Artemis signatory with a lunar landing capacity to date. In June 2023, the U.S. and India signed a joint statement that highlighted, in part, increasing space cooperation between the two. This included training Indian astronauts at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, a joint effort with the International Space Station (2024), and the establishment of a closer relationship between the U.S. and India in regard to commercial space. In a joint statement in September 2023, on the sideline of the G-20 summit in New Delhi, the U.S. and India agreed to establish a working group for commercial space collaboration, develop a strategic framework for human spaceflight and advance planetary defense.

While committing to the Artemis Accords in June, Modi advanced the idea of a BRICS satellite constellation and a BRICS space exploration consortium at the Johannesburg summit in August 2023. As part of the Johannesburg summit declaration, BRICS nations stated that “we reassert our support for ensuring the long-term sustainability of outer space activities and prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) and of its weaponization, including through negotiations to adopt a relevant legally binding multilateral instrument. We recognise the value of the updated Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) submitted to the Conference on Disarmament in 2014.”

In regard to international consensus on the U.K.-initiated United Nations General Assembly Resolution 75/36, “Reducing Space Threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours” India stated that “while we share with the United Kingdom and other sponsors, the objective of reducing space threats, we believe that the resolution does not address the key issue of preventing arms race in outer space through a universally acceptable and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument on PAROS…Furthermore, the resolution introduces a number of subjective elements, including responsible and irresponsible behavior, characterization and interpretation of behavior as well as perception of threats…We believe that this resolution diverts from the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space, which continues to be a priority for the international community. We have voted against some operative paragraphs for the same reason.”

2023 witnessed India hosting the G-20 summit in New Delhi; a Space Economy Leaders Meeting was held on the sidelines. Following the summit, Indian Minister for Science and Technology Jitendra Singh stated that from a current Indian space economy of $8 billion, India is estimated to contribute $40 billion by 2040. Singh specified that “There were only four space startups in the country in 2014 whereas in 2023, there are more than 150 startups.” India views commercial space as a major part of its diplomatic space outreach.

Future Vision for Space

2023 witnessed some rather game-changing updates to India’s space vision. As per the Prime Minister’s Office guidance on space visions, under which falls India’s space policymaking body, the Department of Space, India issued a timeline for its future space vision. This Space Vision 2047 Roadmap includes flexible COMSATS (2025), quantum and optical communications (2030), a human spaceflight program (2030), a reusable heavy launcher (2030), a two-stage to orbit (TSTO) fully reusable vehicle (2035-2040), space based strategic deterrence (2040), a manned mission to the Moon (2040), interplanetary networks (2047), and space mining (2047).

This was a major departure from 2017 when none of these future space missions or visions were present in the space ecosystem. India has also presented an economic roadmap between 2025 and 2047 that is looking to advance space tourism, global space data solutions, and crafting India into a global space manufacturing hub. ISRO’s Somanath reiterated this space road map at an IAF event in June, elaborating that “We have to look at space as a strategic asset of the nation. And we should create that capability, to sustain it, build it in an ‘atma nirbhar’ (self-reliant) way. It is very important. And we have created a roadmap of how to build it.”

India’s strategic clarity in regard to its long-term space strategy is a new development. Back in March 2022, I argued that China had an advantage over India because unlike India, it had a long-term space strategy in place. With India’s 2023 space policy and its space 2047 roadmap, New Delhi has started to catch up.

In some ways, India’s 2047 space roadmap is similar to China’s space roadmap to 2049. Some challenges however remain ahead for India. India has not announced a super heavy lift rocket in the class of a Space X’s Starship or China’s Long March 9. India does not possess the capacity today for human spaceflight or constructing and maintaining large platforms in space. Neither does India possess the mature reusable space plane capability China recently demonstrated. India also does not have a national-level space-based solar power program.

All this implies that India has more catching up to do. However, space power projection is about relative power and capability. We witnessed during this decade how China has caught up with the U.S. in space. Given China’s economic problems, India might be just constituted right, to include its demographic dividend by the 2040s and talent pool, to catch up quickly. The future will tell who emerges as the lead space power by the 2040s. The country with the long-term policy focus, funding, education, training and vision will have the strategic advantage.

The Delimitation of Pakistan’s Democracy

Whether the delay in elections, and the tarnished delimitation process, abets any party in the February polls remains to be seen.

Catherine Putz   27 Dec, 2023

Small national flags of the Pakistan on a black background.

On December 23, the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) decided that it would address all formal complaints regarding the constituency delimitation after the general elections scheduled for February 8. The ECP’s decision comes after the Supreme Court ruled the previous week that holding timely elections needed to “be given primacy” to ensure “continuity of democratic governance” leaving the dispute of delimitations for later. The contention is rooted in the ECP’s November 30 notification, which announced the delimitation of constituencies that would make up the 266 general seats in the National Assembly and 593 general seats for the four provincial assemblies of Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan. The ECP had already “disposed” disputes in 88 districts, and settled 1,324 objections in the lead-up to its final delimitation notification last month.

Many of the objections raised by candidates in the delimitation process criticize the breaching of the population allocation mechanism. According to the ECP regulations, the maximum allowed variation in populations in relation to the average voter per seat in an assembly is 10 percent, a margin exceeded in over one-fifth of the constituencies, as per the Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN). However, the final constituency boundaries unveiled sizeable divergence from the 10 percent rule with the largest constituencies in an assembly seen to be almost twice the size of the smallest; for example, with an almost three-time disparity in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa between NA-39 Bannu and NA-1 Chitral.

An ECP official privy to the delimitation process told The Diplomat that the entire exercise was carried out as per regulations, and that the issue has been politicized by various parties “as is customary.”

“As per the Elections Act, we have to keep the provincial and district integrity in mind. There are geographical considerations as well,” the official said.

Even so, while variation in the populations of constituencies is one criticism, the more prevalent contention hinges around the merging, or separation, of areas that benefit one candidate over others. “We cannot draw delimitation lines running in the middle of populations. A constituency needs to reflect a unit – all the hue and cry is mere electoral excuses,” the ECP official added.

Various parties claim that constituencies have been delimited to benefit the party that many claim is now being backed by the all-powerful military establishment: Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N).

“The PML-N has actively conspired to alter constituencies to play to its strength,” said Jamaat-e-Islami’s (JI) Sher Khan, a candidate from Chakesar town in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. “Tehsils in Shangla district have been turned upside down to benefit the PML-N,” he added, referring to administrative subdivisions.

Even so, the PML-N’s traditional stronghold remains Punjab, where its opponents argue that the party has unleashed its machinations to skew election results in its favor.

“In Kasur, one National Assembly constituency has four Punjab Assembly constituencies. This is unjust and solely designed to benefit the PML-N,” said Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) Punjab leader Chaudhary Manzoor.

The merging of different areas impacts political families, which enjoy clout in certain areas that may have fallen into other parts following the delimitation. In other instances, a consolidated stronghold of a candidate might have been divided into different constituencies, splitting the vote banks. But while opponents insist that such moves are being orchestrated to benefit the PML-N, the party claims to be the victim in other parts of the country.

“Larkana, Naushahro Feroze and other constituencies have been broken on demand. There’s been wrong delimitation in the province,” said PML-N Sindh President Bashir Memon.

Like the PML-N, its allied Muttahida Qaumi Movement-Pakistan (MQM-P) claims that the PPP has used its own influences to rig constituencies in Sindh, with the MQM-P specifically mentioning Hyderabad, the second largest city in the province after Karachi.

Even so, much of the mudslinging over delimitations is rooted in the limits of Pakistan’s democracy, which continues to be dictated by the military establishment, in tandem with all state pillars, with allowance for certain parties to exercise their own undemocratic clout in certain regions of influence.

Former ECP Secretary Kanwar Dilshad concedes that much of the ongoing squabbling could have been avoided had the upcoming election been conducted based on the previous population census, and not as per the one carried out this year.

“The outgoing government took their time carrying out the population census and then issued a notification all of a sudden, after which the Election Commission was bound to carry out new delimitation as per the new census,” he told The Diplomat.

“Without the notification, we would have had the election on October 8, and the delimitation process would not have been rushed. It is a process that needs at least a year, and the lack of time may have led to some discrepancies,” Dilshad added.

Days before the PML-N-led government was supposed to make way for the caretaker setup, the Council of Common Interests approved the digital census on August 5. With the assemblies dissolved on August 9, the constitutionally mandated 90-day period to conduct the next elections was forestalled by the clause mandating that the polls be held as per the “last preceding census.”

“The whole point of approving the census at the time was to delay the elections,” said former Punjab Caretaker Chief Minister, and political scientist, Hasan Askari Rizvi, while talking to The Diplomat.

Much of this exercise was carried out by the outgoing regime that featured both the PML-N and PPP in a broad coalition, and was intended to buy time in order to counter the surging popularity of Imran Khan and his Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI). Since Khan’s ouster as the prime minister in a no-confidence motion in April 2022, a result of his fallout with the military leadership, the PTI has emerged as the resounding favorite to win a transparent election, whenever that might be held.

The first half of 2023 was marred by an electoral limbo centered around the logistics of simultaneously holding the national and the provincial elections, the latter theoretically mandated for May this year. However, the violent May 9 protests in the aftermath of Khan’s arrest brought the military establishment to the fore, with a relentless crackdown on PTI leaders and workers since. In August, Khan was sentenced to three years in prison over corruption charges in a case related to the selling of state gifts during his time as the prime minister. Since then, PML-N supremo and three-time Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has returned to Pakistan from exile in the U.K. The graft cases against him have been overturned. Sharif, along with 28,625 others nationwide, has filed his nomination papers for the upcoming elections.

Meanwhile, on December 23, the ECP stripped the PTI of its electoral symbol of a bat, underlining that the candidates affiliated with the already depleted party will have to contest the polls independently if the verdict isn’t overturned. While the Peshawar High Court overturned the ECP ruling on December 26, a renewed effort to outlaw the now iconic bat symbol is likely before the January 13 cutoff date for the allocation of electoral symbols.

“If these [anti-PTI] trends during the nomination filing processes continue there cannot be free and fair elections. In Punjab, the other major party is the PML-N, which will benefit from this,” added Hasan Rizvi.

Whether the delay in elections, and the tarnished delimitation process, abets any party in the February polls remains to be seen, however, it is obvious that the entire state machinery orchestrated by the military leadership has been tasked with sidelining Imran Khan and the PTI.

Even so, there is also sufficient evidence through independent surveys, social media, and personal testimonies that where physical delimitation of constituencies might tilt local contests one way or the other, the nationwide support for the PTI has grown beyond electoral demarcations – with or without the party’s iconic symbol and electoral participation of its incarcerated chief.

26 Dec, 2023

- Isaac McKean Scarborough on Moscow’s Heavy Shadow in Tajikistan

- Economic Revival is on the Minds of Bhutanese Voters

- Why Do Half of Pakistan’s Voters Stay Away From the Polls?

- Huawei’s Growing Presence in Central Asia’s Telecom Industry

Isaac McKean Scarborough on Moscow’s Heavy Shadow in Tajikistan

The Soviet Union’s collapse 32 years ago led to rapid change, economic collapse, and violence. In Tajikistan, that violence slid rapidly into civil war.

Catherine Putz   26 Dec, 2023

View of Dushanbe with the Varzob River and the Flagpole. The capital of Tajikistan, Central Asia

Reflecting on the Soviet Union’s collapse 32 years ago and attempting to draw any sort of conclusion is often a matter of perspective. In his new book, “Moscow’s Heavy Shadow: The Violent Collapse of the USSR,” Dr. Isaac McKean Scarborough, an assistant professor of Russian and Eurasian Studies at Leiden University, writes of the collapse from one of the Soviet Union’s most distant peripheries — Dushanbe. In doing so, he highlights a perspective not often taken into account in Western understanding of the collapse, charting how Moscow’s reforms — glasnost and perestroika — played out in the far-flung Tajik context and ultimately resulted in rapid change, economic collapse, and violence, as they did elsewhere.

But the violence did not end with the collapse in Tajikistan. As Scarborough told The Diplomat’s Catherine Putz, “In Tajikistan, moreover, this collapse was made longer and more visceral by the civil war that followed, and I think we need to keep in mind that for the majority of the citizens of Tajikistan, there is no clear line between the two. The collapse of the USSR became the civil war; one moved smoothly and quickly into the other.”

In the following interview, Scarborough explains the state of affairs in Soviet Tajikistan in the years leading up to the collapse, discusses the effects of reforms on the Tajik economy, the republican government’s reliance on and loyalty to Moscow, and how Tajikistan continues to wrestle with the unresolved tensions of the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Your book “Moscow’s Heavy Shadow: The Violent Collapse of the USSR” focuses on the collapse of the USSR from one of its most distant peripheries: Soviet Tajikistan. In this corner of the Soviet Union in 1985 as Moscow was starting to push reforms you note that  “Tajikistani politicians and average citizens alike” viewed the Soviet economic and political system with a “modicum of satisfaction.” For readers who may be surprised by that assessment, can you explain what you mean?

I think there is a general feeling in the West that life in the USSR was fundamentally bad – poor, dirty, devoid of modern amenities – and that most Soviet citizens essentially wished for the Soviet system to collapse. But this really wasn’t the case. Although significantly falling behind European or American standards of living, life in most parts of the USSR was in fact quite decent by the 1970s and 1980s. As the economic historian Robert Allen has shown, for example, if compared to almost any country outside of Europe or the “West,” the economic outcomes achieved by Soviet citizens in this period are amongst the world’s best. Dissatisfaction, then, was driven not by actual economic degradation – but rather by the sense that life was no longer improving by the late 1970s in ways that it previously had.  And in Moscow, or Leningrad, or perhaps Kiev, this was true: Soviet economic life had reached a certain plateau, beyond which the state seemed unable to provide much more in terms of goods, or services, or basic entertainment.

For people in Tajikistan, however, this saturation point had not yet been reached. Life into the mid-1980s was continuing to improve, and the basic amenities of life, such as refrigerators, or cars, or air conditioning units, or children’s theaters, were still spreading and providing tangible and real improvements to standards of living. There were, of course, endemic problems – from the lack of housing available in cities to the cotton monoculture retarding economic growth to Tajikistan’s pitifully low standing in the USSR – but there was no denying that life was all the same getting better, year after year. And this, I think, is what drove the general sense of sanguinity: it wasn’t that things couldn’t have been better – they certainly could have been – but that as it was, the system worked, and there was no obvious reason to change it.

How were Gorbachev’s reforms — glasnost and perestroika — carried out in Tajikistan? What were some of the initial economic and political consequences of the reforms?

One key distinction that should be made between “perestroika” and “glasnost” is that these were legally quite different processes, although in retrospect we tend to clump the two together. Perestroika, in the sense of economic reforms meant to restructure the Soviet Union’s enterprises and consumer sector, was made up of a series of laws that changed the rules governing state-owned production and private enterprises. Glasnost, on the other hand, constituted a more amorphous series of changes – legal amendments changing the legislative system in Moscow, but also informal directives and administrative shifts in policy and tone that were aimed at fomenting criticism of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and promoting social change.

Perestroika’s legal backing meant that changes to production and enterprise activity were unavoidable, and the leadership of the Tajik SSR had no choice but to implement them across Tajikistan. Loyal to Moscow, they did so very thoroughly, which led to factories lowering production (to save roubles), private businesses being founded, and, by 1989, the initial signs of recession.

With glasnost an administrative policy, however, there was much more room for local interpretation. Individuals like Kahhor Mahkamov, the leader of the Communist Party of Tajikistan in the late 1980s and a generally conservative figure, used this to their advantage, avoiding any criticism of the state and promoting their own candidates in the new electoral system. When change did occur in terms of political liberalization, it was often the result of direct intervention from Moscow: when Gorbachev’s advisor Aleksander Yakovlev visited Dushanbe in 1987 and caused a local Communist Party shakeup, for example, or when he later helped to push through Tajikistan’s Law on Language in 1989. But the overall situation in Tajikistan by 1989 and early 1990 was both paradoxical and confusing: on the one hand, perestroika’s reforms had led to economic change and even inflation and recession, while on the other the republican government was avoiding glasnost as much as possible and trying to pretend like life was continuing as before.

In Chapter 5, you discuss the unexpected and bloody riots that took place in Dushanbe in February 1990 and remark that “the idea that the events could have been spontaneous or uncontrolled is frequently dismissed outright.” I see parallels to that in modern Tajikistan, and elsewhere in Central Asia. Why do you think it’s so difficult to digest the idea that a situation, or a series of cascading events, might not have some specific hand behind them?

There’s an understandable temptation, I think, both in Tajikistan and elsewhere (and in fact in the West, too), to find a simple and identifiable cause of political violence or negative political outcomes. And it’s always much simpler to point to particular “bad actors,” or “organizers,” or “outside forces” directing the actions of crowds, rather than to pick apart the motivations of the many people involved and the ways in which their actions came together to instigate violence. This also helps to avoid giving legitimacy to the motivations of those involved, which is emotionally easier – we don’t generally want to justify violence, or to ascribe violent motives to average citizens. So instead of considering how economic recession or the loss of jobs can lead to frustration, mass action, and ultimately violence in a collective way, we blame some unseen individuals. Someone lied to the rioters, someone misled them – they themselves are not to blame, nor do we have to deal with their actual motivations or frustrations.

Immediately after the February 1990 riots, this was the dominant discourse in Dushanbe about the riots: from all sides, politicians found it much simpler, emotionally preferable, and politically more useful to blame each other or outsiders than to ask the rioters why they had been on the square, or how the violence had begun. But by refusing to ask these questions, they unfortunately not only failed to undermine the roots of conflict, but in practice tipped the situation even closer to the edge.

Tajikistan’s Soviet leadership seemed to be in denial that the union was collapsing, but ultimately declared independence as did the other republics. What was the root of the Tajikistani leadership’s reluctance to let its connection to Moscow go? And in what ways did that shape the circumstances which gave rise to the civil war?

A number of years ago, Buri Karimov, the former head of Tajikistan’s State Planning Committee (Gosplan) was kind enough to grant me a long interview in Moscow. I asked him then how he had experienced the move to Russia in the early 1990s after his loss of political power during the February 1990 riots – to which he just shrugged. “We were already here every week,” he said, explaining that government work in Dushanbe essentially meant coordinating nearly everything through Moscow; there wasn’t much for him to adjust to afterwards.

I think this is very representative of how the leadership in Dushanbe viewed their positions of power: as an extension of Moscow’s. Because of the place of the Tajik economy in the Soviet Union as a provider of raw materials (primarily cotton, of course), the state relied even more than most republics on centrally organized financial flows. Institutionally, there was also a clear culture of deference to Moscow – much more than in other small Soviet republics, such as Lithuania, where the historian Saulius Grybkauskus, for example, has done important work demonstrating the local party’s independence and sense of local identity. But the Communist Party of Tajikistan and government leaders in Dushanbe could hardly conceive of operating outside of the Soviet remit – it just didn’t compute.

This didn’t change even after the collapse of the USSR, as the new president of Tajikistan, Rahmon Nabiev, continued to defer to Moscow and largely failed to develop important elements of statehood, including any semblance of a military. No one, in fact, seemed to have developed a clear notion of what the independent Tajikistani state should look like at that point – a muddled situation that created additional space for populist mobilization in the face of non-existent state capacity to oppose it.

In some ways, your book serves as a prologue for the Tajik Civil War — we see the advent of some of the major players and the roots of the conflict to come. How does the history as you’ve laid it out, contrast with the narrative in modern Tajikistan about the civil war?

Curiously enough, there is less of an active debate about the civil war in Tajikistan than might be expected, a few decades after it ended. During and immediately after the civil war in the mid-to-late 1990s, there were a number of memoirs/political treatises published by those involved in the war, which were often largely focused on blaming the opposing side for the war’s initiation and extremes. In the years after 2000, moreover, some very important work was done by Tajikistani scholars to delve into the structural and social causes of the war, and I would highlight the work of the historian Gholib Ghoibov and the journalist Nurali Davlat, upon which I draw extensively. For the most part, though, the narrative has gone fallow since then, leaving an incomplete discussion about the causes, start, and course of the war – but one that tends, in some ways similar to my own work, to situate the war in its immediate context of perestroika, reform, and Soviet collapse. Which exact factors – Gorbachev’s reforms, the breakup of the Soviet Union, the breakdown of political authority – then led to war are argued over to this day, but most people in Tajikistan, I think, would also associate the war with this period immediately prior.

So in many ways where my work may differ, I think, is more with the established Western narratives of the Tajik Civil War. These tend to look for causes either in earlier history – for example, in the experiences of forced resettlement and larger socialization in Tajikistan’s south from the 1930s to the 1950s – or in the “particularities” of life in Tajikistan, from its relative religiosity to local norms of honor and masculinity. By returning to the historical and archival record of the years immediately before the civil war and first months of war itself, however, I found that these elements of unusualness were neither terribly present nor particularly helpful in terms of explaining politicians’ behavior or the reactions of the people who then participated in violence. As Ted Gurr has argued, it can be quite tempting to appeal to “aggressive instincts” or elements of otherness to explain one or another example of political violence, but in practice war is largely the result of human commonalities across time and geography.  In the case of the Tajik Civil War, I found that the common experience of Soviet collapse and populist mobilization led to violence – in fact as it did in many other parts of the former USSR. I’m hopeful that this is a story that will resonate with people in Tajikistan, who know far better than I the cost of this violence.

How can this history help us understand modern Tajikistan?

Like much of the former USSR, I think, Tajikistan is still living out the consequences of the Soviet collapse, in the sense that not all the final choices seem to have yet been made about what the proper status quo ante should be. In Tajikistan, moreover, this collapse was made longer and more visceral by the civil war that followed, and I think we need to keep in mind that for the majority of the citizens of Tajikistan, there is no clear line between the two. The collapse of the USSR became the civil war; one moved smoothly and quickly into the other. The civil war then defined the country’s political order in both the 1990s during the conflict and in later decades, notwithstanding the formal end to the war in 1997. Violence in fact continued for many years in a variety of forms, and the state’s moves to first incorporate former opposition fighters into the government after 1997 and then remove most of them in the following years meant that the resolution of the conflict started in 1992 stayed immediate for decades.

Where this has left Tajikistani society today, I think, is in a continuing quandary about how to deal with the unresolved tensions of the late 1980s and early 1990s. There has essentially been no opportunity to collectively decide on matters like language policy, or city development, or the privatization of industry, or broad economic modernization, and there remains a great deal of debate and disagreement on all levels about these matters. Should Dushanbe be rebuilt in steel and glass in an attempt to remove the vestiges of colonial Soviet material culture? Should Russian be encouraged in Tajikistani schools as a way of helping the country’s labor migrants in Russian workplaces? When people tell the stories of their lives since 1992 in Tajikistan, it comes out rushed and running together – “in a single breath” (na odnom dykhanii), as they say in Russian. Tajikistanis haven’t had time to breathe since 1992, let alone to answer these questions or to try to comprehend everything that has changed since the collapse of the USSR.

Economic Revival is on the Minds of Bhutanese Voters

The final round of Bhutan’s fourth general election on January 9 will be a contest between the PDP and the BTP.

Sudha Ramachandran   26 Dec, 2023

The new parliament building in Thimphu, Bhutan – arliament of Bhutan, seen from Trashi Chhoe Dzong, Thimphu

On January 9, Bhutan will vote in the final round of its fourth parliamentary election. The contest is between the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the Bhutan Tendrel Party (BTP), which emerged with the largest percent of the votes in the primary round of voting on November 30. Five parties had contested in the primary round, and the PDP and BTP secured 42.5 and 19.6 percent of the votes, respectively.

The ruling Druk Nyamrup Tshogpa (DNT) secured only 13.1 percent of the votes. Standing fourth among the contesting parties, it failed to qualify for the final round.

In power, the DNT presided over a challenging time for the nation. Its term coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic. The party managed the pandemic through strict and unpopular measures at the cost of business, severely limiting tourism. The external debt service ratio increased from 5.8 percent in 2019-20 to 15.1 percent in 2022-23. Increased fuel prices exacerbated the country’s economic troubles.

As a result, economic issues top the agenda in the upcoming election. Two days before the election primary, Kuensel’s editorial noted that “all parties highlighted reviving [the economy], making it the most talked about during the campaign period, including providing content for social media.” Despite the country being known for its Gross Happiness Index, the newspaper noted that many Bhutanese believe the “rest of the priorities are taken care of if the economy is on the right track.”

Bhutan’s economy has recovered, growing at nearly 4.5 percent a year, after shrinking by 10 percent in 2020. It is expected to grow at a similar rate in the coming year.

However, inflation has exceeded growth rates. Youth unemployment was 29 percent in 2022. “The economy took a battering during the COVID-19, and we have not been able to resuscitate it since,” former Prime Minister and President of the PDP Tshering Tobgay said. Consequently, youth emigration, particularly to Australia, has increased significantly post-pandemic. The youth population and experienced people from the civil service and private sector are emigrating as opportunities dry up in the Himalayan kingdom.

As reflected in the primary debate among presidents of the five participating parties, PDP’s leader focused on attracting foreign direct investment and expanding the country’s tourism sector. DPT president proposed further development of hydropower projects.

PDP has proposed a 15 billion Nu (or $180 million) economic stimulus plan to be implemented within a couple of months of forming the government to increase liquidity in the banking sector at a reduced cost. Meanwhile, the BTP has proposed a 50 billion Nu ($600 million) stimulus in the 13th plan budget. Other household economic issues such as land tax, housing, and service infrastructure development are also of concern to the voters.

However, both parties have vowed to support the Gelepu Special Administrative Region (SAR) announced by Bhutan’s King Jigme Wangchuck in his National Day address on December 17. The proposed 1,000 sq km international city bordering the northeast Indian state of Assam, which intends to be the vibrant economic between South Asia and Southeast Asia, will enjoy executive autonomy and legal independence and help provide high-paying jobs to youth and a conducive environment for Bhutanese migrants abroad to return. The king  said he would “personally be involved” in the project to ensure its success.

BTP President Pema Chewang said that anyone who came to power should extend their full support to realize the king’s vision. His PDP counterpart also supported the project, saying that the project aims to provide jobs and skills to Bhutan’s youths in Bhutan.

The king’s announcement which came amid the election campaign shows the monarchy’s enduring influence in Bhutan. It shows that regardless of who forms the next government, the project will be carried forward. The king hinted as much in his speech, remarking that such projects have failed in other countries because of a lack of internal consensus, deliberate obstructions, and conflict of ideas among vested interests, implying that he wants the projects to be above such fray. Therefore, the parties have relatively narrower policy differences than in other democracies and engage in little negative campaigning. However, it also marks the limitation under which the elected government has to function.

Foreign policy has taken a backseat during the elections, though it is not entirely ignored. All of the parties support increasing cooperation with India in the hydropower sector and facilitating trade ties. The Wire notes that only the Druk Phuensum Tshogpa (DPT) manifesto specifically referenced India in terms of foreign policy. The manifesto states that the party will prioritize strengthening connections with the people and government of India and maintaining friendly relations with neighboring nations.

Bhutan’s fourth general elections comes amid major developments on the foreign policy front vis-à-vis its two giant neighbors.

Although it does not have diplomatic relations with China, it is engaged in talks to settle its disputed border with that country. In October, the two countries held the 25th round of boundary talks and signed a Cooperation Agreement on the “Responsibilities and Functions of the Joint Technical Team on the Delimitation and Demarcation of the Bhutan-China Boundary” and have agreed to push forward with implementing all the steps of the Three-Step Roadmap.

India is closely watching the Sino-Bhutanese talks process, as it is concerned over Chinese territorial demands in the Doklam Plateau, area that abuts India’s border near Chicken Neck, connecting India’s Northeastern states to the rest of India. In 2017, the Indian and Chinese armies were locked in a standoff near Doklam.

However, India will not sweat over the elections in Bhutan as India-Bhutan relations remain a pillar of stability. Furthermore, PDP, widely seen as friendly to India, is in pole position in the upcoming elections.

Bhutan is at a critical juncture. Whichever party wins on January 9 has its task cut out. On one hand, it needs to resuscitate the economy. On the other, it will have to engage with China to resolve the border issues.

India will have an acute interest and is a key cog in both. Thimpu needs Indian support to revive its economy and to ensure that the Gelepu project gets off the ground. It will also need India to be on its side in solving the border dispute with China. For better or worse, the next prime minister will also have to work in the shadow of the monarch.

Why Do Half of Pakistan’s Voters Stay Away From the Polls?

The country’s youth, women, transgender community and people with disabilities either stay away from voting or their access to the process is restricted.

Sudha Ramachandran   26 Dec, 2023

The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)’s Sharif dynasty (from left) Maryam Nawaz, Nawaz Sharif, Hamza Sharif (behind) and Shehbaz Sharif, December 25, 2023.

X/ PMLN

https://twitter.com/pmln_org/status/1738999969334620671/photo/1

As Pakistan prepares for general elections scheduled for February, political analysts are probing past electoral patterns to figure out what lies ahead. Among the questions they are grappling with is the low voter turnout in the country. Why doesn’t half of the country’s eligible voting population show up to exercise their right to vote? And does it matter if such a large segment of eligible voters does not vote?

Over the years, Pakistan has witnessed an average voter turnout of 41 percent with some variations across different election cycles. In the 2018 general election, 51 percent of the country’s voters cast ballots. In 2013, it was slightly higher at 53 percent. The highest ever recorded turnout was at the 1970 general elections with 61 percent showing up to vote, and the lowest in 1997 with only 35 percent voting, according to the Gallup Pakistan Electoral Data.

Meanwhile, with the rise in population over the years, the number of registered voters in the country has witnessed a steady increase.

In the 2018 elections, Pakistan had 106 million registered voters. However, the 2023 statistics released by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) indicate that there are 127 million registered voters in the country. Around 45 percent of them are in the 18 to 35-year age group.

However, in the last elections around 70 percent of the youth refrained from voting. It is generally believed in Pakistan that young people are less interested in politics, often convinced that their votes carry minimal weight and may not make any difference. Such perceptions are fueled by a sense of discontent over the country’s failing democracy, the ongoing economic crises, sudden shifts in power within two to three years of every general election, opportunistic struggles for power among older elite men, and a lack of genuine representation.

The sudden shift and shuffle of power has been repeatedly evident in Pakistan; since 1947, none of the country’s 29 prime ministers completed their full five-year tenure. This was a result of different circumstances, including forced resignations, assassination, corruption, and so on.

As for the lack of representation of youth in parties, although they comprise 44 percent of the total registered voters, those below the age of 35 years comprise just 17 percent of the candidates of Pakistan Tehreek-a-Insaaf (PTI), 13 percent of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and 23 percent of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP).

Most political parties in Pakistan have their youth wings and women’s wings, but how much influence they wield is debatable.

A common feature of Pakistan’s major political parties at the national and provincial levels is that they are run as family enterprises. They encourage dynasties. Young people and women make it to prominent political positions and roles only if they belong to the dominant political families.

Thus, Pakistani politics is dominated by older elite men, and similarly, the voter base too is also largely dominated by older men.

This is evident in the gender voter gap data. For the 2024 elections, 10 million more men than women are registered to vote even though women make up almost half of the population. In the 2018 elections, 11 million fewer women exercised their right to vote.

Generally, the gender gap in turnout is higher in rural areas as compared to urban areas because of the traditional setup that constrains women to stay at home.

But, in Pakistan’s case, it is the opposite. A study published on the website of the United States Institute of Peace suggests that in 2018 there was a higher gender gap in voter turnout in the largest cities of the country as compared to the rural areas. The study connects the lower numbers of women voters in cities with the patriarchal norms within the households, despite a high number of women being educated. Political knowledge and electoral processes are still the domain where the heads of the family, which are mainly older men, make the decisions.

However, in rural Pakistan, the higher number of women voters does not always signify their independent right to vote. Instead, it is often driven by family dynamics, where men, influenced by certain tribal leaders, make electoral decisions, often for reasons like being able to use agricultural land under those leaders. Larger numbers of women, in turn, often only vote following their male family members.

Recent reforms in election laws empower the ECP to nullify results in any constituency where the gender gap in electoral turnout falls below 10 percent of the women on the voter rolls. This legal provision was designed to compel political parties and families to encourage more women to cast their votes.

Although Pakistan’s constitution encourages people with disabilities (PWDs) to actively participate in political processes, especially in elections, poor accessibility at polling stations stands in the way of their voting. Polling stations hardly accommodate accessibility, especially for wheelchair users and the visually impaired.

As for the transgender community, which comprises roughly half a million people, according to an advocacy group TransAction Pakistan — official statistics put the figure at a little over 10,000 —  the Transgender Persons Protection Act of 2018, gave the right to citizens to self-identify their gender on national identity cards, followed by the right to vote and run for office as equal citizens.

However, they are rarely registered as voters and the process itself makes it hard for them to get registered. It is also still unspecified where they will cast their votes, as Pakistan has separate polling booths for males and females. The transgender community is often not given access to these polling booths. There is also a lack of information, political mobilization and representation for the transgender community as there is a stigma attached to being transgender.

Pakistan’s youth, women, people with disabilities and transgenders need to find ways in which their active participation in electoral and political processes can make a difference. While the country is taking some steps to ensure more participation, there is still more to be done. There is a need to directly engage with these groups and with political parties and the population in general to create more awareness about the importance of inclusive political engagement.

Huawei’s Growing Presence in Central Asia’s Telecom Industry

In both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Huawei has positioned itself as a major player in the telecommunications market.

Catherine Putz   26 Dec, 2023

–File–Visitors are seen at the stand of Huawei during an exhibition in Beijing, China, 12 October 2010.

Huawei Technologies Co., Chinas largest maker of telephone equipment, said revenue exceeded $32 billion in 2011, narrowing its gap behind Swedens Ericsson AB.

Revenue grew about 11 percent last year, William Xu, a Huawei board member and president in charge of its enterprise division, said in an interview at the Mobile World Congress in Barcelona, citing preliminary figures. The Shenzhen-based company also met its profit targets, helped by sales of mobile devices and growth at the enterprise business, he said.

In the wake of Western sanctions, Huawei has pivoted toward emerging markets, including within Central Asia. The invasion of Ukraine has further underscored the need for adaptability, prompting Huawei to strategically relocate some of its Moscow office staff to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to avoid secondary sanctions while still maintaining research and development (R&D) offices across Russia.

Among the relocated staff are managers and heads of Huawei divisions from China, who were originally assigned to Russia at the beginning of 2022 but were subsequently redirected to other offices. This move complements Huawei’s expansion efforts in the Middle East, encompassing also the Central Asian region.

Huawei’s construction of 4G networks and testing of 5G technology in Kazakhstan have positioned it as a critical player in the nation’s telecommunication sector, overshadowing competitors like Swedish Ericsson and Finnish Nokia.

In an interview, a former Huawei employee shared that the company’s aggressive policies contributed to its market dominance in the country. They noted, “Our government was also very close to China, received a lot of loans, [China] built roads in Kazakhstan, factories are now in construction. Accordingly, the Chinese lobby is very strong.”

Similarly, in Uzbekistan, Huawei’s partnerships with almost all key Uzbek telecom operators – Uztelecom, Unitel, Ucell, Perfectum Mobile, and East Telecom – demonstrate its dominant role in the telecommunications sector.

In 2019, during a visit to Huawei’s R&D center in Beijing, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev called for efforts to introduce 5G to Uzbekistan. Over the past two years, Huawei has helped deploy 5G networks jointly with Uztelecom, Mobiuz, and Ucell. During preparation for the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2022, Uztelecom launched 5G networks in the tourist center of Samarkand using Huawei equipment. Other demonstration projects have included Huawei’s “smart” agriculture pilot project, implemented with the National Research University. Uzbektelecom has also signed contracts with Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE to implement four investment projects worth $506.8 million.

Beyond facilitating the rollout of hard infrastructure, Huawei has also been investing in local talent. In Kazakhstan, the number of Huawei ICT Academies is set to double from 25 to 50 by 2025, providing training for 5,000 students nationwide in critical areas such as artificial intelligence, big data, network security, wireless networks, and cybersecurity. Additionally, Kazakhstani ICT specialists have joined Huawei’s Corporate Social Responsibility program and have visited China to learn about the company’s cutting-edge ICT and to experience China’s traditional and modern culture.

Universities are increasingly aligning themselves with market trends by establishing vendor-sponsored programs on their campuses. A coordinator at one of Kazakhstan’s leading IT universities revealed that over 100 students have enrolled in Huawei’s courses, while fewer students opt for programs offered by vendors such as Oracle, Kaspersky, and Cisco.

In Uzbekistan, one of Huawei’s key initiatives is its annual ICT Competition, “Seeds for the Future,” aimed at students and professionals in the ICT field. In 2020-2021 the event was attended by 50 students of Uzbekistan from universities with IT directions. Additionally, Huawei has established an important new ICT Academy at Inha University in Tashkent.

Huawei’s developments are in line with the ambitions of both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to position themselves as digital hubs. The current Kassym-Jomart Tokayev regime in Kazakhstan recognizes the pivotal role of education, especially in STEM and IT, as potential catalysts for bridging economic disparities, preventing future unrest, and maintaining social and regime stability. Likewise, Uzbekistan’s government has been implementing ambitious plans to transform the country into a digital hub through its “Digital Uzbekistan – 2030” strategy.

Huawei has thrown its weight behind ambitious plans in Kazakhstan to train 100,000 IT specialists through various courses, the benefit of which for the economy might reach $500 million. In support of these educational objectives, Huawei’s Information and Communication Technology Academies, which collaborate with institutions globally, are an excellent potential aid to Tokayev’s initiative. In a meeting with the company’s leadership, Tokayev endorsed the revitalization of ICT Academies, which are based at Kazakhstani universities and offer vendor knowledge, equipping students and staff in the IT sphere with certifications tailored to industry requirements.

However, university program coordinators hosting Huawei’s ICT Academies in Kazakhstan have indicated in interviews that the focus primarily lies in training top students to become program trainers working in foreign branches of Huawei rather than fostering R&D at home.

Huawei’s courses, it appears, are geared more toward producing administrative staff than nurturing R&D talent. In one interview, the coordinator of Huawei ICT Academies at a university in Kazakhstan explained, “We need to engage in research and educate individuals on how to construct systems like Huawei’s — we have to do things the other way around.”

According to this coordinator, any vendor-sponsored education, including Huawei’s, aims to instill the habit of using their technology from a young age so that students will naturally gravitate toward it in the future. Interviews suggest that Huawei’s investment in the essential IT infrastructure of these universities remains minimal, although there are indications that Huawei  has started to invest in areas such as sports programming and cybersecurity.

For local talent, it remains a challenge to attain high-ranking positions within Chinese companies. Instead, Chinese nationals often fill these roles. “Two directors work on any project, one is local, and the other is Chinese, who ensures that everything is done according to the official line of China,” said a previous Huawei employee. Rather than professional skills, knowledge of the Chinese language is key for career growth.

Beyond the lack of R&D investment, there are also concerns about data flowing to China, which raises questions regarding state access and personal data protection. “If the data ends up in China, the state has wide access. If Huawei sends some data to China for analysis, personal data is not protected from the state,” said a Kazakhstani software engineer trained in Nanjing.

These data concerns are particularly prevalent in the case of Huawei’s “Safe City” infrastructure, which feature surveillance cameras with facial and license plate recognition capabilities and are predominantly manufactured in China.

On April 25, 2019 Uzbekistan’s Mirziyoyev visited the Huawei Research and Innovation Center as part of his participation in the second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. Following on from agreements signed as part of that visit, an Uzbek-Chinese joint venture (JV) with an authorized capital of $2 million was established for the purpose of constructing a “Safe City” complex in Tashkent. The companies “Costar Group Co. Ltd” and “CITIC Guoan Information Technology Co. Ltd” own 42 percent of the JV, with the state of Uzbekistan owning shares in the amount of 58 percent.

The safe city attracted direct investments in the amount of $300 million and according to the project’s “road map,” Huawei is defined as the main supplier of goods and services. The Ministry of Information Technologies and Communications Development was designated as the authorized state organization for maintenance and technical support of the integrated system, which involved a data processing center, mandatory integration of state information systems into the “Safe City” system, surveillance of traffic violations, and monitoring of residences.

It is unclear which of these steps has been implemented, but as a result of the road map, Huawei secured a contract with the government of Uzbekistan valued at $1 billion to advance the country’s surveillance infrastructure. Since 2014, approximately 500 Chinese cities have initiated transformation projects to become cyber-integrated “smart” cities. And now Chinese tech giant Huawei has moved to export its systems to Uzbekistan.

According to a former Huawei employee in Kazakhstan, Chinese companies such as Huawei “can use resources to pump data. The Chinese company, for example, creates a VPN and duplicates data. In one oil and gas project, China requires every picture from CCTV cameras to be duplicated in China.”

The increase in Chinese economic influence in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is leading to the domination of companies like Huawei in critical infrastructure sectors such as telecommunications and IT-related hardware.

These countries rely on companies such as Huawei in order to become digital hubs, but as the example of Kazakhstan demonstrates, in order to truly advance this goal, investment in R&D talent is needed – not something not necessarily at the top of Huawei’s agenda. Additionally, there are clear risks associated with dependence on Huawei’s surveillance technology.

This article was produced as part of the Spheres of Influence Uncovered project, implemented by n-ost, BIRN, Anhor, and JAM News, with financial support from the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).

23 Dec, 2023

- How China Games the Universal Periodic Review System

- Japan-South Korea Cooperation: Strength in Unity, Danger in Division

- Philippine Broadcast Regulator Suspends TV Show of Former President Duterte

- An Interview With Song Young-gil, South Korea’s Other Opposition Leader

- The Evolution of Identity in Taiwan

- India Announces Republic Day Chief Guest: French President Emmanuel Macron

- China’s Electric Vehicle Expansion in Central Asia

- Balochistan’s Long March Protest

- Previewing North Korea’s Strategic Moves in 2024

How China Games the Universal Periodic Review System

China will try to manipulate a U.N. human rights review in January. States can’t let that happen.

Shannon   23 Dec, 2023

China United Nations UN flag

A United Nations review of China’s human rights record set to occur in January should shine a light on Beijing’s atrocity crimes. But there are three ways in which this Universal Periodic Review (UPR) may actually worsen rather than improve the human rights situation inside China.

In 2006, the U.N. created the UPR, in which every U.N. member state must undergo an examination of its human rights performance every 4.5 years. The idea is that through good faith dialogue with other states, governments can improve their human rights record. The process depends on states making and accepting strong, clear recommendations linked to real progress. Yet not only do highly abusive governments also get to participate, but also there is no mechanism to block recommendations that effectively endorse ongoing human rights violations.

Beijing’s lack of good faith in the process is the first and fundamental problem. Since its last review in 2018, instead of working with U.N. human rights experts to improve the situation on the ground, the Chinese government has worsened its record in terms of cooperation with U.N. human rights mechanisms. This includes the Chinese government’s dishonorable distinction of consistently topping the list of governments that persecute human rights defenders for cooperating with those very U.N. mechanisms. Beijing is notorious for manipulating U.N. processes to shield itself from scrutiny, and it is likely to do so again at the upcoming UPR.

Second, our research, designed to help states approach China’s next review strategically, illuminates how Beijing manipulates UPR recommendations. In the last review, Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng declared that his government had accepted 284 of 346 recommendations. However, the majority of these accepted recommendations were so weak or vague that any progress toward improving human rights could not be measured.

For example, Hungary encouraged Beijing to “Continue to protect the rights of vulnerable groups.” But it did not specify any particular vulnerable groups. It also misleadingly asked China to “continue” to do something that China had not done: to protect vulnerable groups. China accepted Hungary’s recommendation – and continued to discriminate against, and violate the rights of, migrant workers, LGBTQ+ persons, ethnic minorities, and others.

Third, dozens of the recommendations that China eagerly accepted effectively endorsed its oppressive laws and policies. These recommendations often come from states that are themselves notorious for violating human rights. For example, Iran suggested that China “Safeguard its political system and the development path chosen by its own people.” But this sort of recommendation seeks to legitimize the Chinese government’s persecution of human rights defenders and dissidents who push for democracy and human rights.

Many governments operating in good faith are still under the impression that they should aim at crafting recommendations likely acceptable by China. Our message to them is clear: doing so would waste a critical opportunity for advancing human rights and inadvertently help defeat the purpose of the UPR.

This moment calls for great courage in calling out China for its human rights abuses. Mainland human rights defenders and lawyers in China face severe persecution. In Hong Kong, the 2020 National Security Law (NSL) has allowed authorities to rapidly dismantle civil and political rights, with the U.N. Human Rights Committee calling for “concrete steps” to repeal the NSL and “in the meantime, refrain from applying it.” Human rights are systematically denied in Tibet, with particular concern for freedom of religion and cultural rights. Beijing is credibly accused of committing ongoing crimes against humanity in the Uyghur region.

Given this crisis, states must focus on making strong recommendations, invoking the credible work by U.N. human rights experts on China since 2018. States should recommend China to implement the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ suggestions for change in its Xinjiang assessment.

Beijing may well reject these and other tough recommendations, but building a body of evidence showing its refusal to cooperate with U.N. human rights mechanism is useful. That body of evidence can in turn inform U.N. Human Rights Council (HRC) votes on investigations in the Uyghur region and China’s suitability for HRC membership.

The many victims and survivors of Beijing’s vast human rights abuses need a review that brings them immediate relief and moral support, not one that endorses those realities. Diplomats participating in this review must also recall that these reviews create an opportunity to speak truth to Chinese authorities – an opportunity not available to the vast majority of people inside China.

Diplomats should prepare to offer up precise recommendations on the hardest issues with a view toward making a real difference. Anything less betrays human rights defenders, wastes a rare opportunity – and emboldens the abusers.

Japan-South Korea Cooperation: Strength in Unity, Danger in Division

Deepened trilateral cooperation between the U.S. and its two key East Asian allies is a positive development, but the fragility of Japanese and South Korean leadership underscores the importance of long-term reconciliation.

Catherine Putz   23 Dec, 2023

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol (left) and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio attend a joint press conference after their summit in Tokyo, Japan, Mar. 16, 2023.

To say that Japan-South Korea relations went through a rough patch in the late 2010s and early 2020s would be quite an understatement. From trade and territorial disputes, to the radar lock incident, the situation was made all the worse by ongoing historical disputes, which resurfaced with high-profile court cases. It seemed at one point almost inconceivable that the bilateral relationship would ever recover.

This makes the seemingly rapid turnaround pulled off by the Kishida Fumio and Yoon Suk-yeoul administrations all the more impressive; within months of each taking office, the resumption of so-called shuttle diplomacy, the resolution of the Abe-Moon era trade disputes, and even trilateral summits including the United States were all on the table. In the wake of China’s continued military expansion, Russia’s renewed imperial aggression, and North Korea’s recurrent belligerence, these moves toward reconciliation are in the obvious interests of both Japan and South Korea.

However, the seemingly miraculous ointment that has been used by the two leaders has some very large flies in it.

Chief among these is the inherent unpopularity of both Kishida and Yoon; in a recent poll, Yoon sits at a 36.3 percent approval rating while the ongoing slush fund scandal has seen Kishida’s approval rating slip to just 26 percent. Even if these issues were to be overcome, outstanding historical issues still simmer, other fault lines such as the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute remain unresolved, and in any case it would be unreasonable to expect that years of acrimony could be washed away so quickly.

An even greater issue is the potential for the eventual political successors to Kishida and Yoon to undo their work. Of the leading contenders to replace Kishida, at least two are members of Nippon Kaigi, which promotes the exact kind of historical revisionism to which South Korea is very sensitive, and the leadership of South Korea’s opposition Democratic Party has made plain it does not support Yoon’s Japan policy.

Consequently, while seemingly positive at the moment, the foundation of this rapprochement is very much built on sand; if it is to last, more must be done by both Japan and South Korea to resolve outstanding issues.

History, Reconciliation, and Shared Values

The United States has long screamed the question from the sidelines to Japan and South Korea: “Why can’t you two just get along?”

The answer is, of course, primarily historical. For all the proclamations of a “future-oriented relationship,” history remains a defining factor. South Korea’s liberal party, now in opposition, in particular continues to run on a platform that it perceives primarily as based around seeking justice from Japan for past historical issues, and some argue that this sometimes devolves into wider anti-Japanese sentiment.

Whether this is the case or not, the scale of sensitivity in South Korea cannot be overstated – the 2019 trade dispute, tied heavily to a dispute over compensation for wartime forced labor, led to a wide-scale boycott movement of Japanese products, even causing a 17.9 percent decline in travel to Japan. The former United States Ambassador to South Korea Harry Harris, of Japanese ancestry, even came under fire for a mustache that was perceived to bear a resemblance to those of colonial-era figures. For their part, Japanese politicians making historical revisionist statements or paying visits to Yasukuni Shrine have further stoked controversy. The legacy of the colonial period cannot be easily forgotten.

History is immutable, and reconciliation will not come easily or quickly. Yet it remains important to the long-term relationship and the interests of both nations to resolve these issues. The goal of this article is not to pronounce on which side should do more to resolve historical issues and to achieve reconciliation or to suggest means for the two to reconcile. However, as a practical acknowledgement of the nature of Japan-South Korea relations and the limits of what can be expected in terms of cooperation, it is important to raise this point. At the very least, it should tell us to not expect too much too quickly, and it highlights the potential dangers to any current bilateral or trilateral cooperation. If the issues of history are not dealt with, then a return to the acrimonious Abe-Moon era is far from off the cards, and such an outcome is only to the benefit of the shared adversaries of both Japan and South Korea.

Despite these historical issues, Japanese and South Korean values on present day issues are in broad alignment.

When Yoon proclaimed that South Korea and Japan shared universal values and pursued common interests, it was no mere soundbite. Both countries espouse similar values in their respective policy documents relating to areas such as overseas aid, defense, and foreign policy, emphasizing freedom and human rights. Both rank as leading democracies along with Taiwan and are important standard-bearers of democratic values in a region rife with autocracy. Both heavily value their relationships with the United States and support the preservation of a rules-based international order.

These are shared ideals that can be built on; they are a solid foundation for an alliance not only of interests, but of values – values that both countries see as worth promoting and defending. The effective defense of these values demands a united response, and acrimony between two of the staunchest defenders of these values over historical issues is an abrogation of responsibility on the part of those charged with defending them. For the limits of Japan-South Korea cooperation to be fully broken, real, lasting solutions to the historical disputes between the two must be found and viewed as vital matters of national security.

Unity and Shared Values as National Security

China, Russia and North Korea – nuclear-armed states with territorial ambitions, unstable governments, or both – represent three of the world’s most dangerous security challenges, and they are arguably becoming more closely aligned with each other. While I myself have argued that such alliances of narrow interest do not last compared to alliances built on values, these countries nonetheless present long-term threats in that they are each dangerous even on their own. Neither Japan nor South Korea alone has the strength to effectively deter or induce any of these, and only through the preservation of a friendly, united relationship can the objectives of either be fulfilled.

Autocratic states have long tried to sow mutual division and hatred. In particular, China’s invitation to then-South Korean President Park Geun-hye to attend a military parade in Tiananmen Square in 2015 raised immediate alarm bells in Washington and Tokyo, and Beijing has attempted to weaponize the shared history of Japanese colonialism in its other interactions with South Korea. It also practices influence operations in South Korea, aimed at dividing society, and it would be little stretch to imagine that such influence operations may be used to undermine the Japan-South Korea relationship as well. Both Russia and North Korea also invest heavily in influence operations, and it can be expected that efforts to drive wedges between Japan, South Korea, and the United States will continue.

These tactics, however, are only effective because policymakers have failed to resolve outstanding historical issues; without a pot to stir, it is inevitable that such efforts would decline in effectiveness. This is why the resolution of these issues is a vital matter of national security for both Japan and South Korea – creating a genuinely friendly and positive relationship is the best way to guard against those who would seek to wedge-drive. A change in leadership in Japan or South Korea would be little threat if future leaders were not faced with the imminent problem of historical disputes.

Whether Pressure or Inducement, Unity is Key

As things stand, countries like North Korea can simply wait for a change in leadership to exploit division to their own ends. It is vital that this ability be taken away. Regardless of whether pressure or inducement is being pursued, the policy objectives of Japan and South Korea are more likely to be achieved with unity. Sanctions and deterrence are less effective with a weak link, and the inducement power of individual states is not strong enough to produce meaningful, long-term change so long as there is the chance that it will be undone later. Unity – real unity without exploitable fault lines – is key to both effectively inducing and pressuring. Again, if the pot is taken away, it can no longer be stirred by adversaries that only wish harm on both South Korea and Japan.

A foundation of shared values is an important first step, and with the institutionalization of trilateral cooperation promoted by the Biden administration there is hope that at least some of the benefits of the Kishida-Yoon thaw will be lasting. Nonetheless, for the benefits of the rapprochement to be permanent, real, and lasting, then resolutions, however hard they may be, need to be found. Doing so is the only way to safeguard both Japanese and South Korean values and interests in the long-term.

Philippine Broadcast Regulator Suspends TV Show of Former President Duterte

Duterte’s TV show will be off the air for two weeks. Has the former president finally lost the backing of the ruling coalition?

Catherine Putz   23 Dec, 2023

Former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte speaks in the southern Philippines on March 5, 2021. (Facebook/Rody Duterte)

A Philippine regulatory board has suspended former President Rodrigo Duterte’s TV show, reflecting a deepening discord within the ruling coalition. Supporters of the former president insist that the move is a violation of press freedom, but human rights advocates assert that those who make death threats on live TV should be held accountable.

The Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) issued a two-week suspension order against two Sonshine Media Network International (SMNI) programs, which included Duterte’s show, for airing profane language and alleged death threats against an opposition lawmaker. The controversial episode of the show aired in October and became the basis for a criminal complaint against Duterte, whose term as president ended in June 2022.

In the program, Duterte was ranting against Leftist lawmakers who questioned the confidential funds proposed by the office of his daughter, Vice President Sara Duterte, who also serves as education secretary. He condemned Congress as a “rotten institution” after the latter removed all confidential funds from civilian agencies. Bowing to public pressure, the younger Duterte eventually withdrew her proposal for the confidential funds.

Although the complaint against Duterte has yet to be resolved by the prosecutor’s office, the MTRCB issued its suspension order anyway. The MTRCB is an independent body, but its bold decision could indicate that government agencies are now ready to review the statements and actions of the former president. Duterte has long used his show to lambast and demonize critics and rival political personalities.

A few months ago, it would be unthinkable to hear comments, suggestions, and orders from officials that could potentially sever the alliance between the Dutertes and the government of President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr.

But the situation has evolved. In addition to the Congress realignment of confidential funds and the recent MTRCB decision, Marcos himself has publicly stated that his government is reconsidering the option of rejoining the International Criminal Court. The ICC is conducting a probe directed against Duterte for allegedly committing crimes against humanity concerning the bloody enforcement of his administration’s “war on drugs.”

Reacting to the MTRCB decision, Duterte’s allies warned that it could have a chilling effect on the press and those who are challenging the policies of the Marcos government. Ironically, the same people who cheered the closure of the country’s largest media station and those who echoed Duterte’s harassment and intimidation of the media when he was president are now raising the importance of upholding the freedom of expression.

Former Senator Leila de Lima, who was detained under the Duterte government, clarified in a thread posted on X (formerly Twitter) that “free speech must be distinguished from the peddling of fake news and incitement of people to criminal conduct.” She added that “government can’t be made powerless to penalize consummated violations in order to preclude recidivist and unapologetic repetition of illegal conduct on air.”

SMNI has been accused of being a platform for amplifying hate against communists, activists, and political forces that opposed Duterte’s repressive policies during his term. SMNI is allegedly owned by Apollo Carreon Quiboloy, a close ally of Duterte (though the network has denied that). The self-proclaimed “appointed son of God” is wanted by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation for sexual and child trafficking charges.

In a statement, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines reminded Duterte and SMNI that “freedom of expression and the freedom of the press are not blanket justifications for hate speech, vilification and threats.” Indeed, it is hypocritical for Duterte and SMNI to invoke free speech when they consistently tagged activists, human rights defenders, and even the media as enemies of the state, members of armed rebel groups, and terrorists.

Duterte will be off the air for two weeks, and the network hosting his show could face bigger sanctions. It may be a brief setback for the former president, but he can find other ways to broadcast his messages. As for the MTRCB decision and the spirited debates that followed it, Duterte’s camp must realize by now that it has lost solid backing from the ruling coalition. More importantly, the forces previously targeted by the former president’s verbal attacks are now availing all opportunities to pursue accountability and justice.

An Interview With Song Young-gil, South Korea’s Other Opposition Leader

“If I end up creating a new party, the objective will be to oust President Yoon,” says the former Democratic Party head.

Shannon   23 Dec, 2023

As South Korea’s 2024 general election nears, the ruling People Power Party (PPP) and the leading opposition Democratic Party (DP) are bracing for a bitter race.

For now, the prospects favor the liberal DP, headed by Lee Jae-myung, which currently holds enough seats in the legislature to stymie any moves by President Yoon Suk-yeol of the PPP. The DP’s landslide victory against the PPP in October’s Gangseo District by-election puts them in an advantageous position heading into the April 2024 election.

However, the opposition party has its own hurdles. Lee still faces a criminal investigation over graft and several other charges. Likewise, while Yoon’s approval rating continues to falter, the DP has largely failed to build a unified front against the president. As such, some are questioning whether Lee could lead his team to victory in April and, more crucially, in the 2027 presidential election.

Amid uncertainties, political outcasts that were once high-profile members of the DP are attempting comebacks. One such figure is Song Young-gil, former head of the DP, mayor of Incheon, and a five-time elected lawmaker.

Song recently vowed to form a new party to bring down Yoon and his clique. Despite the paucity of concrete actions, his willingness to fight seems to have caught the attention of DP voters. Whether Song’s talk will manifest in action is unclear, but it certainly carries the potential to shake up the DP’s electoral landscape and Lee’s calculus come April.

Earlier this month, Song spoke to The Diplomat about his election strategies and why he believes Yoon is not fit to run the country.

During the last presidential election, you said you won’t run in the 2024 general election. But you seem to have changed your mind lately. Can you explain?

To clarify, I said that I had no intention of running in my Gyeyang District in Incheon. Of course, this was contingent on Lee Jae-myung, then-presidential candidate from the Democratic Party (DP), coming out victorious in the race. But Lee lost to Yoon – albeit by a razor-thin 0.7 point margin – so my plans have changed since. Gyeyang District is still off the list of possibilities, but I might run as a proportional representation candidate.

While the DP currently holds a majority in the legislature, it has lost momentum and largely abandoned its duty to check the ruling PPP and the executive branch. If I could help the DP maintain its dominance in the National Assembly and form a stronger coalition against the president, I’m prepared to do so in whatever capacity.

Former Minister of Justice Cho Kuk seems to be vying for a seat in the legislature. So is Lee Jun-seok, former chief of the PPP. You spoke to the press about potentially forming a new party and partnering with Cho and Lee if need be. Can you elaborate?

If I end up creating a new party, the objective will be to oust President Yoon. I think the president has exemplified time and again his incompetence in leading the nation, not to mention the recent failure to host the 2030 Expo and his ruinous economic policies. This is on top of myriad allegations of criminal activities by the president and his family. The incumbent administration, I believe, has run its course.

A partnership doesn’t necessarily mean I’ll be working hand-in-hand with Cho or Lee. If their views align with mine, say, in building a coalition against the incumbent leader, we can compartmentalize and work towards a common goal.

Why do you think President Yoon is not fit to run the country?

By filling government agencies, his ruling party, and the presidential office with a “pro-Yoon prosecutorial clique,” the president has effectively built a “republic of prosecutors.” The latest example is the appointment of Kim Hong-il, former chief of the anti-corruption agency, as chairperson of the Korea Communications Commission.

This clique, working under the auspices of President Yoon, has debilitated South Korea’s democratic norms by wielding their authority to shield the president and his family from criminal liabilities, suppress press freedom, and shut down opponents and dissenters.

Take, for instance, some of the accusations leveled against President Yoon and the first lady. When Yoon was the prosecutor-general, he is said to have colluded with and ordered the pro-Yoon prosecutorial clique to sue ranking member politicians and journalists right before the 2020 general election. Meanwhile, the first lady is accused of gaining outsized profits through manipulating Deutsche Motors stock prices. These are all indictable offenses, but the investigation has completely ceased due to the president’s systematic obstruction. It will now require a special counsel to resume the case.

The Yoon administration is also intensifying media crackdowns, especially against those investigating the president’s delinquencies. In September, prosecutors raided and confiscated evidence from the offices of the online outlet News Tapa and cable network JTBC for investigating President Yoon’s potential involvement in a real estate corruption scheme. More recently, the prosecutors sought to re-arrest an independent journalist probing Yoon’s alleged misconduct involving manipulating evidence during [former President] Park Geun-hye’s impeachment investigation.

Forming a new party might be seen as stirring division within the liberal camp heading into the election. What do you say to those who criticize you for it?

If our proportional representation system reverts to the old “parallel” system, there’s no reason for me to enter the race or create a new party. But with the current “interlocking” system, my initiatives, if anything, will help expand liberal forces and maintain dominance in the legislature.

My new party would be a proportional representation party, largely composed of proportional representation candidates. Thus, it’s unlikely that these candidates would compete with the DP for a seat in the district race. Even if they decide to run in the district race, we will encourage them to unify their candidacy with DP candidates. So, we’re not “robbing” any seats from the DP or, in a larger sense, the left.

You are currently under investigation for an alleged “cash-for-vote scandal.” Would you like to comment?

The gist of the allegation is that, during the Democratic Party convention in May 2021, my acquaintances and party affiliates funneled money (about 60 million won or $45,000) to some two dozen lawmakers to get me elected as party chief.

Cases concerning public elections usually have a six-month statute of limitation and are often resolved within that time frame. But this was an intra-party convention, so election laws don’t apply. Therefore, the prosecution deemed the incident, which allegedly occurred more than two years ago at a political convention that permits far more leeway than an election, to be “corruption.”

While the whole event transpired without my knowledge, I take full political responsibility. So immediately after such a report came out, I quit my professorship in France, returned to Korea, and withdrew my party membership. But legally speaking, I should be absolved of all charges.

Nevertheless, the Seoul Central Prosecution Office has dragged out the investigation for seven months without any reasonable suspicion. They went as far as to issue a subpoena for questioning and filed a motion for my arrest warrant on December 13.

[Editor’s note: Song was arrested on December 18 after the Seoul Central District Court issued his arrest warrant.]

You claim that the pending investigation is unjust. How so? Will it influence your bid next April?

Fundamentally, the prosecutors are less concerned about scrutinizing my case but are instead focusing on peripheral matters, such as summoning people around me and raiding a civic group I’m affiliated with. They are alleging that funds tied to civic groups were illicitly funneled to support my political activities. In South Korea, we call this tactic a “pretextual investigation,” whereby the prosecutors pressure and probe my surroundings to induce damaging testimonies against me.

Given the timeline of the investigation that overlaps with the election period, I cannot rule out the negative impact of the investigation entirely. If the prosecution decides to strategically wield its authority, and if the media paints a grim picture as a result, it will certainly hurt my campaign.

The Evolution of Identity in Taiwan

That more and more people in Taiwan identify as “Taiwanese” and not “Chinese” is partially the result of Beijing’s own policies.

Shannon   23 Dec, 2023

Longshan Temple in Taipei, Taiwan.

The problem of identity is the most important issue in Taiwanese politics, occupying the center stage for both presidential campaigns and cross-strait relations. In recent years, there has been a notable decline in Chinese identification in Taiwan. This decline is the result of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s monopolization of Chinese identity since the 1970s. Beijing’s goal is to use Chinese nationalism and cultural appeal to draw Taiwan closer to the mainland. However, it backfires by pushing Taiwan away; Taiwanese people are searching for an alternative identity to demonstrate their difference with the PRC.

Following its defeat in mainland China, the Republic of China (ROC) government relocated to Taiwan. However, the Kuomintang (KMT) retained its devotion as a party of Chinese nationalists (the literal translation of the party name). The KMT made “reconquering the mainland” the mission for everyone on Taiwan. The island was to become the bastion against communism and a base for the KMT’s eventual return to the mainland.

Under this narrative, Taiwan is part of the ROC, and a separate Taiwanese state does not exist. Taiwan’s sovereignty was returned to the ROC after Japan’s surrender in 1945, recognized by the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations; prior to that, the island had been a colony of imperial Japan since 1895.

Another way to demonstrate Chinese nationalism was through cultural promotion and preservation. During the retreat to Taiwan, the Nationalists brought national treasures from the Forbidden City in Beijing, including the original scripts of imperial dynastic histories, to Taipei and stored them in the Taipei Palace Museum. This gesture symbolized the KMT’s efforts to claim that the ROC is the legitimate heir of Chinese dynasties.

More broadly, the ROC government enforced policies to promote Chinese culture in Taiwan to preserve its claim to be the legitimate government of the entire China. The government renamed streets in Taipei after Confucian virtues and places in the mainland. Mandarin was made the official language and the only language at school; students who did not speak Mandarin would face punishment. Non-Mandarin radio and television programs were limited to a few hours a day. Students were required to learn every detail of Chinese history and geography at school, including train stations on railroad lines in the mainland.

The international recognition of the ROC rested on its claim to be the sole representative of China on the international stage. The ROC’s international recognition and participation in the United Nations and other international organizations strengthened this claim. Therefore, the Chiang Kai-shek government adopted the policy of “汉贼不两立,” a quote from the Three Kingdoms era that means “true Chinese and the rebel could not stand together.” Zhuge Liang, the premier of Shuhan, a kingdom in Sichuan built by the decadents of Han Dynasty imperial households, used this phrase to justify his policies of refusing to engage with the kingdom of Wei in Northern China and military invasions to reunify China.

Using this historical example as an allusion, the Chiang government claimed that the ROC was the only legitimate government of China, the mainland was under rebel control, and international engagement with China should only go through the ROC government. Under this policy, Taipei would cut relations with any country or organization that recognized the PRC government in Beijing.

The ROC’s claim as China’s sole representation suffered a major blow in 1971. The U.N. adopted General Assembly Resolution 2758 on October 25, 1971, which “to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it.” To avoid further humiliation, Chiang ordered the delegation to walk out of the United Nations. After walking out, the head of the ROC delegation declared that the ROC was a U.N. founding member after great sacrifices and contributions in World War II, and compared Resolution 2758 to the appeasement policy in the Munich Agreement, which led to further Nazi aggression.

In Chiang’s declaration after the ROC withdrew from the U.N., he continued to invoke the mainland-centric narrative and claim legitimacy to represent all of China. He referred to the PRC as the “Maoist-Communist bandit group,” which purged millions of Chinese compatriots. Chiang also stressed that the ROC government represented China to sign the U.N. Declaration after World War II. Therefore, the ROC should be the real representation of China and the 700 million Chinese people.

The retreat from the U.N. and the loss of recognition from the United States, Japan, and other Western countries shortly thereafter was a significant blow to the ROC’s claim as the sole representation of China. Beijing launched an international offense to establish diplomatic relations with foreign countries and claimed the ROC’s seat in international organizations.

By squeezing Taiwan’s international space, the PRC aims to demonstrate the One China principle, which positions Beijing as the central government while Taipei is a local government. Beijing increasingly monopolized the meaning of being “Chinese” and equated it with PRC identity. Being Chinese, in the eyes of the Chinese Communist Party, means supporting the PRC’s political system and the party’s ideology. Those who disagree with the CCP’s vision would be labeled “traitors” or “scum of the nation.”

The 1979 “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan” was released the same day the PRC established a diplomatic relationship with the United States. On the day the ROC lost its most important ally, the message served as Beijing’s victory declaration, as it could deal with Taipei from a position of strength. The message was delivered on behalf of the entire Chinese nation, stating that “every Chinese, in Taiwan or on the mainland, has a compelling responsibility for the survival, growth, and prosperity of the Chinese nation.” Therefore, “The important task of reunifying our motherland …. is an issue no one can evade or should try to.” Those who refuse unification would “go down in history as a traitor of the nation.”

The message further declared, “The world in general recognizes only one China, with the government of the People’s Republic of China as its sole legal government. The recent conclusion of the China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the normalization of relations between China and the United States show still more clearly that no one can stop this trend.” The international recognition of the PRC further supported Beijing’s monopoly over Chinese identity.

While the ROC lost its international recognition to the PRC, it was also facing increasing domestic pressure for change. Since the KMT’s arrival in 1945, the native Taiwanese (benshengren, 本省人) never trusted the ROC regime and mainlanders (waishengren, 外省人). The 2-28 Incident further aggravated this mutual distrust into mutual hatred after the heavy KMT crackdown on Taiwanese protests. Reacting to the KMT’s policy to forge a mainland-centric Chinese identity, the Taiwanese advocated nativization, which aimed to replace mainland themes with Taiwan themes. Authors depicted characters who spoke local dialects and wrote stories about their lives in Taiwan. Taiwanese political activists also struggled for democratization under the banner of nativization and even independence.

The growing native identity in Taiwan and the PRC’s monopoly over the Chinese identity put the KMT and the waishengren in Taiwan in a dilemma. Second and third-generation waishengren were born and raised in Taiwan; mainland China was the place where their fathers and grandfathers came from. This generational change meant that young waishengren have less affection toward the mainland, a place many have never been to.

The KMT refused the Taiwan independence narrative and felt suspicious toward native Taiwanese identity. However, the PRC’s definition of China was also alien; they refused to subscribe to the CCP’s nationalistic visions. The PRC’s increasing monopoly over the definition of China meant that people in Taiwan could not express their identity in line with how China is defined worldwide, which equates to the PRC.

Facing this dilemma, the KMT leaders sought to reshape their identity. Starting with Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek’s son and successor, the KMT selectively embraced elements of native Taiwanese identity to reinvigorate KMT’s legitimacy. Between 1973 and 1979, Taiwanese representation on the KMT central standing committee more than doubled. In 1982, Chiang Ching-kuo elevated Lee Teng-hui, a native Taiwanese technocrat, to vice president and later his successor. In addition, Chiang decided to lift martial law and revoked bans on newspapers, other publications, and political parties, which granted Taiwanese more political power and representation.

When Lee Teng-hui became the first Taiwan-born KMT president, he faced a dilemma. He had to shape a collective identity for over 20 million Taiwanese people that was distinct from the PRC narrative, which was increasingly monopolizing Chinese identity, while maintaining the KMT’s one China and national unification principles in his 1992 National Unification Guideline.

To square this impossible circle, Lee introduced the concept of New Taiwanese, which tried to bridge the gap between the ethnic differences among Taiwanese, waishengren, and Indigenous peoples. He defined New Taiwanese as anyone who “lives in and loves Taiwan.” This definition allows waishengren to resolve their identity crisis and express their identity with this new concept.

In addition, following the democratization in Taiwan and the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, both waishengren and Taiwanese increasingly associated their identity with liberal democratic values. Democracy also reinforced this Taiwan-first identity because KMT must appeal to voters in Taiwan.

Since Lee, this value-based identity has become increasingly accepted by the Taiwanese public. Former President Ma Ying-Jeou of the KMT expressed that “liberal democracy” is the “historical pre-condition” for cross-strait peaceful development. He also stated that “democracy, liberty, human rights, and the rule of law” are the “core values of Taiwan”; Taiwan would be alienated if the PRC government cannot advance these values.

Taiwan’s two DPP presidents to date, Chen Shui-bian and Tsai Ing-wen, also moved away from the traditional Taiwanese-focused ethno-nationalistic position of the DPP and accepted a value-based identity to unify the entire Taiwanese population.

Today, different identities remain at the front and center of cross-strait differences. The PRC must understand the evolution of identity in Taiwan to make a successful Taiwan policy. The current Taiwanese identity is a rejection of the PRC’s authoritarian political system rather than the rejection of China as a cultural entity; the crackdown on Hong Kong since 2019 further aggravated this rejection. Beijing’s continued monopolization of Chinese identity only pushes Taiwan society away and forces the Taiwan public to find an alternative way to express their identity.

Beijing must adopt an open approach in influencing the identity discussion in Taiwan. First, the PRC should engage with all political forces in Taiwan, including the DPP. Freezing the DPP out of conversations will not lead to any breakthrough in shaping identity politics in Taiwan. Second, the PRC should disassociate the concept of China with the PRC’s polity, and invite Taiwanese, Hong Kongers, Macanese, and overseas Chinese to define China jointly.

India Announces Republic Day Chief Guest: French President Emmanuel Macron

New Delhi and Paris have a lot in common in terms of their strategic perspectives on a free, open, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific.

Catherine Putz   23 Dec, 2023

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi with French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris, France, to mark the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the strategic partnership, July 14, 2023.

India announced on December 22 that French President Emmanuel Macron will be the chief guest at India’s Republic Day celebrations in January. According to Indian media reports, his invitation was done on short notice because U.S. President Joe Biden, who was hoped to be the chief guest, could not come on account of the annual State of the Union address in Washington D.C.

Clearly, the French president’s confirmation, despite the last-minute request, reiterates for many in India that France is an all-weather friend that India can rely on. It will be the sixth time a French leader has been the chief guest at India’s Republic Day celebrations. French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac was the chief guest in 1976 and again as French president in 1998. Other French leaders so honored have included Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Nicolas Sarkozy, and François Hollande in 1980, 2008, and 2016 respectively.

New Delhi and Paris have a lot in common in terms of their strategic perspectives on a free, open, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific. That the two countries make a big case for strategic autonomy in the face of major geopolitical churning in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific can be viewed as a key driver for India and France to pursue an even closer strategic agenda. Further, the two countries have both pushed for a strengthening of multilateralism and multilateral institutions by making such bodies more representative and effective.

The joint statement issued during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Paris earlier this year, in fact, highlighted the “shared values, belief in sovereignty and strategic autonomy, an unwavering commitment to international law and the U.N. Charter, an abiding faith in multilateralism, and a common quest for a stable multipolar world.”

The number of high-level visits between India and France is a demonstration of the importance that the two attach to each other. Modi was in France as the chief guest at the French National Day celebrations in July 2023. The visit was also an occasion to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the India-France Strategic Partnership. If one were to do a quick scan of the documents signed between the two sides, the visit was a major success. The two put out a number of documents, including a Joint Communique;  Horizon 2047 – 25th Anniversary of the India-France Strategic Partnership, Towards a Century of India-France Relations; a list of outcomes; and the India-France Indo-Pacific Roadmap. Thereafter, Macron was in India for the G-20 Summit in September, when the two leaders reviewed and took stock of the many agreements signed in the summer.

India and France have remained close strategic partners with long-standing cooperation in all strategic sectors, including civil nuclear energy, defense, and outer space, and these came up in the bilateral meetings as well. The two discussed in particular how the two countries can loop in industries and start-ups to spur cooperation, especially in nuclear energy, including partnerships for co-developing small modular reactor and advanced modular reactor technologies, digital public infrastructure, critical technology, connectivity, energy, climate change, and education.

France has continued to enjoy unconditional support across the entire political spectrum in India and the larger public, and that helps the Indian government to pursue such partnerships without any impediment, be it in the civil nuclear energy arena or on the conventional defense front.

In fact, this also comes from the kind of staunch support that India has received from France at critical times in history. For instance, in May 1998, a few months after India and France elevated their partnership to a strategic partnership, India conducted its first nuclear tests, which were condemned across the international community. Many countries, including the U.S., Japan, the U.K., and others imposed sanctions on India. France was one country that did not condemn or sanction India for the nuclear tests, which is possibly something that New Delhi will continue to remember for a long time.

France is held, therefore, in high regard within India’s strategic calculations. And as Mohamed Zeeshan wrote in July this year, “if India has a natural ally, it’s probably France.” Japan arguably comes as a close second, with no historical baggage. Zeeshan noted France’s role as a middle power with significant geographical and geopolitical influence in the Indian Ocean: “France has the right mix of strengths and weaknesses to be India’s priority defense partner.”

Even during Modi’s visit in July, cooperation in the defense sector appeared to be high on the agenda, with India in need of more weapons and platforms and the inadequacies of Russian weapons on full display, accelerating the pace of Indian efforts to diversify its defense trade partners.

Amid rapidly changing balance of power politics, China’s belligerence and lucrative defense deals keep the France-India relationship on an ever-strong footing. However, it must also be noted that there are some differences between the two on international political issues. For example, France has been a strong supporter of Ukraine and sanctioned Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. Similarly, France has also sought closer economic ties with China. These are probably unlikely to make a big difference in the bilateral ties between New Delhi and Paris, but they are noteworthy, nevertheless.

China’s Electric Vehicle Expansion in Central Asia

Chinese electric vehicles are making inroads into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, but for different reasons.

Catherine Putz   23 Dec, 2023

Electric vehicle charging station

China produced almost 60 percent of the world’s electric vehicles (EVs) in 2022. In Central Asia, the market for EVs is small but growing, and Chinese companies are especially dominant. While imports from China accounted for only 3 percent of Europe’s EV sales in 2022, over 90 percent of EVs sold in Uzbekistan that year came from China. In Uzbekistan, brands like BYD are shifting perceptions of “Made in China” products.

Chinese brands also dominate EV imports to Kyrgyzstan, but unlike in Uzbekistan, where local demand is driving sales, few EVs from China can be seen on the streets of Bishkek or Osh. Instead, Kyrgyzstan serves as a convenient base for re-export to Russia.

From January to August 2023, Kyrgyzstan imported 4,085 EVs from China — almost six times more than the same period last year. Bishkek consistently ranks as one of the most polluted cities in the world, and Kyrgyzstan is trying to tackle pollution by encouraging the use of EVs through preferences such as a zero import tax rate.

Given Kyrgyzstan’s geographical distance from Europe and ongoing sanctions against Russia, China is a major supplier of vehicles. Although Chinese cars were associated with low quality just three to five years ago, today their popularity is rapidly gaining momentum.

However, the current state of electric charging station infrastructure in Kyrgyzstan leaves much to be desired. There are only about 30 charging points across the country, most of which are located in the capital, Bishkek. Bureaucratic hurdles also hinder the rollout of charging infrastructure, with approximately 195 days needed to obtain the necessary permits.

The shortage of service points for EVs significantly hinders the development of demand among the population. One Kyrgyz owner of a Chinese EV who we spoke to, Adilet, said that he decided to purchase his EV only because he owns a private house, which allows him to charge the car.

Most of the growing number of Chinese EV imports into Kyrgyzstan are re-exported to Russia. One importer of Chinese automobiles in Kyrgyzstan, speaking on condition of anonymity, shared that the demand for EVs within Kyrgyzstan is still low. His business primarily focuses on re-export to Russia, where purchasing power is higher, and there are fewer issues with energy supplies.

According to the importer, Chinese EV manufacturers have several significant advantages compared to Western ones: Geographical proximity and the “absence of restrictive conditions” due to sanctions; rock-bottom prices due to “the dumping of Chinese manufacturers;” and most importantly, Chinese companies are “ready to declare an official price in documents that is much lower than the actual price.”

Kyrgyzstan has become an attractive country for re-export due to the absence of indirect taxes. A Kyrgyz importer emphasized, “We don’t have excise taxes. No fees for recycling. So it’s cheaper to import through us. Secondly, our value-added tax is 12 percent – in Russia they pay 19-20 percent for a car.”

At this stage, the growth in the import of Chinese cars in Kyrgyzstan mainly benefits businesspeople and smugglers eyeing re-export to Russia. Efforts by authorities to encourage the population to switch to EVs appear to be largely unsuccessful, given that the infrastructure and economic incentives for demand are not yet well established.

Since 2019, Kyrgyzstan has been trying to encourage Chinese EV companies to build manufacturing plants in Kyrgyzstan. If plans to open an assembly plant for Chinese EVs do move from the realm of announcements to practical implementation, opportunities will emerge. However, the government must still address the primary hurdle to a burgeoning EV market: the energy deficit, which is estimated at 3.2 billion kilowatt-hours this year.

Uzbekistan’s government has also introduced a number of benefits to encourage the adoption of EVs, and on the face of it, these measures are yielding greater results. From January 1, 2019, a zero customs and excise tax rate has applied to the import of EVs, and in September 2021, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev exempted EVs from road transportation fees.

When these import exemptions for EVs first became effective in 2019, only 20 units were imported, and up until 2021, the number of imported EVs totalled only 200. However, from 2021 onward, the situation began to change dramatically. In 2021, the value of imported EVs reached $16.9 million – six times higher than in 2020. Almost 90 percent of these EVs came from China. In 2022, Uzbekistan imported 2,180 EVs worth $69.8 million, with 92 percent coming from China.

The explosion in EV imports coincided with the roll-out of charging infrastructure. Prior to 2020, EVs lacked adequate infrastructure: The first powering station in Tashkent was installed by Uzbekistani company Makro only in October 2020.

By early 2022, 36 charging stations had been established across the country, most of them built by private sector companies Makro, TokBor, and Megawatt Motors. In December 2022, Mirziyoyev signed an ambitious decree to increase the number of electric charging stations to 2,500 by the end of 2024.

Despite having only 66 operational stations at the time of the decree, the government hopes to achieve their goal through incentivizing and mandating stations. Earlier this year, businesses gained the right to sell electricity at independently set prices and on January 1, 2024, new shopping malls, hotels, gas stations, business centers, and infrastructure facilities along highways will be required to install electric charging stations.

Chinese companies are also moving EV manufacturing to Uzbekistan. On September 26, Chinese automaker BYD, agreed with Uzavtosanoat to establish a factory in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan has made plans to establish its own production of EVs in the past, but many of these plans have not yet materialized.

BYD may be different as it already has a strong customer base in Uzbekistan. Although many Uzbek consumers are still skeptical of Chinese products, which are associated with low prices and cheap quality, brands such as BYD may be shifting these perceptions.

Olesya, 21, who bought a BYD Song Plus Flagship in January 2023, describes her BYD car as meeting the standards of luxury cars. She stresses that the purchase of an EV is becoming more relevant against the background of problems with high-quality gasoline in Uzbekistan.

Shokhrukh, 43, claims that thanks to the purchase of an EV, his monthly expenses have decreased by 30 times — from $300 to $10. Another BYD owner, Olimkh, 24, also justifies his purchase in terms of savings on gasoline, and says that in terms of comfort, quality, design, and layout, the Chinese EV is ahead of local competitors.

But despite government support and all sorts of incentives, the development of the EV market in Uzbekistan may still be threatened by the same high prices in the energy sector suffered by Kyrgyzstan. According to the Ministry of Energy, electricity subsidies cost the budget $1 billion annually, and Uzbekistan’s national electricity company is the country’s most unprofitable state-owned company.

Although growing imports of Chinese EVs in Uzbekistan appear to be based on genuine consumer demand, the development of the electric transport sector still appears to hinge on reform of the energy sector.

This article was produced as part of the Spheres of Influence Uncovered project, implemented by n-ost, BIRN, Anhor, and JAM News, with financial support from the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).

Balochistan’s Long March Protest

An interview with Somaiyah Hafeez about the current protest movement demanding an end to forced disappearances and real accountability in Balochistan.

Shannon   23 Dec, 2023

Protesters joining the long march from Turbat to Islamabad.

Pakistan’s largest and poorest province, Balochistan has been the site of a long-running insurgency – and the heavy-handed response from the state has brought forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and impunity for security forces. In late November, the killing of four Baloch men in an alleged “fake encounter” touched off longstanding anger and anguish. Thousands of Balochs took to the streets to protest, eventually coalescing in a march from Turbat all the way to Pakistan’s capital, Islamabad. Security forces responded with a violent crackdown that began the night of December 21.

Where does the protest movement go from here, and what are the prospects for Baloch families to achieve justice for their missing loved ones?

In this video recorded on December 22, The Diplomat’s Shannon Tiezzi spoke to Somaiyah Hafeez, an Islamabad-based journalist who frequently reports on human rights in Balochistan, about the current protest movement and what it means for Balochistan’s future.

Previewing North Korea’s Strategic Moves in 2024

Expect North Korea to continue to advance military ties with Russia, push forward key advanced weapons programs (like nuclear subs), and generally shun diplomacy with the U.S. and South Korea.

Shannon   23 Dec, 2023

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (left) shakes hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin during a meeting at the Vostochny Cosmodrome, Sep. 13, 2023.

Since the breakdown of the 2019 Hanoi Summit between then-U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, North Korea has openly beefed up its missile capabilities. Also, with the election of Yoon Suk-yeol, the conservative South Korean president, in March 2022, tensions on the Korean Peninsula have been aggravated by the explicit power game between the two sides.

In light of the current security environment, this article forecasts how North Korea will likely behave toward the United States and South Korea in 2024.

Explicit Military Cooperation Between North Korea and Russia

Amid the strengthened South Korea-U.S. alliance, North Korea showed its clear intention to enhance ties with Russia to keep its leverage on the Korean Peninsula. This was made explicit at the summit between Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin on September 13, 2023.

In the past few months, Kim’s diplomacy has fully focused on strengthening ties with Russia, including hosting Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. Considering his vow to faithfully fulfill agreements made with Putin, Kim will likely continue to support Russia in 2024, which will give Washington and Seoul no chance to renew the stalled nuclear talks with Pyongyang.

Putin’s plan to completely suppress Ukraine in a short period has been impeded by the unexpected resistance of Ukrainians. To continue the “special military operation” in Ukraine, Putin needs munitions from like-minded leaders, and Kim is one of them. Although North Korea has denied accusations that it is supplying munitions to Russia, there have been numerous reports to the contrary.

According to the White House, North Korea delivered 1,000 containers of equipment and munitions to Russia in September. The South Korean spy agency believes that North Korea has sent more than a million artillery shells to Russia since August. Also, the South Korean military suspects North Korea of sending several types of missiles to Russia involving short-range ballistic missiles, anti-tank missiles, and portable anti-air missiles.

Now the question is what Putin is giving to North Korea in return for its munitions support. Considering North Korea’s hardship caused by the devastating U.S. and U.N. economic sanctions, Kim could have asked Putin for cash, energy, and weapons technologies transfers. For example, it’s widely believed that Russia provided support to North Korea to successfully launch its first military satellite, which Putin promised to do during his summit with Kim.

North Korea’s Successful Military Reconnaissance Satellite Launch

On November 22, North Korea claimed that it has successfully placed a spy satellite into orbit. According to the North’s space agency, its “Chollima-1” carrier rocket placed the “Malligyong-1” satellite into orbit on the night of November 21. After previous attempts in May and August failed due to technical issues, Pyongyang finally succeeded on its third attempt. Notably, North Korea had originally vowed to try a third launch in October. Given the delay, it is presumed that North Korean missile scientists were working with Russia to send its satellite into orbit successfully.

To better monitor South Korea and other areas, North Korea has vowed that it will launch more spy satellites. However, the South’s spy agency reported the North is unlikely to conduct another satellite launches this year.

To counter criticisms from the United States and its allies, North Korea has reiterated that its military reconnaissance satellite launch is a sovereign right that should not be restrained by outside forces. However, the U.S., South Korea, and Japan strongly condemned the launch.

U.S. National Security Council spokesperson Adrienne Watson called the launch “a brazen violation of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions.” She said it “raises tensions and risks destabilizing the security situation in the region and beyond.” She also added that the space launch “involved technologies that are directly related to the DPRK intercontinental ballistic missile program.” (DPRK is an acronym of the North’s official name: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.)

On November 30, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned eight foreign-based North Korean agents that allegedly “facilitate sanctions evasion, including revenue generation and missile-related technology procurement” to support the North’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs.

In response to the North’s spy satellite launch, South Korean President Yoon approved his National Security Council’s decision on November 22 to partially suspend the military agreement that was reached by then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong Un during the inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang in September 2018. It is the South’s first formal suspension of agreements made with North Korea since the two Koreas made their first agreement in 1991.

According to Seoul, Pyongyang has already violated the 2018 military agreement ceaselessly by conducting military activities near the inter-Korean borders, which are banned under the agreement. If North Korea continues to launch spy satellite rockets or test ballistic missiles, Seoul said it will suspend the remaining clauses agreement and reinvigorate front-line aerial surveillance and live-fire exercises at no-fly zones near the inter-Korean borders.

A day after Seoul made its decision to partially suspend the military agreement, the North Korean Defense Ministry firmly vowed to immediately restore all military measures that were halted under the agreement. It also threatened to deploy powerful and new military weapons to the military demarcation line.

Assuming that the North would successfully obtain useful images of U.S. and South Korean military bases through its reconnaissance satellite, it will ultimately enhance the North’s preemptive and precision strike capability with a more favorable monitoring environment.

Pyongyang Holds out, Hoping for Negotiations With Trump

Amid North Korea’s emphasis on diplomacy with Russia and focus on a military buildup, there has been no sign of interest in resuming stalled talks with the United States.

As U.S. President Joe Biden’s policy on North Korea appears to be an updated version of the Obama administration’s “strategic patience” approach, North Korea has not been interested in renewing the stalled nuclear talks with the United States. Biden prefers a traditional bottom-up approach when tackling security challenges, where working-level officials reach agreement on concrete issues before high-level meetings occur..

The Biden administration has reiterated that it is willing to negotiate with North Korea “anytime, anywhere, with no preconditions” since it finalized its policy review on North Korea, but Pyongyang has not responded to this message. Since the failed Hanoi talks, North Korea has made clear that it will insist on sanctions relief as a preemptive gesture before renewing the stalled nuclear talks.

Unlike Biden, Trump preferred a top-down approach to complicated security issues. Considering Kim Jong Un’s similar preference, Pyongyang would want Donald Trump to be re-elected in the 2024 presidential election so that Kim can again attempt to persuade Trump to lift the economic sanctions against his country.

Despite Trump’s decision to walk out of the Hanoi summit with no deal in February 2019, North Korea still has reason to prefer him to other leaders. Pyongyang might have concluded that other U.S. politicians are likely to pursue the “Libya model,” which pressures the Kim regime to withdraw its nuclear weapons first before the normalization of relations with the United States. Due to the ugly fate of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, who was murdered by rebels, Kim Jong Un will never accept this approach; if he returns to talks with the United States, Kim will continue to insist on a phased denuclearization process with a reciprocal approach.

It is uncertain, however, that a future Trump White House would be interested in dealing with North Korea issues, as the degree of North Korean nuclear threats is incomparable with the ongoing Ukraine War and Israel-Hamas War for the United States. In this context, Pyongyang will focus on developing more powerful nuclear weapons to raise the ante for future negotiations with Washington.

No Inter-Korean Dialogue

Ever since Yoon assumed the presidency, Pyongyang’s attitude toward Seoul has been crystal clear. Due to Yoon’s hawkish overture on North Korea – which is no different from his conservative predecessors’ – Pyongyang ruled out the possibility of negotiating with Yoon early in his presidency.

During U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s visit to Seoul in November, he met his South Korean counterpart Shin Won-sik and signed a new version of the Tailored Deterrence Strategy agreement. This was the first revision in a decade to effectively address the North’s growing nuclear programs.

According to Shin, the new document demonstrates the United States’ firm commitment to the South’s security. In the event of a North Korean nuclear attack, the U.S. would use its full range of military capabilities, including nuclear assets. No further details were elaborated.

As Yoon boosts his efforts to strengthen the trilateral cooperation with the U.S. and Japan to cope with the growing missile capabilities of North Korea, Pyongyang’s adamant attitude toward talks with Seoul will not change unless Yoon shifts his stance on North Korea preemptively.

Although the Yoon administration has left room for inter-Korean talks, Pyongyang clearly showed its displeasure against Seoul’s two-pronged approach.

Considering Yoon’s preference for dealing with North Korea’s missile threats by relying on U.S. strategic assets, Yoon will not actively seek diplomatic means to make Kim return to the negotiating table. Rather, he and his team will seek to further advance U.S. extended deterrence, which the Yoon administration sees as the most powerful and effective policy to tackle North Korea’s growing aggression.

Like Biden, Yoon’s approval ratings are low. According to polls and media predictions, the main opposition Democratic Party will likely retain its majority in the South Korean National Assembly following the legislative elections in April 2024. If so, Yoon’s lame duck will begin, which would also give North Korea no reason to seek dialogue with Seoul until the next president takes office in May 2027.

Conclusion

In contrast to its unprecedented ballistic missile launches in 2022, North Korea will likely focus on developing new ballistic missile programs that can be considered as a direct threat to security of the United States.

According to the five-year plan to develop strategic weapons announced at a Workers’ Party Congress in early 2021, North Korea aims to develop tactical nuclear weapons, a new intercontinental ballistic missile, hypersonic gliding flight warheads, nuclear-powered submarines, and a reconnaissance satellite.

In 2024, North Korea will likely focus on successfully developing its indigenous military reconnaissance satellites and nuclear-powered submarines that would boost its asymmetrical military capabilities against South Korea.

On November 15, North Korea said it had successfully tested new solid-fuel engines designed for intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Based on its missile test activities, North Korea may focus on developing a nuclear-powered submarine and a new solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile, advancing its ability to target the U.S. mainland. With this, North Korea will likely develop hypersonic weapons and multi-warhead missiles to cope with the overwhelming U.S. military assets.

North Korea will also focus on providing munition support to Russia.

Due to the ongoing Ukraine War and Israel-Hamas War, North Korea may know that its ballistic missile launches will not have the same effect as they had years ago. In this context, North Korea will focus on developing advanced new nuclear weapons to raise the ante for future negotiations with the U.S. Meanwhile, Pyongyang will lay the groundwork for some future scenarios in which Kim can have another summit meeting with Trump if he wins the presidential election. Biden’s re-election would mean no dialogue and negotiation between the U.S. and North Korea for another four years.

Meanwhile, the tensions on the Korean Peninsula will worsen as the two Koreas are no longer bound by the 2018 military agreement that halted military activities near the inter-Korean borders.

All told, 2024 looks set to be another tense year of aggravated security conditions on the Korean Peninsula.

22 Dec, 2023

- In Coal’s Shadow, Bangladeshi Women Forge a New Life Through Art

- How Can Australia Stand up for Human Rights in Xinjiang?

- The US Does Not Lack Leverage Over India

- Japan Approves 16.5% Increase in Defense Spending for FY2024

- North Korean Exports Hit Record High Since UN Sanctions Took Full Effect

- Bombing Revives Fears of Islamist Militancy in the Philippines

- The Untold Stories of Chinese Translators in Angola

- Rights Group Accuses Myanmar Rebel Outfit of Forced Recruitment

- Thai MPs Urge Talks with Cambodia Over Access to Preah Vihear

- How Taiwan-ASEAN Semiconductor Cooperation Can Bolster Taipei’s National Security

- Looking Back on Deng Xiaoping’s Landmark Visit to Singapore

- Thailand’s Quiet Pivot to the Maritime Sphere

- Political and Electoral Uncertainty in Sri Lanka Ahead of the 2024 Elections

- Thailand Takes Another Step Toward Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage

- New China-Serbia Free Trade Agreement Raises Security Concerns for Europe

- China, America, and Vietnam’s Diplomatic Blitz in 2023

- As Scandal Engulfs the LDP, the Kishida Administration Goes on

- Hong Kong’s Dismal December

- The China-Philippines South China Sea Face-Off Requires Restraint

- New Zealand Abandons Indigenous Rights and Pacific Priorities in Foreign Policy

- Another Launch for China’s Reusable Space Plane

- Workers Lose as Indonesian Laws Can’t Keep Pace With Rideshare Apps

In Coal’s Shadow, Bangladeshi Women Forge a New Life Through Art

Displaced by a massive coal power plant, a group of women in Matarbari have turned to embroidery to craft a future.

Catherine Putz   22 Dec, 2023

In the southeastern coastal area of Matarbari, Bangladesh, a group of women are forging a new life through embroidery and art in the shadow of a massive new coal power plant, which looms over hundreds of families displaced by its construction.

Jannatul Naim Jhuma’s family used to have three houses where the coal power plant now sits. One belonged to her father and two to her brothers. When construction started on the Matarbari 1 coal power plant, they were forced to leave their homes and relocate to small concrete houses beside the polluting power plant, which belched black smoke overhead.

Bangladeshi environment groups and local community members are very concerned about the coal power project, and how Japanese companies worked with authorities to acquire nearly 6 square kilometers of land to build the coal power plant.

The first phase of the project has been jointly developed by the state-owned Coal Power Generation Company Bangladesh Limited along with Japanese companies: Sumitomo Corporation, IHI Corporation and Toshiba. Sumitomo Banking Corporation (SMBC) acted as financial adviser. Japanese companies, including power giant JERA a joint venture of TEPCO and Chubu Electric Power, Mitsubishi Corporation, and megabanks SMBC and MUFG are involved in further expansion of fossil fuels in Matarbari.

Local homes have not been the only casualty of this massive coal power plant. Traditional livelihoods like salt and fish farming have also been lost forever due to the plant’s construction. Many families are in crisis.

But despite the ongoing impacts from the coal power plant, 30 displaced women have come together, striving to rebuild their lives and find ways of securing an income and providing for their families. The women have found a voice and a new way of sharing their story and art with the world through embroidery.

How Can Australia Stand up for Human Rights in Xinjiang?

Australia’s diplomatic reset with China is complete, it’s time to talk about human rights.

Catherine Putz   22 Dec, 2023

flags of Australia and China painted on cracked wall. (Depositphotos)

Anthony Albanese’s historic visit to China last month — the first by an Australian prime minister since 2016 — has widely been heralded as a turning point in the bilateral relationship.

But Australians will be left wondering if stabilization has come at the cost of fundamental human rights.

Polling conducted by the United States Studies Centre reveals that an overwhelming 76 percent of Australians want their government to hold China to account on human rights. This figure jumps by almost 10 percent when there is an opportunity to act on the issue alongside like-minded countries like the United States. In fact, only a small minority of Australians (6 percent) disagree with doing so — a sentiment that also prevails among American and Japanese respondents.

These results come as no surprise.

There is a growing body of evidence detailing Beijing’s grave human rights abuses, not least in China’s Xinjiang region. A groundbreaking U.N. report released just over a year ago contains victim testimonies substantiating reports of mass arbitrary detention, torture, cultural and religious repression, coercive population control methods, and other “serious human rights violations” against Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang. State-sponsored modern slavery is central to this so-called “re-education” project — as many as 1 million people in Xinjiang are estimated to be working in conditions of forced labor. The harrowing report ultimately concludes that the curtailing of rights in Xinjiang “may constitute crimes against humanity.”

Yet as human rights concerns have grown, so has Australia’s trade with Xinjiang.

Two-way trade between Xinjiang and Australia increased by 150 percent in the first four years of the Chinese Communist Party’s crackdown, which began in 2017. The vast majority of trade (73 percent) comes from Australia’s import of goods produced in the region. From solar panels to clothing, Australian companies are not only complicit in but ultimately profiting from Uyghur forced labor.

As the diplomatic freeze between the two countries thaws, attention should now turn to developing a coherent response to China’s egregious human rights abuses — an issue of major concern for the Australian public.

So, how can Australia work with allies like the United States to hold China to account on human rights?

Australia’s efforts to press China through bilateral and multilateral diplomatic channels have so far been ineffective. When asked about Australia’s response to the U.N. report on Xinjiang, Foreign Minister Penny Wong pointed to the government’s efforts to strengthen Australia’s Modern Slavery Act, legislation requiring certain domestic entities to submit annual statements detailing modern slavery risks in their operations and supply chains.

Yet, even with bolstered compliance and more onerous requirements for business, there remains little concrete evidence that corporate due diligence approaches can have a meaningful impact in combatting modern slavery on the ground. And these limitations are only magnified in the instance of state-sanctioned forced labor in Xinjiang — the CCP’s opaque, tightly controlled information environment makes it extremely difficult to conduct an independent and credible supply chain audit, rendering the already lackluster law even weaker.

Fortunately, and as the public are clearly attuned to, Australia does not have to approach this issue alone.

In the United States, the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), which came into effect in June last year, grants customs authorities greater power to block goods linked to forced labor from entering U.S. markets. The law assumes that any goods “mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part” in Xinjiang are the product of forced labor, unless companies can furnish “clear and convincing evidence” to challenge this presumption.

A similar bill, initially focused on Uyghur forced labor and later amended to not specify a particular geographic origin, passed the Australian Senate in August 2021 — with support from the then-opposition Labor party — but lapsed in the 2022 dissolution of Parliament and never became law. Such legislation would undeniably strengthen Australia’s modern slavery policy settings, and has received bipartisan support from the federal opposition, echoing a growing chorus of civil society. There is clearly room for the government to successfully pass similar legislation into law.

Short of more significant legislation, the Australian government could consider formalizing a data sharing mechanism with the United States in order to exchange information on instances of forced labor and specific modern slavery risks in supply chains. This could be expanded to include other allies like Japan, a leader in corporate human rights due diligence in Asia. Mapping supply chain risks in tandem with the United States and other allies would maximize the efficiency of national approaches and help to alleviate some of the bureaucratic burden that the Australian government has previously highlighted as an obstacle to effectively enforcing an import ban.

Above all, Australia must reckon with the price it is willing to pay for cooling tensions with China. Introducing stronger modern slavery provisions to hold China to account on human rights will no doubt bring challenges — it could threaten recent diplomatic gains and will likely pose hurdles to the green energy transition.

But polling shows that Australians may be unlikely to be satisfied with relationship repair that comes at the expense of standing up for basic human rights and freedoms on the global stage.

The US Does Not Lack Leverage Over India

Washington should not avoid honest discussions with India on differences for fear of souring ties.

Sudha Ramachandran   22 Dec, 2023

U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser Jon Finer in talks with India’s Minister for External Affairs Dr. S. Jaishankar at New Delhi, India, December 4, 2023

X/Dr. S. Jaishankar

https://twitter.com/DrSJaishankar/status/1731583791406154059/photo/1

In 2023, two countries separately accused an agent of the Indian government of plotting the assassination of a Sikh separatist leader on their territory. The two countries received wildly contrasting responses from India.

In September, Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said that his government was pursuing “credible allegations of a potential link between agents of the government of India and the killing of a Canadian citizen [Sikh separatist leader Hardeep Singh Nijjar].” India responded in angry denial, expelling several Canadian diplomats from New Delhi and suspending visa services for Canadian citizens. India’s foreign ministry also called Canada a “safe haven for terrorists.”

Months later, the U.S. Department of Justice alleged that an Indian government employee had “directed a plot to assassinate on U.S. soil an attorney and political activist,” identified by the media as Sikh separatist leader Gurpatwant Singh Pannun.

But this time around, there were no indignant denouncements from New Delhi or a declaration that America was harboring terrorists. Instead, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi said, “If a citizen of ours has done anything good or bad, we are ready to look into it.”

The contrast did not escape Trudeau’s notice. This week, Trudeau said that India’s tone had changed after the U.S. revelations. “I think there is a beginning of an understanding that they can’t bluster their way through this,” he said.

But this contrast, innocuous as it may seem, has one inescapable conclusion. For all the talk in New Delhi of blazing a path of defiance against the West, India has far more to lose than Washington if ties turn sour.

That conclusion flies in the face of the established narrative in Washington. Through much of this past year, as U.S. President Joe Biden courted Modi at the White House, the G-20, and at democracy summits, there was one constant refrain in Washington: that India has arrived on the world stage and is now too important an ally for honest talk on differences.

In May, Stanford University’s Arzan Tarapore argued that India is America’s “best bet in the Indo-Pacific.” In June, as Modi headed to the White House for a state dinner, experts at the U.S. Institute of Peace wrote, “While Washington and New Delhi have their disagreements on issues like Russia’s war on Ukraine and human rights, they see the relationship as too strategically vital to be jeopardized by these differences.” This week, The Diplomat’s Akhilesh Pillalamarri argued that India is too important to be “ignored, sidelined, or meaningfully punished, even when its officials are accused of an attempted assassination on American soil.”

Washington’s view on India often has the effect of ceding excessive leverage to New Delhi. The implicit argument is that, given how important India is to the U.S. cause of counterbalancing China, Biden should eschew talking to New Delhi about democratic backsliding, human rights concerns, or violations of the rule of law.

That is a conclusion that many in New Delhi have drawn as well. After Biden declined an invitation to visit India this coming January, Yale University’s Sushant Singh wrote, “India has likely observed that even if the U.S. and Canadian accusations prove to be true, they wouldn’t amount to serious consequences.”

Yet, underneath this bluster, India’s response to the U.S. indictment betrays a more realistic assessment: that given their hugely different levels of development and threat assessments of China, the India-U.S. power balance is still heavily tilted in Washington’s favor.

This is true even in defense cooperation — an issue where India is perceived to enjoy significant leverage because of U.S. export interests.

In recent years, as the world’s largest arms importer, India has used its market power to good effect in bargaining with defense partners. Yet, given crippling shortcomings in its defense capabilities, India has few alternatives to cooperation with the U.S. — especially in areas such as cybersecurity and artificial intelligence, where U.S. capabilities are comparatively advanced.

The threat of China makes defense ties with the U.S. far more critical to India’s basic security needs than those ties are to the United States. Unlike the U.S., by virtue of sharing a border with China, New Delhi perceives the China threat as a far more immediate concern than China can ever be to Washington — a problem that was highlighted by India’s inability to reverse losses to China after the 2020 Galwan clashes.

Yet, as much as China is a physical threat, Modi is unlikely to want to counterbalance its influence in multilateralism and global geopolitics — a key interest that drives much of the U.S. courtship of Modi.

This is where the uncomfortable and much-reviled question of democratic values, rule of law, and political stability become important.

Two decades ago, long before India’s border tensions with China flared up, Washington had begun investing in India’s rise in the hope that New Delhi would be a U.S. ally in thwarting a Chinese world order. There was good cause for that hope. In my 2021 book, “Flying Blind: India’s Quest for Global Leadership,” I had explained why a secular, liberal democratic India would want to champion many of the same rules and laws in global governance as the United States. Similar domestic polities, societies, and economies need similar global frameworks.

But as India redefines its convictions in parliamentary democracy, secularism, and the rule of law, New Delhi’s needs and interests are drifting away from those of the U.S. and closer to what would constitute a Chinese world order. That shift has already manifested in the way that India votes and speaks on global issues such as cybersecurity, data privacy, religious freedom, and media censorship. This is not to discount the fact that India can only compete meaningfully with China if it retains the civic code and inclusive democratic order that has underpinned its political stability and economic growth thus far.

In its dealings and discussions with the Modi government, the U.S. should not avoid these issues for fear of souring ties, falsely believing that it lacks leverage to talk about them. Instead, India and the U.S. should confront these issues more honestly.

Japan Approves 16.5% Increase in Defense Spending for FY2024

For the tenth year in a row, the budget draft set a new record for national defense spending as Japan continues to pursue its Defense Buildup Program.

Shannon   22 Dec, 2023

The JS Mogami, first ship of the Mogami class, at sea on June 10, 2022.

Japan is striving to expedite its drastic defense buildup to deal with rising military threats posed by China, North Korea, and Russia.

On December 22, the cabinet of Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio approved 7.95 trillion yen ($55.9 billion) in defense spending for fiscal year 2024, starting in April, amid what Tokyo calls “the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II.”

Including U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses allocated for mitigating impacts on local communities, the draft budget will rise by a whopping 16.5 percent, or $7.92 billion, from the current fiscal year. This marked another record figure for the tenth year in a row for Japan’s national defense budget.

The FY2024 budget plan, which is expected to be passed by the country’s bicameral legislature in the coming months, marks the second year of the new Defense Buildup Program, which outlines $302 billion in defense spending over the five-year period through FY2027.

The budget plan lists seven key pillars of “necessary efforts to drastically strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities.”

Those are: (1) “stand-off defense capabilities,” such as mass production of longer-range missiles; (2) “comprehensive air and missile defense capabilities” to respond to increasingly diverse and complex airborne threats, including missiles; (3) “unmanned asset defense capabilities,” such as the use of drones; (4) “cross-domain operational capabilities” in space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic domains; (5) “command and control and intelligence-related functions”; (6) “maneuvering and deployment capability” to send troops and supplies to the front line of a conflict; and (7) “sustainability and resiliency.”

As for the first pillar, the ministry secured about $5.16 billion to develop and produce a range of homegrown stand-off missiles to acquire counterstrike capabilities against enemy bases. That follows through on a decision made in December 2022 for Japan to pursue a long-range strike capability, as reflected in the new National Security Strategy.

Most notably, the Defense Ministry earmarked $675.7 million to acquire a land-based improved variant of the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI)-developed Type 12 surface-to-ship missile (SSM) for FY2024.

On December 15, Japan’s Defense Minister Kihara Minoru announced that the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) will deploy the land-based upgraded Type 12 SSM starting in its fiscal year FY2025, a year earlier than originally planned.

Japan’s current stand-off missile capability is mainly focused on the upgraded Type 12 SSM, which is the core of Japan’s counterattack ability. Stand-off missiles allow a military to attack sites such as enemy missile bases from outside the enemy’s range.

On the second pillar, the Defense Ministry secured $8.77 billion for strengthening the nation’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), a system already adopted by the U.S. military, to address new aerial threats, including hypersonic weapons developed by China, North Korea, and Russia.

The ministry’s Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Agency (ATLA) was allocated $513 million to push ahead with its next-generation fighter program in partnership with the United Kingdom and Italy. It plans to continue developing a basic design of the future fighter’s fuselage and the detailed engineering of its engines.

ATLA also secured $129 million to domestically develop a new medium-range air-to-air guided missile to be installed in the next-generation fighter, which is set to be the successor to the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF)’s F2 fighter jet.

The JASDF earmarked $787 million to buy eight more Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II joint strike fighters and $901 million to purchase seven more F-35B Lightning multirole fighter aircraft.

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) was allocated large amounts of funds totaling $2.62 billion to build two Aegis system-equipped vessels, which are alternatives to Japan’s now-scrapped plan for a land-based Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense system. The ministry expects the total construction cost for each vessel to reach $2.75 billion.

The JMSDF also secured $1.22 billion to build two new multirole frigates, called “New FFM,” in Tokyo.

The Defense Ministry said it will acquire a total of 12 New FFMs that will succeed the Mogami-class FFM for the JMSDF. The New FFM has a standard displacement of 4,800 tons, while the Mogami class has a standard displacement of 3,900 tons.

Although the new warship class will be heavier and larger than the Mogami class, defense officials said the New FFM’s crew complement will be only 90, the same as that of the Mogami class.

The JMSDF had originally planned to build a total of 22 Mogami-class frigates as Tokyo ramps up efforts to strengthen the country’s naval forces.

However, it has decided to now procure a total of only 12 such frigates until 2023, with plans to construct a new class of 12 warships from 2024. The new frigates will essentially be improved Mogami-class ships.

The Defense Ministry said the new-class FFM will be fitted with longer-range missiles, enhanced anti-submarine capabilities, and improved capabilities for various maritime operations.

The JMSDF also earmarked $298 million to continue modifying its two Izumo-class helicopter carriers – JS Izumo and JS Kaga – into aircraft carriers capable of enabling Lockheed Martin F-35B fighter operations.

The JMSDF said both ships will complete all necessary upgrades to become light aircraft carriers operating F-35B fighters in fiscal year 2027.

Meanwhile, the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) strives to strengthen security efforts in response to emergency contingencies in areas surrounding Japan, particularly in the Nansei Islands, with China in mind.

It was allocated $121.6 million to procure three maneuverable boats during the next fiscal year in an effort to secure capabilities for swift and reliable transportation of necessary units to defeat an invasion of Japan’s southwestern islands. The Defense Ministry said the boats will be 35 meters long.

Officials at the ministry stressed at a press briefing on December 21 that despite the rapid depreciation of the yen and rising prices, there has been no reduction in the number of major weapons and equipment for FY2024, based on the Defense Buildup Program, which was drawn up in December 2022.

North Korean Exports Hit Record High Since UN Sanctions Took Full Effect

North Korea’s exports overwhelmingly go to China – and rely on a single (and surprising) export category.

Shannon   22 Dec, 2023

Pyongyang North Korea – November 12, 2015: Kim Il-sung Square and government building decorated with huge national flag of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in central Pyongyang, North Korea

After years of disruption from United Nations sanctions and the pandemic, North Korean exports to China surged through the first 11 months of 2023. However, North Korea’s export recovery is potentially fragile due to its dependence on a single export category.

Beginning with Resolution 2270 in 2016, the U.N. Security Council has passed a series of resolutions designed to sanction key sectors of North Korea’s international trade in response to Pyongyang’s increased rate of ballistic missile and nuclear weapons tests. Over time, these sanctions significantly curtailed North Korea’s legitimate export earnings. Exports to China, which accounts for more than 90 percent of North Korea’s trade, declined from $2.6 billion in 2016 to only $213.2 million in 2018.

North Korea’s decision to strictly control its border during the pandemic further depressed exports to China. In 2020, they fell to just $48 million and only grew to $58 million in 2021 despite global trade exceeding pre-pandemic levels. North Korean exports began to recover in 2022 as China and North Korea resumed trade via freight trains across the border and grew to $133.7 million, though still below pre-pandemic levels.

However, through November of this year, North Korea’s exports to China have already reached $267 million, exceeding the full year total in 2018 when U.N. sanctions were fully implemented. The figure through November is 133 percent higher than through the same period in 2022.

With North Korean exports to China averaging just under $27 million a month over the last six months, total exports for the year will likely end up just under $300 million.

While exports remain significantly below their pre-U.N. sanction level, Pyongyang has shown an ability to adapt in recent years. With exports such as coal and seafood under sanction, North Korea began to export items that previously were not part of its export mix. Watch movements, for example, surged from no exports in 2016 to $49.2 million in 2018 to become North Korea’s top export item shortly after sanctions were fully implemented. North Korea also switched to exporting non-sanctioned minerals such as tungsten and molybdenum that it had previously exported in lower volumes.

The current resurgence in North Korean exports is being driven almost entirely by a surge in exports of wigs, false beards, eyebrows, and lashes. These now account for 57 percent of North Korea’s exports to China, or $151.8 million in exports this year. They also account for 86 percent of China’s imports of these products.

This surge in exports, however, is built on a fragile basis. Prior to U.N. sanctions, exports of coal dominated North Korea’s export mix, but only accounted for 43 percent of exports at the time. Exports of wigs, false beards, eyebrows, and eyelashes take up a much larger percentage of North Korea’s exports today. The current level of exports of these products also significantly exceed previous levels. Exports in this category didn’t top $1 million until 2016, and the previous high was $31 million in exports in 2019.

This trade is also built on processing trade with China. So far this year, North Korea has imported $145 million in human hair, nearly as much in value as it has exported in wigs, false beards, eyebrows, and eyelashes. This could signal growing exports going forward, but also highlights how dependent North Korea is on China for what is now far and away its most important export. It also suggests that Pyongyang is likely earning little off this trade.

At the same time, North Korea has not seen a recovery in the export of watch movements, which through November were $3.4 million and only 1.27 percent of exports. In contrast, they accounted for 22 percent of exports in 2019. Exports of optical and photographic parts, sports equipment, and fishing equipment also remain severely depressed despite having grown after sanctions were put in place.

The only other significant exports for North Korea of more than $10 million are ferroalloys (alloys of iron and other minerals), tungsten, molybdenum, and electricity. Exports of ferroalloys are just above non-inflation adjusted highs at $30.7 million through November, and exports of electricity to China are up as well. However, exports of tungsten and molybdenum have declined this year.

On the surface North Korea is experiencing its strongest year of exports since U.N. sanctions were fully implemented in 2018. However, underneath the surface that surge in exports is being driven by a single export category, and one that may provide little financial benefit to North Korea. Should Pyongyang manage to restore exports in watch movements, toys, sports equipment, and fishing equipment to prior levels, and grow its non-sanctioned mineral exports there is ample room for North Korean exports to grow in 2024. However, that growth potential is also built on a fragile foundation that could as easily see exports decline next year.

Bombing Revives Fears of Islamist Militancy in the Philippines

The December 3 bombing of a Catholic mass in Marawi City was an ominous warning as the Bangsamoro peace process approaches a crucial juncture.

Sebastian Strangio   22 Dec, 2023

Law enforcement officers investigate the scene of an explosion that occurred during a Catholic Mass in a gymnasium at Mindanao State University in Marawi, Philippines, December 3, 2023. (Facebook/Provincial Government of Lanao Del Sur)

Three weeks on from an explosion that killed four people at a Catholic mass on a university campus in Marawi City in the southern island of Mindanao in the Philippines, revelers are returning to church for Christmas on the island. The blast, claimed by the Islamic State, sent shock waves across the Muslim-majority Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, where memories of past instability remain raw.

I visited Marawi City just weeks before the attack. Scars remain of a five-month siege in 2017, in which hundreds of local jihadist militants that coalesced around a local outfit known as the Maute Group took control of the city with the support of foreign fighters, acting in the name of the Islamic State. Subsequent combat with the Philippine military razed chunks of Marawi to the ground.

Six years on, a new stadium and reconstructed mosques stand next to crumbled high-rises and abandoned houses, home to tens of thousands of people that still haven’t been able to return to their former neighborhoods. After their crushing defeat, the Salafi-jihadist outfit, also known as Dawlah Islamiyah (the Arabic term for Islamic State) tried to regroup and rebuild in and around Marawi. But military operations, loss of leaders, demoralization, and the surrender of fighters weakened it and other jihadist groups.

Despite some hushed talk of the Maute remnants, estimated to now number only 40 members, recruiting and allegedly holding gatherings in Lanao del Sur province (of which Marawi is the capital), when I visited, the likelihood of an imminent attack felt slim. Instead, locals spoke with concern about those that have been unable to recover their homes or livelihoods since the 2017 siege, and discussed the crisis in the Middle East, brandishing Palestinian flags from their homes and shop fronts. But the December 3 blast has come as a grim reminder that the risk of jihadist violence remains very real.

Jihadist militancy in Mindanao should be understood against the backdrop of the 40-year Moro separatist conflict, which formally ended in 2014, when the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) signed a peace deal. At the time of the 2017 Marawi crisis, a number of armed groups, including jihadist factions, opposed the talks, leveraging local Moro Muslim grievances and frustrations related to a stalled peace process, recruiting disillusioned youth and frustrated MILF members.

Since 2019, the ex-rebels have been leading the transition through an interim administration that will formally come to an end with parliamentary elections in 2025. The transition has not been entirely peaceful, but before the attacks, upward trends in violence related to political tensions, clan conflict, and elections in certain pockets of Mindanao stood in contrast to the waning influence of Islamist  militancy.

Following the Marawi blast, which came just five months after the neutralization of Dawlah-leader Abu Zacharia, the Islamic State’s designated regional emir, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. was quick to refer to “foreign terrorist” involvement. While it is not impossible that some foreign militants are still present in Mindanao, it is unlikely their presence in Marawi City could long go undetected. For his part, the Philippine military chief pointed to a series of encounters between the military and Dawlah militants in the days prior, suggesting that the blast may have been retaliatory in nature. It is noteworthy, however, that the church bombers targeted civilians rather than security forces, indicating a more sectarian background to the attack.  Detonated remotely through a basic, improvised explosive device with a 60 mm mortar round, such an attack would not be too difficult to pull off elsewhere.

Since the blast, the military has launched operations against Dawlah militants in marshy parts of Maguindanao, a historical hotspot for jihadist groups around 200 kilometers south of Marawi City. More than 5,000 people have been displaced by clashes between the MILF and jihadists after MILF fighters were killed in retaliation for support the former rebels gave to government forces during the operation. The IS-inspired militants later uploaded a video of one of the killings, showing the gruesome death of a MILF guerrilla accused of being a spy.

It is, however, possible that these clashes may be the result of intra-Moro hostilities, with Dawlah fighters retaliating against perceived injustices inflicted upon them by the MILF – particularly in light of recent allegations from militants themselves of MILF commanders having recently grabbed their land and resources.

To understand the broader impact of the bombing, two questions are crucial to answer. First, to what extent are the IS-inspired factions across the Bangsamoro coordinating their operations? Second, what is the reason behind IS central’s increased interest in claiming incidents in the Philippines?

The jihadist momentum in Mindanao largely depends on the ability of local groups to come together under centralized leadership. Without coordination, various outfits will continue to pose only a localized threat, and will therefore be easier for government forces to target. For now, there is hardly any evidence to suggest substantial cooperation between the various pro-IS militant factions. Even in Maguindanao, a historical hotspot for jihadist lairs, it is not clear who is leading the militants and how many factions there actually are. But there is once again talk on the ground about money reaching the militants from outside the country and also circulating within Mindanao, suggesting a degree of organization.

The relative increase of IS claims for incidents in Mindanao over the last months is also puzzling. While some claims are clearly misleading, it is noteworthy that these claims spread quickly on various online platforms. This suggests either a strategic interest from IS in the Philippines for propaganda purposes or an effort from local actors to generate funding and attention from abroad by feeding information to externals. A few days after the December 3 blast, the Islamic State published an editorial about the Philippines in its weekly newsletter Al Naba. The article, which describes the MILF as a renegade “apostate militia,” argues that Mindanao remains a battlefield between “Muslims” and “Crusaders,” inciting local and by extension foreign fighters to carry on the struggle.

Encouragingly, there has been little buy-in from Bangsamoro’s Muslim communities for more extreme beliefs. However, delays to the peace process and the failure of both Manila and the regional administration to address local grievances and conflicts, as well as the emotional impact of the Gaza war on some young Moros, could stir frustrations, leading to further recruitment and violence. For the estimated 80,000 people still displaced from the 2017 Marawi siege, unresolved property claims from their destroyed houses and lack of proper access to water around the former battlefield continue to fuel resentment.

The blast on December 3 has revealed cracks that will be crucial to address if authorities are to keep the risks of militancy at bay in the newly autonomous Bangsamoro. First, the security sector needs to do more to improve intelligence collection, analysis, and sharing. Having received warnings days before the blast, authorities failed to react with Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. later acknowledging a “failure to appreciate intelligence.”

Second, two of the blast suspects had surrendered in 2018, making it vital to understand why they relapsed and to examine the effectiveness of the current demobilization initiatives. A monitoring and evaluation component, including a case management system, and better learning from past experiences in regard to the reintegration of former fighters, will be essential to avoid future recidivism.

Third, the Bangsamoro government should accelerate the rehabilitation of Marawi and do more to settle land disputes and improve basic services in far-flung areas, which often lie at the core of the community grievances that militants exploit.

The Marawi bombing and its aftermath do not mean that militants will once again engulf the region in violence. But it is an important reminder that all actors should redouble their efforts to make the Bangsamoro peace process a success before the specter of jihadism once again comes to haunt Mindanao.

The Untold Stories of Chinese Translators in Angola

The experiences of young Chinese professionals provide an additional layer of complexity to the relations between China and Lusophone Africa.

Shannon   22 Dec, 2023

Photo: Tigres Island, Angola, 2009/2010, taken by Charles*

This year marked the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries (also known as Forum Macao). 2023 also wraps up 40 years of Angola-China bilateral relations and a decade of the Belt and Road Initiative. In 2024, we are expecting the hosting of the first post-pandemic Forum Macao ministerial conference with representation from all top Lusophone representatives and officials, including from Angola.

Angola is China’s biggest and most emblematic Portuguese-speaking African economic partner. The 40 years of diplomatic relations have entered history, illustrated with an abundance of formal, ceremonial Angola-China visuals stemming from state visits and high-level exchanges. Yet there is another layer of Angola-China engagement, one that involves ordinary citizens of both countries.

We should be seriously accessing the knowledge of ordinary people if we want to understand China’s international engagement in perspective. For instance, how do the younger generation of Chinese participate in Angola-China relations?

This report is based on interview of Portuguese-language translators and interpreters – the relatively recent outflow of young, urbanized, educated, multilingual Chinese arriving in post-civil war Angola (from the 2000s onwards) for foreign missions and business exchanges. For many, this has been their first job after obtaining their undergraduate degree.

All are language professionals by university training. They come from all parts of China. A great number of them are the only child in their family, having grown up with much financial comfort, parental love, and multigenerational attention. Effectively, heading to Africa is their rite of passage into a Global China, wherein they experience being Chinese beyond China’s borders.

In many cases, Angola provided these young Chinese professionals with their first lived experience of an African country. Their perceptions provide a window into Angola-China relations beyond the carefully choreographed summits and top-tier consultations. They represent the human level of diplomatic ties.

In 2009, Charles* finished a Portuguese language and culture bachelor’s degree course in Macao and went to provincial Angola on contract with a Chinese state company. During his one-year stint in Angola, Charles took part in several port projects. Chatting with me, he recalled one instance of an unsuccessful business talk. The “Tigres Island” project was not developed as planned because the Angolan side allegedly withdrew from negotiations. Charles, therefore, likes to joke that he is the first and last person from Macao to have ever set foot on the deserted island (shown in the photo above).

Almost a decade and a half have passed since then, but Charles still has precious memories of Angola. He likes to check the different locations – airports, bridges, port facilities, and other complexes – on Google Earth and recount his professional and leisurely activities in the country, from resolving government red tape, to grocery shopping, watching football matches, playing tennis, eating lobsters, or simply bantering with Angolan colleagues about mundane subjects.

In academia, research on Angola-China relations fixates at the top decision-making level, such that we only rarely hear the voices of Charles and his peers. But these individuals shape people-to-people relations in important, if yet unquantified, ways. For example, Charles shared with me how he would purposefully misinterpret when explaining reasons for workers’ absences – births, illnesses, and deaths – to “help” whichever side appeared more pitiful. Such social and cultural subtlety is not often discussed.

Comparable to Charles in age, Thomas started as a translator and since then moved up to project manager with a Beijing-based Chinese state company. Thomas earned his undergraduate degree at a prestigious Beijing university in 2012. He is now in his early 30s and possesses multiple years of on-the-ground expertise working for the same company with intercontinental interests.

Thomas is an impressive orator – eloquent, confident, and forthcoming. He closely follows news on Angola through Chinese social media. Thomas sees Angola’s colonial legacy hindering the country’s development, and he is mindful of the unpredictable nature of political leadership.

Even as Thomas identifies plenty of challenges to cooperation, he is sure about one thing. Thomas and the other young Chinese I talked to have internalized the idea of a greater developmental pursuit bringing China closer with the rest of the world and a vision for a different international order in which China takes a proactive role.

As Thomas’ classmate Judith explained, what matters is that they took part in this larger scheme, be it through preparatory work or guest accompaniment. Judith was young, but she saw Li Keqiang – then the Chinese premier – not in China but in Angola, back in the year 2014. A group photo is still proudly displayed in her parents’ home. According to Judith, an individual story like this always impresses relatives and friends.

Rebecca is an empathetic Beijing-educated professional in her mid-20s. She is currently completing a master’s degree in Portugal. Previously, in the midst of the pandemic, she worked in Angola for a Chinese vehicle manufacturer.

During our conversation, Rebecca recalled one incident in which her superior asked for a car to be driven to a distant site, away from Luanda. Two Angolans took turns driving, and when Rebecca and her colleagues arrived, it was getting dark. The Angolan drivers did not intend to stay and asked for a small sum to travel back instead. The Chinese company was reluctant to fund their return trip in full. Seeing that, Rebecca actually proposed she would pay them out of her own pocket. After much confusion and numerous phone calls, the Chinese accounts manager responded to the local workers more generously so that they could choose where to stay the night.

While doing her job, Rebecca saw both sides and often had to deal with conflicts between Chinese management and Angolan workers, sometimes at her own expense. In a multimillion deal, Rebecca’s gesture of goodwill would still be qualitatively significant to the people involved, helping foster smooth relations. Such stories are replicated countless times in each Chinese development project, adding extra layers of complexity to the story of Angola-China relations.

Immediately after graduating from a private university in Macao, Robert went to Angola to work for a private Chinese enterprise. During that time, Robert demonstrated an admirable capacity to broker business deals. However, just before signing a regular contract, he fell out with the company and was not able to continue in Angola.

He is now heading for Brazil, another promising Lusophone market, where he will start a new chapter, much more fluent in Portuguese and knowledgeable about Chinese overseas engagement. Enthusiastically, Robert envisions himself flourishing as a mobile young expatriate in the Lusophone space and fashioning his personal project – even if the world economy is enduring a downturn.

These five young Chinese professionals, in descending order of age, are storytellers of Angola-China relations. They all saw and experienced Angola profoundly. They were involved in some of the infrastructural projects that make headlines as part of the Belt and Road Initiative.

Importantly, different from the earlier generations of Chinese laborers, they are perfectly capable of articulating their stories and claiming their share of participation in China’s global outreach. They embody the refined profiles of a Lusophone Africa-China encounter. Capturing their narratives provides a fuller picture of Angola-China relations.

*Pseudonyms are used throughout.

This article was elaborated in June 2023 during The Chinese in Africa/Africans in China (CA/AC) Research Network “Writing for Impact” Workshop at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa.

Rights Group Accuses Myanmar Rebel Outfit of Forced Recruitment

The allegations raise questions about the MNDAA’s relationship to the country’s broader anti-junta resistance movement.

Sebastian Strangio   22 Dec, 2023

MNDAA soldiers patrol a market in Pang Hseng, in Muse township, Shan State, Myanmar, November 30, 2023. (The Kokang)

Yesterday, the advocacy group Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a statement accusing a key armed rebel group in Myanmar of abducting and forcibly recruiting civilians fleeing fighting in northern Shan State.

The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), which is currently engaged in an ongoing offensive against Myanmar’s military junta, “is violating the laws of war by abducting and forcibly recruiting civilians, putting them at grave risk,” Elaine Pearson, HRW’s Asia director, said in the statement.

She added, “Civilians should be able to seek safety from fighting without fearing that the Myanmar military or ethnic armed groups will force them into their armies.”

On October 27, the MNDAA launched Operation 1027, an offensive targeting Myanmar military outposts in northern Shan State, along with the Arakan Army and Ta’ang National Liberation Army, its allies in the Three Brotherhood Alliance. The coalition has since made rapid progress, overrunning scores of Myanmar military outposts, capturing numerous towns, and seizing key border crossings with China. The MNDAA has now encircled Laukkai, the capital of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone (SAZ), from which it was driven out by the Myanmar military in 2009.

With armed resistance groups launching attacks in other parts of the country, Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing’s military government now faces the greatest challenge to its power since it seized power in February 2021.

The resulting fighting, however, has led to the mass displacement of civilian populations in northern Shan State. More than half a million people are estimated to have been displaced in the current campaign as of December 8, according to the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

HRW claims that it is from this vulnerable floating population that the MNDAA has press-ganged people into its ranks. Citing local news reports, the rights group claimed that on November 24, the MNDAA abducted seven men as they traveled from Laukkai to Chinshwehaw, on the Myanmar-China border. The same reportedly happened on November 25, when MNDAA soldiers “were pulling over men who were on motorcycles in groups of twos and threes,” a doctor who left Laukkai along the same route was quoted as saying.

Similarly, on December 12, the parents of seven other young men who did not arrive home after fleeing Laukkai in late October wrote a letter to the MNDAA, pleading for their release. The letter, a copy of which was obtained by the rights group, states that they “last saw their sons being led away by MNDAA fighters near Chinshwehaw,” in HRW’s paraphrase.

HRW stated that such practices violated international humanitarian law, under which “warring parties are prohibited from arbitrarily depriving anyone of their liberty, including through abductions and forced recruitment.”

It is unclear whether the MNDAA is all that concerned about international law; nor is it likely to pay much attention to HRW’s admonition. A case could be made that the defeat of Myanmar’s noxious military junta is a goal of such importance that sometimes less than savory means might be needed to achieve this end. But the issue does raise an interesting question about the MNDAA and its relation to the broader movement seeking the overthrow of the military administration that seized power in February 2021.

In announcing the offensive on October 27, the MNDAA and its allies stated that they were “dedicated to eradicating the oppressive military dictatorship” and has widely been embraced as part of the movement, loosely led by the National Unity Government, aiming to create an inclusive federal democracy in its place. At the same time, it is hard to know how committed the group is to this goal.

The MNDAA’s past certainly suggests some reasons for skepticism. The group shares a lineage with the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the similarly-named National Democratic Alliance Army, or Mong La group, all of which formed from the fragments of the Burmese Communist Party following its collapse in 1989. Like these latter groups, the MNDAA, led by the former communist fighter Peng Jiasheng, were granted de facto control of “special regions” in Shan State, and subsequently became key nodes of the Golden Triangle drug trade.

Even though the MNDAA claims to have ended opium cultivation, there is evidence that like the UWSA, Peng has simply branched out into synthetic drugs. “Once a source of opium,” U.S. diplomats wrote in a 2009 diplomatic cable, “the Kokang’s Special Region Number One more recently has been documented as a source of high-quality methamphetamine.” Peng also began licensing casinos catering to a border-hopping Chinese clientele.

Then, in August 2009, after Peng refuged to convert itself into a Border Guard Force under central control, the Myanmar military launched attacks on the MNDAA and drove it from power. A splinter group took control and turned Kokang – since renamed the Kokang Self-Administered Zone – into a crime-ridden limpet attached to the underside of China’s Yunnan province. In recent years, it has become home to industrial-scale online scam centers that rely on a trafficked labor force of thousands.

The MNDAA’s clear goal in the current offensive is to take back control of Kokang and wreak vengeance on those who betrayed it to the Myanmar military 14 years ago. Beyond that, it remains unclear. Perhaps the group has evolved since 2009; it has certainly said all of the right things about ending Myanmar’s military dictatorship. But HRW’s revelation about its battlefield practices raises the question of whether it is committed to anything more than the restoration of its own (non-democratic) rule over Kokang.

Thai MPs Urge Talks with Cambodia Over Access to Preah Vihear

Cambodia has every right to stand its ground over a needless Little War

Sebastian Strangio   22 Dec, 2023

Preah Vihear ancient Khmer temple ruins famous landmark in Cambodia

Sporadically fought between 2008 and 2011, the Little War – as it is sometimes known – had an enormous impact on Cambodia-Thailand relations that still rankles to this day. Even now, the border crossing at the foot of the temple’s steps remains closed and the 11th century ruins are off limits from the Thai side.

The area was once a lucrative business zone. Thai tourist operators boasted a perfectly sealed highway all the way to the border and the temple’s footsteps, and dodgy tour guides in Bangkok would even erroneously claim there was no access at all from the Cambodian side.

The only way up, they said, was through their border gate at Pha Mor E Daeng.

Thousands of tourists would climb the steps each day from Thailand with visa free access, a cash cow for those at the gate. Now, many in the new government in Bangkok want that access back and to let bygones be bygones.

Seven lawmakers from Thailand’s northeast have petitioned Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, urging him to open talks with the Cambodian government regarding visa-free travel to Preah Vihear temple for Thais from the Thai side of the border.

According to Thai Defense Minister Sutin Klungsang, the petition was received during a recent trip to Pha Mor E Daeng, where the fence around the temple has remained shut for 15 years.

He also said a discussion with the defense committee was slated for early next year and he told the Bangkok Post that any decision would be purely based on the expected benefits for the armed forces as a whole.

That reasoning is at odds with the MPs, whose petition is based on the prospective tourist receipts from visa-free access for Thais and perhaps foreigners who, as always, would be required to pay any additional charges, including for a special visa to enter Cambodian territory.

Tourism in both countries is still recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic but the Cambodians hold the moral high ground on this and have nothing to lose by ignoring the request.

There’s little financial gain on offer for Phnom Penh and the Cambodian government can be forgiven for still carrying a grudge over a conflict that did not have to happen and officially left 34 soldiers dead on both sides, quite a few civilians wounded, and many more displaced.

The Little War began when Thai troops crossed the border and seized control of the temple, which sits atop the Dangrek Mountains, and with that the military high ground, which the senior brass in Bangkok had coveted ever since the current boundaries were signed off by French colonialists in 1904.

There was no justification for what the Thais did and the Little War was, at times, vicious. As journalist Hurley Scroggins would subsequently report, the Thai military had deployed cluster bombs – a favorite for children who unwittingly pick up what they think are toys.

It ended with a ruling by the International Court of Justice in Cambodia’s favor, a reassertion of previous decisions, and a sweet victory given this country’s litany of tragedies and the repeated put-downs that Khmers had to endure from Thais through decades of civil war as the region’s basket case.

The conflict was one of the few examples in this country’s recent history when the diplomatic community and the press corps – which was much larger than it is today – were sympathetic to Phnom Penh’s view and wholeheartedly backed then-Foreign Minister Hor Namhong.

Cambodia’s control of the temples has been sanctioned by international law, a decision the Thais have had difficulty in accepting, they control the high ground around Preah Vihear, and any decision to reopen the gates at Pha Mor E Daeng is theirs to make.

How Taiwan-ASEAN Semiconductor Cooperation Can Bolster Taipei’s National Security

Three decades after the first iteration of the “Go South” policy, changing geoeconomic realities are making the idea more attractive than ever.

Shannon   22 Dec, 2023

Taiwan National Flag overlaid on PC micro chip on integrated circuit board semiconductor

In her opening remarks at the 2023 Yushan Forum, Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen reaffirmed the New Southbound Policy (NSP)’s central role in the island’s Indo-Pacific strategy. During the same event, Vice President William Lai echoed the policy’s significance in deepening Taiwan’s engagement with the NSP’s targeted countries. That includes six states in South Asia, as well as Australia and New Zealand, but the most important target is the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Given that Lai remains the candidate most likely to win Taiwan’s presidential election in January, his speech sent a clear signal to the attending Taiwanese business leaders that, if elected, his administration will continue to shift the island’s economic focus from China to the NSP countries, especially ASEAN.

As its title suggests, the NSP is a new version of an old policy. It originated from the Go South policy that President Lee Teng-Hui unveiled in 1994. During that time, Taiwan’s international space was rapidly shrinking. Lee’s Go South policy aimed to broaden Taiwan’s engagement with Southeast Asian countries in order to enhance the island’s diplomatic visibility and diversify Taiwan’s investments from China to ASEAN.

The policy yielded some initial success. From 1993 to 1994, Taiwan’s foreign direct investment (FDI) into ASEAN countries rose from $1.76 billion to $4.98 billion. Over the same period, Taiwan’s FDI into China declined from $3.17 billion to $962 million. Moreover, guided by Lee’s Go South policy, Taiwan helped build several industrial parks for ASEAN members, including the Philippines’ Subic Industrial Park and Indonesia’s Medan Industrial Park.

Yet, in 1996, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs abruptly announced a freeze on government enterprises’ overseas investment, as it began to direct resources into promoting domestic industrial growth. That effectively brought Lee’s Go South policy to an end.

In 2002, Lee’s successor, Chen Shui-bian, launched his own Go South policy, a year after Taiwan acceded to the World Trade Organization. Chen’s policy objectives were similar to Lee’s, but with less successful results. During Chen’s eight-year administration, except in 2001 and 2008, Taiwanese FDI to China significantly outweighed its investment in Southeast Asia.

After 2008, it became increasingly evident that China has developed a growing appetite for using economic coercion to achieve political goals. Its rare earth export ban to Japan in September 2010 was a case in point. With that recognition in mind, Tsai put forth her NSP in 2016, the year she came into office. The overarching goal remains the same: diversifying Taiwan’s economic engagement from China toward ASEAN. Yet, the international environment could not be more different.

During Chen’s era, China’s economic rise created a market that proved impossible to resist for many Taiwanese businesses. Essentially, the gravity of China’s economy blunted the effectiveness of Chen’s Go South Policy. By contrast, only one year after Tsai became president, the China-U.S. trade war began to escalate. The unresolved trade tensions between the world’s two biggest economies started to shake up global supply chains. That gave Tsai’s NSP a significant boost, as major companies began to pivot away from China.

For instance, Apple has requested its Taiwanese suppliers to relocate their factories from China to ASEAN countries such as Vietnam. Quanta Computer, the top contract manufacturer of Apple’s MacBooks, signed an agreement in April to build its first plant in Vietnam. Pegatron, the second biggest iPhone producer, formed a subsidiary in Vietnam in 2020 and began mass production in the country last year. Moreover, Apple’s biggest iPhone maker Foxconn signed a $300 million agreement with a Vietnamese developer last August to build a new factory in the country, with a lease that will run through February 2057. In fact, for the first time in 2022, Taiwanese companies invested more in the NSP’s selected countries than in China.

The rising risk of doing business in China will sustain this trend of supply chain restructuring. This presents a rare strategic opportunity for Taiwan to leverage its manufacturing prowess in bolstering the island’s relations with ASEAN nations. Specifically, Taiwan’s incoming president should celebrate the Go South policy’s 30th anniversary next year by putting semiconductor cooperation at the forefront of the Taiwan-ASEAN partnership.

Each ASEAN country has distinct strengths in manufacturing various products. Yet, almost all of these products require the installation of semiconductors to function, from cars produced in Thailand to smartphones assembled in Vietnam. As Taiwan produces nearly two-thirds of the world’s chips annually, this creates opportunities for the Taiwanese government to collaborate with individual ASEAN countries in meeting their respective chip demand, laying the groundwork for higher-level partnerships with ASEAN as a whole.

Take Thailand for example. Its consistent lead in auto production among its ASEAN peers has made it known as the Detroit of Asia. Now, the country is transforming into a central hub of electric vehicle (EV) manufacturing. The Thai government has laid out a 30:30 EV ambition – 30 percent of vehicles produced will be electric by 2030. The growing trend of EVs will go hand-in-hand with the rising demand for car chips. That is because, compared to internal combustion cars, EVs have a heavier reliance on software, which is powered by chips. As a result, whereas a traditional car requires around 1,000 chips, an EV needs double that amount.

McKinsey’s projection shows that the overall revenues for auto chips could rise from $41 billion in 2019 to $147 billion by 2030. S&P Global Mobility estimated that the value of auto chips installed in vehicles will go up from its 2020 level of $500 per car to $1,400 by 2028. In fact, the automotive semiconductor market already witnessed a 28 percent year-over-year growth in 2022, reaching $69 billion.

A stable supply of car chips is key to realizing the Thai government’s EV dream. Without it, auto companies could not deliver the final products to consumers. This is where the Taiwanese government could come in and demonstrate the value of partnering with the island. Taiwan could work with the Thai government in designing subsidy programs that incentivize Taiwanese chip manufacturers to build new facilities in Thailand. Taiwan could also support capacity building by providing semiconductor training programs for local personnel. Its latest partnership with Singapore to cultivate the city-state’s chip talent exemplified the value of Taiwan’s half-century of experience in nurturing its semiconductor workforce.

Furthermore, chips made in these Thai facilities could be delivered to automakers by land rather than via maritime transport. For Thailand, that proximity will ensure its access to car chips even in an extreme supply chain disruption, such as a Chinese blockade of the Taiwan Strait. For Taiwan, that will position its chipmakers to profit from the expanding pool of revenue there. The same strategy applies to Vietnam’s and India’s booming manufacturing sectors for consumer electronics, another critical end market for Taiwan’s chip companies.

Expanding production footprints outside Taiwan has an additional domestic benefit: It could mitigate the pressure on the island’s growing scarcity of electricity and water, two essential ingredients for chip production. Indeed, by allocating some of their manufacturing capacity to ASEAN, Taiwanese chip companies could free up more resources for their most profitable advanced plants at home, enhancing supply chain resilience and efficiency.

On the geopolitical front, spreading out manufacturing facilities could also help Taiwan alleviate U.S. and Japanese concerns about their reliance on the island’s chip production. For Taipei, meeting its major partners’ diversification demands is imperative to buttress their support to Taiwan if China attacks. Without external support, it’s estimated that China could subjugate Taiwan in 90 days.

The conventional wisdom posits that Taiwan must maintain as much domestic chip production as possible to increase Washington’s and Tokyo’s material stake in preserving Taiwan’s autonomy. That strategy, known as Taiwan’s silicon shield, is counterproductive. A Chinese military assault would disrupt Taiwan’s chip production; overconcentration would send the U.S. and Japanese economies into a tailspin. Amid the chaos, U.S. and Japanese leaders would arguably prioritize the management of domestic economic issues over the defense of Taiwan. After all, voters’ grading criteria for their leaders are based predominantly on economic performance, not foreign policy. Hence, rather than enticing U.S. and Japanese support, Taiwan’s silicon shield would damage its partners’ capacity to defend the island.

In contrast, a more diversified chip manufacturing landscape could ensure partial semiconductor supply to Washington and Tokyo in a Taiwan Strait contingency, minimizing the adverse impact of disruptions. That could enable both capitals to keep their houses in order, which in turn creates room and resources for them to intervene militarily. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that the United States and Japan would come to Taiwan’s rescue if their domestic economies were already in tatters at the beginning of the war.

Crucially, Taiwanese chip firms’ investments outside Taiwan do not necessarily have to come at the expense of the island’s semiconductor dominance. It is not a zero-sum game, where a semiconductor investment outside Taiwan will directly undermine the island’s chip supremacy. As long as Taiwanese chip companies keep the most valuable research and development centers and the most advanced manufacturing plants at home, while the Taiwanese government continues to invest in human capital through public-private partnerships with leading universities, Taiwan’s semiconductor preeminence will remain intact.

The incoming Taiwanese administration should recognize the NSP’s strategic value as an integral platform to advance Taiwan-ASEAN semiconductor cooperation. A successful advancement could sustain the island’s semiconductor leadership through broader revenue streams and more efficient use of resources. That could cement Taiwan’s role as an indispensable linchpin of the global economy, while demonstrating that its survival matters to the prosperity of the international community.

Looking Back on Deng Xiaoping’s Landmark Visit to Singapore

The trip, when Deng met Lee Kuan Yew for the first time, offers a reminder of the importance of competent leadership to nations’ development.

Sebastian Strangio   22 Dec, 2023

The bust of China’s leader Deng Xiaoping on the banks of the Singapore River. (Sebastian Strangio)

Competent leaders can have substantial effects on the development of nations and the growth of diplomatic relations between them, as demonstrated by the case of China and Singapore. How did relations between the two independent countries first develop? The start of cordial and collaborative relations between the two nations can be traced to 1978, and the meeting between Deng Xiaoping and Lee Kuan Yew.

This year marks the 45th anniversary of Deng Xiaoping’s historic visit to Singapore and Southeast Asia. As the paramount leader of China, Deng was a transformational leader whose leadership contributed to the peaceful, productive economic growth of China and the development of cordial relations with countries in the region. Deng was in Singapore from November 12 to 14, 1978, when he for the first time met with Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew.

This visit enabled these two remarkable leaders to meet and understand each other, as well as establish subsequent collaborations that influenced both countries and, indirectly, the region as a whole. This trip, which also saw Deng visit Malaysia and Thailand, was intended to galvanize support from these Southeast Asian countries for China amid its growing tensions with the Soviet Union and Vietnam, which was then gearing up to attack Khmer Rouge-ruled Cambodia.

After Deng explained China’s position to Lee, Lee informed Deng that the Southeast Asian countries were concerned about Beijing’s support for communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia and its denunciations of local governments through radio broadcasts. Deng was receptive to these concerns, and within two years, China ceased these antagonistic practices, and relations with the Southeast Asian countries gradually improved.

Deng’s visit to Singapore also enabled him to see first-hand the growth and development of Singapore as an island and a nation-state. Deng first visited Singapore in 1920 when he was 16 years old, on his way from China to France for a work and study program. Singapore was then a British colonial port city.

Fifty-eight years later, Deng witnessed Singapore’s transformation into a modern city-state. Other than China, Singapore is the only independent nation where ethnic Chinese form the majority. During Deng’s visit, Lee stated that if the Chinese in Singapore, who descended from poorly educated migrants from southern China, could succeed to this degree, mainland China could do even better with the right policies.

In the subsequent years, Deng and his administration opened up China and adopted policies that uplifted the lives of hundreds of millions in China. Another key leader in China who played a significant role is Xi Zhongxun. He led in the opening of Guangdong province and its growth. In addition to reforms to the agricultural economic system in this southern Chinese province, Xi advocated for the opening up of Guangdong. Xi Zongxun is the father of the current president of China, Xi Jinping, who was once the Governor of Fujian.

In a speech in Beijing on April 8, 1979, Xi Zhongxun said, “Guangdong is adjacent to Hong Kong and Macao and has a large number of overseas Chinese. It should make full use of this favorable condition to actively carry out foreign economic and technological exchanges. Our provincial party committee has discussed that when we come to this meeting, we hope that the central government will give some power, let Guangdong take the first step, and let it go.”

Deng supported Xi Zhongxun’s bold and visionary proposal. Inspired by his experience in Singapore, Deng also cited Singapore as a successful case study. Subsequently,  the Chinese Communist Party approved the pilot implementation of special economic zones in Shenzhen and Zhuhai, and later Shantou and Xiamen, in southern China. With effective leaders aligned to a shared vision, China’s economy opened, evolved, and grew substantially over the subsequent decades.

Despite not opening official diplomatic relations until October 1990, the good relations between Singapore and China continued to develop in the years after Deng’s visit. In December 1984, Dr. Goh Keng Swee, who played a huge role in the independence of Singapore and its nation building efforts, retired as deputy prime minister and the following year, was appointed by China as an advisor on the development of China’s special economic zones.

In the conclusion of a prescient speech that Goh delivered in 1987, he noted that China’s incipient transformation was “the final phase of the historical process of transforming an ancient civilization into a modern industrial state.” He added, “China has decided to come to terms with the modern world of science and technology, of business management and information systems. In the process of modernizing, she offers some unique opportunities to foreign investors who understand her policy objectives and who take a long-term view of their investment.” His advice more than 35 years ago remains relevant today and this remains Singapore’s main approach to development.

In 1992, when Deng visited Shenzhen, he referenced his visit to Singapore in 1978, telling local officials that the city-state’s society “is quite orderly…We ought to use their experience as a model and we ought to manage things even better than they do.” Like many successful leaders, Deng and fellow leaders such as Xi Zhongxun had an ongoing desire to learn and improve, and to overcome the challenges facing them, ultimately setting China on the path to peaceful development.

In October 2023, when I visited the Futian district of Shenzhen in Guangdong province, filled with towering skyscrapers and electric vehicles driving down the tree-lined streets, it reminded me of a larger, newer variation of the Central Business District in Singapore. My two American and British friends from San Francisco and London who were traveling with me remarked “The future is here.”

As reflected in their multiple visits to China and their many meetings with its leaders, Lee and Goh believed that it was in Singapore’s national interest to support China’s efforts to reform and open its economy. Lee also advocated for China to be integrated into the global economy. For more than 40 years, the public and private sectors in Singapore have actively supported China’s economic development. Since 2013, Singapore has been the largest foreign investor in China, and the economic growth of China has benefited both Singapore and Asia as a whole.

In November 2010, Lee Kuan Yew, then serving as minister mentor, and then-Vice President Xi Jinping unveiled a small bust of Deng Xiaoping along the Singapore River. Though Lee and Deng have since passed away, the warm and mutually beneficial relations between the leaders and people of Singapore and China continue to flourish. This month, Singapore ministers led by Deputy Prime Minister Lawrence Wong met their counterparts in China and both countries signed more than 20 memoranda of understanding and agreements to further enhance collaborations and partnerships.

Deng and Lee were able to set visionary goals for their people and successfully work with their fellow leaders and teams to motivate and guide their citizens to strive towards a brighter future. They were also receptive to feedback and advice, while seeking to constantly learn and do better, for their respective countries and the region.

On the 45th anniversary of Deng’s visit to Singapore, as we recall the roles of outstanding leaders and look toward the future, the aspiration is that the current leaders will take a similarly long-term perspective. In particular, there is the hope that the sometimes troubled relations between China and the countries of Southeast Asia, including the Philippines, will improve. With capable leadership and amicable relations, there is no reason why the countries of our region cannot continue to experience peace, prosperity and progress for decades to come.

Thailand’s Quiet Pivot to the Maritime Sphere

In 2023, the government published several documents detailing the steps necessary to enhance the country’s maritime governance.

Sebastian Strangio   22 Dec, 2023

Chonburi ,Thailand-September 21,2013:2 Battle ship stop near HTMS Chakri Naruebet is biggest in Thai Military Battleship at Chonburi ,Thailand

As 2023 is wrapping up, it’s a fitting time to reflect on the events of the past year. One thing that stands out is the growing centrality of maritime security in international relations. The seas, notably in East Asia, are today the main arena of great power competition, pressuring smaller mainland Southeast Asian states to ramp up their naval modernization to protect their territorial, commercial, and environmental interests. Among them is Thailand, an army-dominated nation traditionally preoccupied with defense against land threats, both from abroad and within.

Throughout 2023, Thai authorities have published several documents that outline the steps necessary to enhance Thailand’s maritime governance. The 281-page National Maritime Security Plan (2023-2027), the country’s fifth iteration in the series (the first appeared in 1993) came out during the first half of the year. Accompanying this was the 5-Year Strategic Plan of the Thai Maritime Enforcement Command Center (Thai-MECC), which is Thailand’s principal maritime security authority under the prime minister’s direct supervision. Then, in October, the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) unveiled what is believed to be its first comprehensive white paper.

Yet these important publications, particularly the rare white paper, have gone quite unnoticed. It’s easy to overlook them considering that Thailand is a relatively peripheral state in maritime affairs. It has no claims in any maritime flashpoints and is unlikely to explicitly back either the United States or China in a maritime clash.

Perhaps the only aspect of Thailand’s maritime development that really turns heads is the RTN’s procurement of Chinese-made S26T submarines, and that is generally examined in the context of Bangkok’s realignment further away from its old American ally toward Beijing.

Thailand’s apparent policy flip-flop makes it harder for people to take official maritime blueprints seriously. Less than a month after the white paper was released, the government’s plan to buy an anti-submarine warfare frigate as a substitute for one S26T submarine with engine troubles – something that I interpret as a political show rather than a real deal – came into view. The issue, as noted in my last article for The Diplomat, is that the Type 054A frigate eyed by Thai officials is equipped with weapon systems that are largely incompatible with the RTN’s current arsenal. This thus overrides one of the white paper’s avowed goals: to develop a “focused force” defense posture facilitated by commonality in military equipment.

Still, it would be silly to dismiss the white paper entirely. When read alongside the other two documents, it provides some interesting insights into Thailand’s broader maritime outlook beyond weapons acquisition.

First, the Andaman Coast facing the Indian Ocean is Thailand’s strategic priority, with major infrastructure upgrades underway. The objectives are twofold: to fortify defenses against potential aggression and to facilitate economic expansion. Despite being a gateway to a crucial supply route (for oil imports, above all), Thailand’s Andaman Coast remains vulnerable without a proper shipyard. And, because of Thailand’s geographical constraints, vessels requiring repairs in the Gulf of Thailand would need to travel a long way via the Malacca Strait, which is obviously very costly, especially in times of conflict.

Economically speaking, a deep-sea port on the Andaman Sea is an integral part of the “Landbridge” project that aims to make Thailand a regional commercial and logistics hub. The Andaman is also home to Thailand’s popular beach destinations that still have room to grow. The “Andaman Wellness Corridor” scheme, as well as the booming real estate market and superyacht business in Phuket, are clear indicators. New features, such as digitally-driven smart piers and a potential cruise terminal, would effectively bolster marine tourism.

Second, Thai elites see self-reliance as imperative. Although the indigenization of the defense industry is not a new concept in Thailand, there appears to be a greater sense of urgency to translate this into reality. The white paper, which has 27 pages of content, repeatedly uses the Thai term for self-reliance (การพึ่งพาตนเอง) and contains a list of private companies capable of constructing ships domestically. Furthermore, three research projects – to develop an unmanned aerial vehicle, unmanned surface vehicle, and midget submarine – aimed at boosting self-reliance are among the RTN’s top priorities for the next 14 years. It’s safe to say that Thailand wants to portray itself to the world as a serious and able maritime player.

Third, while most regional states are consolidating their coast guards as standalone units to cope with enlarging maritime responsibilities, Thailand does not have such a plan and is relying on Thai-MECC and the RTN’s coast guard squadron (all operate on a rotational basis) for law enforcement missions. Why? Thailand’s comparatively low-threat environment is one answer, but there are other considerations. One can argue that Thai leaders see centralization as the best governance model. The Thai bureaucracy is evidently rigidly centralized and Thai-MECC, another highly centralized force that can swiftly make decisions and pool whatever resources to tackle maritime problems, is considered a critical strength in the National Maritime Security Plan.

Even if Thailand wishes to follow the trend, establishing a dedicated coast guard seems impractical due to personnel shortages. Thailand’s birthrate is alarmingly low – possibly even worse than that of South Korea. And, given the youth-led rejection of military-backed political parties and calls to abolish conscription, it makes sense to think that many youngsters view military service with contempt. The growing focus on the welfare and career trajectories of lower-ranked officers in government papers is ultimately a systematic effort to rally more public support.

Political and Electoral Uncertainty in Sri Lanka Ahead of the 2024 Elections

Wickremesinghe wants to keep his job; the SLPP wants to mount a comeback. Sri Lanka voters seem to want radical change.

Shannon   22 Dec, 2023

Sri Lanka President Ranil Wickremesinghe, July 21, 2022.

In Sri Lanka, political parties are getting ready for presidential elections scheduled for some time next year. Many of them have named their candidates; others are preparing to do so. The country is constitutionally mandated to hold presidential polls in 2024, and the president himself has hinted that he will go ahead with them.

But the government is led by a deeply unpopular party associated with a once popular but now derided family, the Rajapaksas. It faces an uncertain situation and has yet to confirm when elections will be held, or if they will be held at all. Indeed, a section of the opposition has implied that they will not.

This, however, has not prevented the Rajapaksas’ party, the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), from joining the election frenzy. On December 15, it organized its annual convention at a sports stadium in Colombo. Party MPs and officials took the opportunity to reflect optimistically on their future while criticizing their detractors, with one prominent official taking the stage to threaten the public. Yet though the event ended on a somewhat triumphalist note, the party continues to be overwhelmed by challenges and contradictions.

At present, the SLPP holds a clear and comfortable majority in Parliament. But its hold on the legislature is tenuous. In 2022, then-President Gotabaya Rajapaksa was forced to vacate office in the aftermath of large-scale anti-regime protests. He was succeeded by Ranil Wickremesinghe.

Wickremesinghe was, and remains, the sole MP from a party that the SLPP campaigned against in the 2019 presidential elections and 2020 parliamentary polls. Today, however, the SLPP has accommodated Wickremesinghe and, by implication, his party, the United National Party (UNP). Yet important differences have crept up between them, differences that may compel the SLPP to reassert itself against its foe-turned-friend.

To be sure, the SLPP continues to lend Wickremesinghe support. It has given him the numbers he needs to pass laws and budgets in Parliament. In April, for instance, its MPs made up the bulk of the 120 votes that ensured the smooth passage of a resolution on the country’s International Monetary Fund (IMF) program. While a few party MPs absented themselves from the vote, the SLPP went ahead and voted for it.

Today the president remains widely censured by trade unions and civil society. Yet the SLPP has chosen to ignore these developments; recently it helped pass the 2024 budget, a document that one economist called a “fairytale.”

Despite these alignments, the SLPP and UNP don’t see eye to eye on everything. In 2019, the SLPP led a highly charged campaign against the then-government’s economic and foreign policies. The party accused the government, then led by Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, of selling out the country and compromising on its sovereignty, allegations that gained weight after the 2019 Easter attacks.

One of the key areas that the SLPP targeted in its campaign was the UNP’s handling of ethnic issues. Whipping up nationalist sentiment, the SLPP ended up courting the ethnic Sinhalese middle classes. Today, however, the SLPP has joined hands with Wickremesinghe, who served as prime minister and leader of the UNP then, a man who openly courts minority parties and has brought to the same table Buddhist monks and Tamil outfits.

In pursuit of his reconciliation agenda, as president, Wickremesinghe has spoken in support of the devolution of power. The SLPP has opposed such rhetoric and has publicly criticized the president’s stance on these issues. Minority parties and civil society, on the other hand, have welcomed his moves. As Rathindra Kuruwita noted in an article in The Diplomat, Wickremesinghe may be leveraging minority parties, most of them Tamil, to ensure support at the next election. Perhaps because of this, opposition parties have chosen not to comment on the government’s reconciliation agenda, or have snidely criticized it.

The government’s ties with India have driven another wedge between the president and the ruling party. Wickremesinghe has been supportive of closer relations with India, to the extent of launching a ferry service and raising the possibility of currency integration with New Delhi. Yet Sri Lankans, in particular the dominant ethnic Sinhalese, have historically been wary of such measures. Opposition parties, such as the left-wing Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, have censured these proposals. While the SLPP itself did advocate closer ties and greater engagement with India under Gotabaya Rajapaksa, it may not be keen on advocating policies that can be seen as undermining the country’s sovereignty.

As a result, the government is divided between the ruling party and the president. Yet, so far, this rift has not come out to the open. If it does, it would hardly be the first time. From 2001 to 2003, and again from 2015 to 2018, the country was led by a president and a prime minister from two different parties. In both cases a period of cohabitation was followed by a period of breakdown and breakup, until finally the president used executive powers to expel the other party. In both instances, it was Wickremesinghe who served as prime minister, and in one case he found himself prematurely relieved of his job.

The situation is different today. Ranil Wickremesinghe is the president, not the prime minister. As he frequently implies or points out, he was appointed as prime minister by Gotabaya Rajapaksa at a time when no one else was willing to come forward.

The SLPP, moreover, is still reeling from the backlash of the 2022 protests. Wickremesinghe is seen as the man who saved them from being ousted from power, the man who intervened at a time when political parties and activists were marching against them to Parliament. Because of what he did or is seen to have done, Wickremesinghe has been able to rally the most unlikely political elements in the SLPP around him, even if they disagree with his stances.

The SLPP also faces a disadvantage in that it no longer has a monopoly on nationalist sentiment. The party itself is fragmented between a main faction, which supports Wickremesinghe almost unconditionally, and a dissident faction, which has formed a separate association with other parties. Moreover, nationalist politics no longer holds much appeal in Sri Lanka; economic issues have become the order of the day. On the other hand, various opposition parties have made use of nationalist criticisms of Wickremesinghe’s reconciliation agenda and populist criticisms of his economic reforms to reinforce their identity.

These shifts have put some parties ahead of others. A recent survey on presidential election voting intent by the Institute of Health Policy places the left-wing Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) at the top, with 51 percent of respondents registering support for it. The main opposition Samagi Jana Balawegaya, an offshoot of the UNP, clocks in at a distant 30 percent, Wickremesinghe shows a poor 13 percent, and the SLPP’s candidate – yet to be named, despite much speculation following the recent convention – an even poorer 6 percent. As the authors of the survey note, these numbers show not so much support for the JVP as a rejection of the establishment. Yet the result of such rejection has been a swelling tide of support for the JVP.

Rajapaksa’s policies, such as his ban on chemical fertilizers, ended up depriving his government and his party of the voting bloc that put them in power in 2019. These include the peasantry and the middle classes. Today they have become fair game for the opposition. This is particularly so in light of ongoing economic reforms, which the government highlights as too important to reverse but which are seen as benefiting a few at the cost of the many. As a result of widespread disaffection with the establishment, parties like the JVP, which call for radical change, have endeared themselves to the young and the undecided.

Ultimately, it is the younger voters who will decide on Sri Lanka’s future next year. Yet while they emphasize the JVP’s winning streak, many of them also acknowledge the UNP’s potential to make use of the SLPP’s unpopularity. At the same time, they remain uncertain of the SLPP’s grand designs, and are suspicious of what the party will do next.

Uthpala Wijesuriya, a young political and history researcher, echoed these uncertainties and anxieties well. “It is not clear who the SLPP will nominate as its presidential candidate. It may be a Rajapaksa or even someone else. The UNP under Wickremesinghe has been content in enforcing short-term, cosmetic reforms at the cost of long-term policies,” Wijesuriya said. “On the other hand, those once associated with the SLPP are taking their own routes and are contesting against it. Political kingmakers are busy trying to become political kings.”

All political alliances are ultimately marriages of convenience. Sri Lankan politics has always been rooted in such alliances, which have dissolved even in the best of times. In the face of a deeply polarized political climate, and with an even more polarizing election season on the way, one thing thus remains clear: the days of the SLPP’s marriage with the UNP are numbered. It is not a question of whether it will end, but when, and how.

Thailand Takes Another Step Toward Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage

The lower house overwhelmingly passed a package of four laws that would redefine marriage as a union between any two individuals.

Sebastian Strangio   22 Dec, 2023

https://pixabay.com/photos/pride-lgbt-flag-rainbow-community-828056/

Yesterday, Thai lawmakers resoundingly passed a package of four draft laws on same-sex marriage, moving the country a step closer to becoming Southeast Asia’s first nation to enshrine such unions in law.

According to the Bangkok Post, the draft legislation received nearly unanimous support in the lower house of Parliament and was approved by an overwhelming vote of 369 to 10, with one abstention, after several hours of debate and discussion.

The four bills debated included one tabled by Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin’s government, which promised to legalize same-sex marriage in the run-up to the general election in May.

Deputy Prime Minister Somsak Thepsuthin told parliament that the draft law “is for the amendment of some provisions in the civic codes to open the way for lovers, regardless of their gender, to engage and get married,” Reuters reported. He added, “This will provide rights, responsibilities and family status as equal to the marriage between a man and a woman presently in all aspects.”

The Parliament also passed three other similar bills that were submitted by civil society groups, and the opposition Move Forward and Democrat parties. Like the government’s bill, these have proposed altering the definition of marriage from a union between “male and female” to one between “two individuals.”

The government will now form a committee to merge the four bills into one ahead of a further reading and possible votes next year. If and when the law is passed and endorsed by King Vajiralongkorn, Thailand will become the first country in Southeast Asia to legalize same-sex marriage, and the third in Asia after Taiwan and Nepal.

Thailand has long been seen by many as a relative haven for LGBTQ people, and has a visible lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community, especially in the capital Bangkok and the larger urban centers. It is also one of only nine Asian countries that signed a declaration of LGBTQ rights at the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2011. At the same time, however, Thailand has struggled to pass a marriage equality bill, and human rights activists say that Thai law continues to discriminate against same-sex couples and LGBTQ people.

This is not necessarily because of a lack of public support. A survey conducted during the consultation period for the government’s draft bill found that 96.6 percent supported it, Reuters reported. BenarNews also cited a recent survey from Pew that found 60 percent of Thai adults support the legalization of same-sex marriage, behind only Japan (68 percent) and Vietnam (65 percent).

The slow progress is due rather to the government’s lack of political will, especially under Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha. Last year, parliament debated a similar package of draft laws, including a more conservative bill drafted by Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha’s government, but they did not come to a final vote before the session ended.

Yesterday’s vote marks a further step toward harmonizing Thailand’s reputation with the reality faced by the country’s LGBTQ couples. “We are finally on the road to bridging the gap to equal rights for all today!” Srettha wrote yesterday on the social media network X (formerly Twitter). “May love finally triumph,” he added, followed by a rainbow emoji.

New China-Serbia Free Trade Agreement Raises Security Concerns for Europe

The FTA aims to increase trade flows and eliminate custom tariffs on arms deals, opening the field for sanctioned Chinese companies in Serbia. That’s bad news for Europe.

Shannon   22 Dec, 2023

waving colorful flag of china and national flag of serbia. macro

In October, the Serbian Parliament adopted an 850-page bilateral trade agreement with China. Drowned out by other global events – foremost the breakout of violent conflict in Israel and Palestine – the deal was barely noticed by European media.

Signed on the eve of the country’s upcoming elections, Serbian leaders promoted the deal as a major opportunity for economic growth, while the defense aspects were minimized or not mentioned at all.

Yet buried within the agreement’s mountain of statutes are developments that warrant serious attention. The negotiations covered a variety of products, including weapons, copper, and agricultural goods, that Serbia has agreed to import from China and vice-versa. Custom tariffs on these products will decrease each year for the following 15 years.

Most alarming are the armament portions of the deal. Serbia will benefit from a growing discount every year if it buys Chinese missiles, bombs, torpedoes, tanks, and other defense-related products listed in the agreement. Customs tariffs for these Chinese manufactured weapons will fall from a 25 percent custom tariff to 2.5 percent at the end of the 15-year period, according to the agreement.

Serbia first announced plans to buy arms from China in 2019. Since then, the EU candidate country has received deliveries of battle drones and the air defense system FK-3 , as well as large medical donations from Chinese defense companies during the COVID-19 pandemic. For its part, Serbia has allowed special Chinese security forces to drill in the town of Smederevo, an hour’s drive from Belgrade.

The free trade agreement is likely to lock Serbia into a more involved, long-term strategic relationship with China, while further distancing the Balkan nation from the rest of Europe. All Chinese defense companies have direct links to the Chinese Communist Party and to the party’s military wing, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Some of the Chinese firms operating in Serbia are sanctioned by the United States and other Western countries. For example, the Poly Group Corporation, which is in discussions to establish a joint venture agreement with Serbia to develop night vision missile systems and anti-terror equipment, has been accused of delivering arms to Iran, North Korea, and Syria.

Chinese civilian companies with ties to the PLA may also find greater opportunities to expand their presence in Serbia. One such firm, the China Machinery Engineering Corporation (CMEC), made a deal with Serbia last year to handle the wastewater in Belgrade. CMEC is involved in arms trades with regimes and entities in conflict areas or countries in war and has been sanctioned by the United States.

The new trade agreement may also be harmful to Serbia’s domestic economy. As Chinese competitors flood into the country’s market, many small and medium-size Serbian enterprises may fail to keep up and be forced to close. China is already Serbia’s single largest contributor of foreign direct investment, pumping $737 million into the country in 2021.

Serbia’s deepening links with China have been criticized by both the United States and the EU. A resolution from the European Parliament warned that Serbia’s warming relationship with China “raises questions about the country’s strategic direction” and hinders the country’s “economic and political development.”

The president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, applied a touch of soft diplomacy when she recently commented on the new trade agreement: “We want Serbia to join the EU. Being a part of the union is a unique opportunity that no one else can match. Serbia should take the next steps to get closer to us, including in foreign policy.”

But so far, Belgrade has shown no signs of taking a more cautious approach toward China. Instead, Serbia’s long-volatile flirtation with China is smoothing into a long-term marriage.

European lawmakers must recognize that dangling the promise of EU membership has proven ineffective in curtailing Serbia’s growing ties with China. The same goes for EU attempts to put more diplomatic and economic pressure on the country. For years, Serbia’s ruling elite have changed legislation in order to facilitate greater capital flows from China, even as Chinese investors have repeatedly flouted demands for greater transparency. In addition to representing a clear security threat, Chinese investments in Serbia have wreaked devastating impacts on the country’s climate, environment, and human rights.

It is time for Serbia’s neighbors and EU member countries to act, before Europe is exposed to even more harm from China’s investments into new coal power and other polluting industries. A more efficient strategy than simply applying diplomatic pressure on Serbia would be to introduce and promote much-needed European investments into the country. It is time to include the Western Balkans in the EU’s single market and provide the region with more sustainable, long-term economic opportunities.

Otherwise, China will.

China, America, and Vietnam’s Diplomatic Blitz in 2023

The Diplomat interviews Khang Vu, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at Boston College, about Vietnam’s diplomatic strategy amid great power competition.

Shannon   22 Dec, 2023

flags of Vietnam and China painted on cracked wall. (Depositphotos)

2023 was a busy year for Vietnam’s foreign relations. Last month, Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited the country, where he and his hosts announced that Vietnam was joining Beijing’s “community of common destiny.” This came less than three months after U.S. President Joe Biden visited Hanoi, announcing a similarly significant upgrade in the diplomatic ties between the United States and Vietnam. Vietnam has also announced significant upgrades in its relations with other major partners, including Australia, Japan, and South Korea.

What lies behind this rash of diplomatic activity, and what does it say about how Vietnam is seeking to position itself in a world of growing superpower competition?

The Diplomat’s Sebastian Strangio interviews Khang Vu, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at Boston College and a Hans J. Morgenthau pre-doctoral fellow at the University of Notre Dame, about Vietnam’s diplomatic strategy and great power competition.

As Scandal Engulfs the LDP, the Kishida Administration Goes on

Despite a growing scandal and bottom-dwelling approval ratings, Prime Minister Kishida faces a window of stability.

Shannon   22 Dec, 2023

Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio attended the Reinventing Infrastructure of Wisdom and Action (ReIWA) forum held in Tokyo, Japan, July 22, 2023,

A college professor’s criminal complaint about the Liberal Democratic Party’s sloppy bookkeeping resulted in some of the most influential LDP members being purged from the Kishida Cabinet and the party leadership.

After conducting meticulous research, Hiroyuki Kamiwaki of Kobe Gakuin University found out that the members of the leadership of the so-called Abe faction, the largest grouping in the LDP, had failed to record all donations, which is required by law. Suspicious of a cover-up, Kamiwaki reported his finding to the Tokyo Public Prosecutor Office. which is undertaking a formal investigation against the Abe faction.

Further investigation has revealed that the severity and the scale of the inadequate reporting of political funds amounts to a criminal inquiry. The scandal has plunged the entire party into disarray.

Reports surrounding the public prosecutors’ criminal probe of the Abe faction have highlighted the existence of “slush funds,” a pool of fundraising money that was unreported and went directly into the pockets of lawmakers. Recently, the offices of the Abe faction and the Nikai faction have been raided by Tokyo prosecutors in the ongoing investigation into the scheme, which is reported to involve hundreds of millions of yen that went undisclosed.

Facing potential criminal inquiry, the Abe faction’s “Big 5,” who held prominent positions in both government and party leadership, have either already resigned or have signaled their intention to do so. The most prominent officials out of the Big 5 is Chief Cabinet Secretary Matsuno Hirokazu, whom Kishida once referred to as part of the “core” of his administration. Others include Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Nishimura Yasutoshi and Secretary-General for the LDP in the House of Councillors Seko Hiroshige, who are avowed aspirants for higher office.

The severity of the allegations has led some commentators to compare the circumstances to the Recruit scandal, a corruption scandal that engulfed the LDP back in the late 1980s, which toppled the sitting prime minister, and opened up the path to ending the 40 years of uninterrupted rule by the LDP. Opposition party leaders have alleged that the criminal investigation of the ruling party has shown that the LDP has no legitimacy to govern anymore, and proposed the dismantling of the LDP faction system.

The public backlash to the emerging scandal has plummeted Kishida’s approval rating. A poll from Jiji News showed that Kishida’s approval had dropped to 17 percent, the lowest number seen since 2009 when the LDP was about to lose an election against the Democratic Party of Japan. According to Asahi Shimbun, 58 percent of the public wants Kishida to be removed from power as soon as possible – and 65 percent of independents, which polls show make up almost half of the electorate, have answered the same way.

The problem that Kishida has is that solving the political funds scandal will not suffice, since his numbers were already on the decline several months before the incident. On October 23, in the general policy speech for the Extraordinary Diet session, Kishida emphasized his resolve to tackle soaring inflation and prioritize his government’s focus on the economy, a word that he took time to repeat three times – “Economy, economy, economy – I will focus on the economy above all else.”

However, the plan that he produced did not bear any fruit. Polls showed that his plan for a tax reduction has been seen as a crude move to manipulate the electorate, which only accelerated distrust of the regime.

If an election is close, there is no doubt that Kishida would face internal pressure from his parliamentarians to resign, in the same way Suga Yoshihide did in 2021. This is the fate that Kishida wanted to avoid above anything else.

The only thing that is allowing Kishida to remain in power is time. He still has time until he is up for re-election as LDP president in September 2024, and he will not have to call for a general election until the fall of 2025.

It is not certain whether Kishida would be willing to continue in office after the LDP presidential election next year, given the possible indictments facing his Cabinet members and members of the LDP leadership, while his approval ratings continue to plummet. However, there is no serious contender within the party who is willing to replace Kishida at this point.

Since every faction of the LDP has been implicated in the slush fund controversy, and much of the public attributes the scandal to the culture of the party, there is a sense in the LDP that no one, in particular, could resolve the public’s distrust and improve the party’s prospects. Also, Kishida’s Cabinet, which is in effect a “team of rivals,” has incorporated possible challengers such as Digital Minister Kono Taro and Economic Security Minster Sanae Takacishi, both of whom fought against Kishida during his last LDP leadership contest.

The opposition parties’ continuing irrelevance is also helping Kishida and the LDP. Both the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) and Nippon Ishin have announced that their goal for the next election is to set the stage to replace the LDP in the election after that, effectively admitting that they will not be able to displace the LDP anytime soon. Moreover, despite the public being disgusted by the LDP amid its ongoing scandal, the opposition’s poll numbers remain stagnant.

Despite the strange stability that Kishida seems to enjoy, everything could change once the criminal investigations ramp up. If that is the case, next year’s regular Diet sessions would be consumed by the scandal, and Kishida would have to embark on the extremely difficult task of explaining his party’s failings while passing a budget. Such an onerous task may force him to give up his premiership, a position that he has been seeking for quite some time.

Whether the current crisis in the LDP would lead to a reconstruction of the political landscape of Japanese politics, or another round of revolving door prime ministers, is not yet to be seen. Yet, time is still on the LDP’s side. Kishida’s resilience will determine how long he will remain as the leader of Japan.

Hong Kong’s Dismal December

The oppression of rights and political participation in Hong Kong marked new milestones at the end of 2023. The international community must hold Beijing to account at its upcoming UPR.

Shannon   22 Dec, 2023

Hong Kong and mainland China national flags stand together with copy space. Nation symbol, countries political conflict concept

With the trial of media mogul Jimmy Lai beginning this week, the issuing of another round of arrest warrants and bounties against five exiled Hong Kong activists last week, and the sham district council elections on December 10, Hong Kong is once again in the news – all of it bad.

The national security trial of Lai is emblematic of the dismantling of Hong Kong’s freedoms. As the founder and publisher of Hong Kong’s major pro-democracy newspaper, the Apple Daily, which was forced to shut down in 2021, his trial symbolizes the collapse of press freedom.  The fact that he has already been in prison for three years on multiple charges, including a 13-month sentence simply for lighting a candle and saying a prayer at a vigil to mark the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre and a 14-month sentence for participating in a peaceful protest in 2019, illustrates the eradication of freedom of assembly and expression. And the prosecution of a very successful entrepreneur simply because of his opinions marks a stab at economic freedom, the heart of Hong Kong’s identity and success.

The way the Chinese Communist Party killed off Lai’s media business was chilling – and ought to serve as a warning to every business person in today’s Hong Kong.

First, the authorities simply froze the bank accounts of his company Next Media, publishers of Apple Daily, leaving the board little choice but to close the newspaper, as they could not pay salaries or bills. They were not short of money in the bank, and were financially able to continue for some time, but they simply could not access their accounts.

Then, in January 2023, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange delisted Next Digital.

And in one of the most absurd developments, Lai was accused of a lease violation for use of a personal office in the Apple Daily building, leading to an almost six-year jail sentence for fraud. This politically-motivated charge was designed with only one purpose: to damage his reputation. The idea that the proprietor of a publication should not use office space in its building seems ridiculous, but even if technically there was a lease violation, in any normal legal system it would be a civil case and not an imprisonable crime.

If Beijing can go after a billionaire tycoon in this way, not only by jailing him but by shutting down some of his businesses, no one is safe in Hong Kong today.

Arrest warrants and HK$1 million bounties issued by the Hong Kong authorities against exiled Hong Kong pro-democracy activists mean the dangers of criticizing Beijing outside Hong Kong have increased too.

The five arrest warrants last week, including against Simon Cheng and two others based in the United Kingdom and Washington, D.C.-based Frances Hui and Joey Siu, a U.S. citizen, follow a previous round of warrants issued against eight exiles in July. They illustrate the extraterritorial application of the draconian National Security Law. The harassment of some of the families of these individuals in Hong Kong also turns up the pressure.

The sham district council elections – or “selections” – on December 10 illustrate the undermining of the right to political participation in Hong Kong. The entire pro-democracy camp was completely excluded from contesting seats, and voters were faced with choosing between pro-Beijing candidates.

The voters opted to make their views known by refusing to participate in the charade, leading to 27.5 percent turnout, the lowest in Hong Kong’s history. That was in stark contrast to the 2019 district council elections, which saw a record 71. percent turnout and an overwhelming victory for pro-democracy parties.

With these developments, as well as the continued imprisonment of barrister Chow Hang-Tung, whose detention has been declared arbitrary by the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, it is vital that as many countries in the United Nations as possible raise Hong Kong prominently in China’s forthcoming Universal Periodic Review (UPR) on January 23 next year.

The UPR is a process by which the human rights record of every member state at the U.N. is reviewed every five years. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can make submissions, but ultimately it is member states that have the opportunity to make statements, ask questions, and issue recommendations.

The list of human rights concerns that deserve to be raised in China’s UPR is long. Member states will quite rightly want to address the genocide of the Uyghurs, atrocities in Tibet, and the crackdown on freedom of expression, freedom of religion or belief, dissidents, human rights defenders, and civil society activists throughout all regions of China. But among that list, Hong Kong must feature prominently.

The UPR reviews the period since the previous UPR, which was in 2018. In that period, the region of China that has changed most dramatically, most rapidly, and most substantially – for the worse – is Hong Kong. The atrocities in the Xinjiang region (known to Uyghurs as East Turkestan) and Tibet are grave, but were well underway at the time of China’s last UPR. In the past five years, meanwhile, Hong Kong has been transformed from one of the most open cities in Asia to one of its most repressive police states, in total violation of an international treaty, the Sino-British Joint Declaration.

Member states will be constrained in the UPR process by time, and so will not be able to raise every issue that deserves attention. So they face a choice. Some could choose to focus particularly on Hong Kong, alongside one or two other issues, and make substantive points, while others may wish to focus on other issues but briefly reference Hong Kong. Both approaches would be welcome.

For those who choose to give Hong Kong substantive attention – and I hope there will be many – there are a range of issues to highlight. The draconian National Security Law, which is at the root of most of Hong Kong’s human rights challenges today, should particularly be highlighted, and calls should be made for its repeal. The sedition law, which has also been used to silence dissent, should also be raised and its repeal recommended.

Arbitrary detention, especially the cases of Lai and Chow, and the plight of all political prisoners in Hong Kong should be addressed. The erosion of judicial independence, the rule of law, trade union rights, freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, the disproportionate police brutality in 2019, and the extraterritorial repression seen in arrest warrants issued for exiled Hong Kongers are all important issues to bring up.

For those member states who choose to prioritize other human rights issues in China, they could still help by simply incorporating Hong Kong into all relevant recommendations made to China. Simply inserting the words “including in Hong Kong” when they make recommendations to Beijing would be valuable, because it would serve two purposes: it would highlight Hong Kong and send a message to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR). If Hong Kong is not mentioned, the danger is that the Hong Kong government – which is still, on paper, autonomous even though in reality it is a directly-controlled subsidiary of Beijing – will choose to ignore recommendations on the basis that they apply to China and not the Hong Kong SAR specifically.

For member states that wish to take a less confrontational approach, they could simply refer to the U.N.’s own recommendations during the past few years. Hong Kong has been subject to several treaty body reviews in recent years, including its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CEDAW), each of which have highlighted the violations of human rights under Hong Kong’s National Security Law. Member states could point to the treaty bodies’ recommendations, and statements by U.N. special rapporteurs, and ask China what it is doing to implement them.

Whatever approach member states take – and there will be a mixture – it is my profound hope that many countries will raise Hong Kong. While the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Australia, and European countries will hopefully play a leading role in speaking up for Hong Kong, it should not be left to “Western” democracies alone. Japan, South Korea, India, Indonesia, and other Asian democracies should also play a key role, as should member states from Latin America, Africa, and the Pacific.

The dismantling of Hong Kong’s freedoms ought to be a matter of concern for every member state that cares about the international rules-based order and upholding the values of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and related treaties. China’s UPR in January is an opportunity to highlight the situation in Hong Kong. It is an opportunity not to be missed.

The China-Philippines South China Sea Face-Off Requires Restraint

The Philippines and the U.S. are on solid legal ground, but what is lawful is not always wise.

Shannon   22 Dec, 2023

A Chinese Coast Guard ship allegedly obstructs the Philippine Coast Guard vessel Malabrigo as it provided support during a Philippine Navy operation near Second Thomas Shoal in the disputed South China Sea, June 30, 2023

Even as the world’s attention is focused on the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, tensions continue to rise in Southeast Asia between the Philippines and China. Recent incidents at sea between the two have been the worst in more than a decade.

The United States, through its active presence in the region and treaty alliance with the Philippines, is intimately tied to this worsening row. Unless handled carefully, the situation could lead to a full-blown crisis or even conflict that none of the parties wants. While the Philippines is exercising agency in its responses to Chinese behavior, the United States retains high levels of bargaining power with its ally. There is a strong case to be made for Washington to exercise restraint and avoid worsening the situation, while aiding the Philippines in measured ways in its defense against intrusive Chinese activities.

When Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. was elected as president of the Philippines in 2022, some Filipinos feared that his foreign policy would continue the tilt toward China that was seen under his predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte. This expectation was partly because Marcos had picked Sara Duterte, the former president’s daughter, as his running mate.

However, as 2023 progressed it became clear that the Philippines was undertaking a major shift in its orientation, placing its bets heavily on its alliance with the United States. The two allies announced four additional military sites that the U.S. would have access to under the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. Three of these sites are in northern Luzon, closer to Taiwan. This year’s Balikatan exercises were also the largest ever, with maneuvers that included the defense of the Batanes islands, which are located even closer to Taiwan than northern Luzon is. Earlier this year I wrote about the risks of fusing the Taiwan and South China Sea theaters and planning joint patrols.

China’s sweeping “nine-dash line” claim line in the South China Sea (recently upgraded to a “ten-dash line”) has its roots in the Republic of China era or even earlier. Beijing’s claims, which are the same as those of Taiwan, are based in so-called historic rights. However, the landmark 2016 Philippines v. China verdict by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague ruled the nine-dash line as illegal. The ruling was clear that the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) superseded any “historic rights,” except in the case of limited artisanal fishing in territorial seas.

In recent incidents, China has tried to prevent the resupply of a small contingent of Filipino troops perched precariously on a derelict but still commissioned naval vessel Manila deliberately grounded in 1999 on Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands. Beijing’s grayzone tactics have included swarming, water-cannoning, lasering, and collisions. Incidents have also occurred off Thitu Island and near Scarborough Shoal (located in a separate area of the South China Sea closer to Luzon). China has also reportedly caused major environmental damage in the sea.

The 2016 PCA ruling was clear that Second Thomas Shoal lies wholly within the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Philippines. The 2016 judgment took no position on the territorial ownership of Scarborough Shoal itself, except that the feature lies within the Philippines EEZ but is entitled to its own territorial sea of within 12 nautical miles.

While Duterte’s predecessor, President Benigno Aquino, used international law as his principal tool to push back against China, Marcos has employed more direct methods. There is much greater reliance on the United States through an enhanced American troop presence in expanded EDCA sites, ramped-up exercises, and newly launched joint patrols. Marcos is also employing radical transparency – publicizing each incident and facilitating media access. This has been effective in widely disseminating the Philippines’ argument that China is entirely to blame for the recent tensions (though Beijing disputes this). Manila is also reportedly doubling down on the legal route and considering filing a new case against China.

Within the Philippines, there is a sense of victimization by China going back decades. The perception of maritime threats is ever-present. Beijing’s seizure of Mischief Reef in 1994-95 and Scarborough Shoal in 2012 has not been forgotten. Manila is determined to prevent a repeat in Second Thomas Shoal and other features it controls.

However, Marcos may be overcompensating for previous failures. Operations to defend and strengthen Philippines’ tenuous footprint on Second Thomas Shoal and other Spratly features such as Thitu Island are geared toward maintaining a fragile status quo. It would be wise and proper for China to stop seeing them as threats. But missions to the Scarborough Shoal area (which have also included the presence of the Philippines military chief himself) have elements of challenging the status quo, as the shoal is controlled by China. The Scarborough Shoal forays also arguably run up against Article 5 of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) signed by ASEAN and China, which requires all signatories to exercise “self-restraint” (though, of course, China has been a major violator of this principle in the region).

Thus, the Philippines seems to have decided that Chinese gray zone tactics need to be met with some gray zoning of its own. It is hard to blame this sentiment, and Manila certainly has international law on its side in the current areas of contestation. But in a dangerous flashpoint such as the South China Sea, any moves undertaken, especially by the weaker party, should not only meet the standard of legality, but also of strategic wisdom.

The same logic applies to the United States. Washington’s interests in the South China Sea are not the same as those of the Philippines. For the United States, a direct conflict with China over tiny islets in a distant sea makes no sense.

Tightening the alliance with the Philippines with an added Taiwan dimension, launching joint patrols, conducting its first Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) near the Second Thomas Shoal hotspot, and deepening jointness with other U.S. allies has not achieved the objective of deterring China in the South China Sea. If anything, Chinese behavior seems to have become more assertive. Doing more of the same and expecting different results will likely lead to disappointment – and risks conflict.

There is also the question of the moral hazard of excessively emboldening an ally, as seems to be happening with the Philippines. Manila is more dependent on Washington than the other way around and is now also highly committed to the alliance since Marcos’ U-turn. Both factors increase U.S. bargaining power over the Philippines. Washington could use this leverage wisely to nudge its more vulnerable partner to be more restrained in some of its actions.

But Washington also needs to also exercise strategic restraint in its own actions. The tightening military embrace of Manila through expansion of EDCA sites, FONOPs near Second Thomas Shoal, and the involvement of U.S. allies such as Australia and Japan in the theater only enhance Chinese fears of bloc formation and armed encirclement. These concerns are not unfounded, considering that Washington – through moves such as AUKUS, the Quad states’ military activities, and the Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral – seems to be doing all it can to create an Asian security front to counter China’s rise.

Ultimately, China, the Philippines, and the United States will have to step back and consider the situation from a holistic crisis management perspective, incorporating reassurance, conflict-avoidance, and civilian-led processes. This is particularly necessary now that joint Philippines-U.S. military patrols could easily short-circuit what would otherwise be a local incident into a direct great power clash. Marcos’ latest statement recognizing the need for a “paradigm shift” in managing China relations may be a first step, to which China might wish to respond.

The Philippines has said that Chinese actions are not an “act of war [but] a cat and mouse game.” Unfortunately, it could take just a couple of escalatory steps on both sides to convert the “game” into a full-blown crisis in the South China Sea.

New Zealand Abandons Indigenous Rights and Pacific Priorities in Foreign Policy

The new government’s foreign policy priorities could jeopardize New Zealand’s relationships with Pacific Island countries.

Shannon   22 Dec, 2023

New Zealand national flag.

New Zealand’s new right-wing government is making dramatic changes to foreign policy. Prime Minister Chris Luxon of the National Party has privileged the priorities of his two coalition partners: New Zealand First and ACT. A core agenda of this coalition government will be to dismantle and undermine progress on Māori rights domestically, and Indigenous rights globally. New Zealand also will invest more in military alliances with the Anglosphere. These policies may also undermine New Zealand’s relationship with Pacific Island countries, which see climate change, not great power rivalries, as their primary security threat.

Under the right-wing coalition, New Zealand will no longer champion Indigenous rights. The new government has declared that it will not recognize the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) as “having any binding effect on New Zealand.” New Zealand signed up to UNDRIP in 2010, under a previous center-right government. The new government has also committed to stopping the work of He Puapua, a report commissioned by former Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern in 2019, which provides a legislative roadmap to New Zealand’s realization of the rights of Māori as articulated by UNDRIP. The new government also intends to review the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, which outlines the rights afforded to Māori. Last week nationwide protests were held in reaction to these policies.

Winston Peters, the leader of New Zealand First Party and the new foreign minister, has been instrumental in this shift. Although he is Māori, Peters advocated strongly against UNDRIP and Indigenous rights during the election campaign, and in coalition negotiations. He will represent a very different New Zealand on the global stage compared to the previous foreign minister, Nanaia Mahuta who was the first Māori woman to hold the role.

Mahuta is the niece of the first Māori Queen Te Arikinui Te Atairangikaahu, who co-signed with Queen Elizabeth II a Treaty Settlement for her Waikato people. Mahuta wears a Moko Kauae (traditional Māori face markings) and explicitly championed Māori values in New Zealand’s foreign policy. In her inaugural speech as foreign minister she emphasized, “The principles of partnership and mutual respect embodied in the Treaty [of Waitangi] provide the foundation for how New Zealand can conduct its foreign policy.”

Mahuta also sought to foster alliances with other Indigenous peoples and Indigenous economies. She supported the Indigenous Peoples Economic and Trade Cooperation Arrangement (IPETCA), an international agreement between Indigenous peoples in Taiwan, Australia, and Canada aimed at strengthening their economic inclusion through trade and investment.

By contrast, Peters is committed to forging closer connections with the United States and questioned New Zealand’s bipartisan commitment to an “independent foreign policy.” He delivered his first speech as foreign minister to the U.S. Business Summit, where he highlighted that “there are few relationships that matter more to New Zealand, than our relationship with the United States.” Peters “warmly welcomed” the opening of new U.S. embassies in the Pacific and expressed his intention to “strengthen engagement with the U.S. on strategic and security challenges” in the Pacific.

New Zealand will likely increase its defense budget and explore signing up to AUKUS. AUKUS is a security agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, centered on a deal to build nuclear-powered submarines in Australia, at the cost of US$250 billion, to “contain” China. New Zealand was not initially invited to join the agreement, despite its close relationship to all three countries, because of its strong nuclear-free policy. However, the new government has expressed interest in exploring cooperation under “Pillar II” of AUKUS. Pillar II envisions cooperation on non-nuclear, advanced military technology, which includes cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, undersea capabilities, electronic warfare capabilities, as well as innovation and information sharing.

Yet there are fundamental problems with AUKUS. First, AUKUS escalates tensions and militarization with New Zealand’s largest trade partner, China. Previous governments have tried to stay on side with both the United States and China, and avoid any military stand-off between the superpowers.

Second, AUKUS does nothing to address the Pacific’s number one security threat: climate change. Pacific Island leaders have been critical of AUKUS and regularly highlighted their top priority is addressing climate change, not containing China. Mark Brown, the Cook Islands’ prime minister and Pacific Island Forum chair, has noted that AUKUS “will lead to an escalation of tension, and we’re not happy with that as a region.” New Zealand is a member of the Pacific Island forum but looks set to undermine the Forum’s priorities in that regard.

Peters, when he was previously foreign minister (2017-2020), was committed to building “deeper, more mature political partnerships with Pacific island countries.” He led the Pacific Reset, which was driven by five principles: “understanding, friendship, mutual benefit, collective ambition, and sustainability.” Peters has also highlighted the need to enhance “the effectiveness of Pacific regional organizations to better respond to shared challenges.” Hence, there is a precedent and potential for this New Zealand government to take a different approach based on regional solidarity.

However, the initial statements from the Luxon government see New Zealand playing a very different role in the world. New Zealand looks likely to dismantle the frameworks that protect the rights of Māori, undermine UNDRIP and weaken international alliances of Indigenous peoples. Instead, Peters will realign New Zealand toward the Anglosphere, closer to the United States, and may invest in military alliances that undermine Pacific Island countries’ top priority: tackling climate change.

Another Launch for China’s Reusable Space Plane

In some ways, China’s Shenlong is similar to the U.S. X-37B reusable space plane, whose planned operations and capabilities have similarly remained unclear.

Catherine Putz   22 Dec, 2023

space

Outer space continues to be drawn into both technological advancements and geopolitical competition. On December 14, China launched a reusable space plane for the third time on a Long March 2F rocket from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center. A Xinhua News report said that the space plane was launched in order to run various space science experiments, in addition to validation of the reusable technology as well as “to provide technical support for the peaceful use of space.”

Interestingly, the timeline for such space plane launches is getting shorter, a sign of the maturity of the reusable technology and Beijing’s confidence in its growing space prowess. China’s first space plane made its debut mission in September 2020, and a second mission followed in August 2022, with a gap of one year and 11 months between the two missions. That the third mission came slightly more than seven months after the last made its return to Earth, after a 276-day mission, reflects the advances that the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), the agency that developed the space plane, has achieved with regard to “reusability of the spacecraft.”

China is yet to release any information on the spacecraft or the mission itself, but given that it was launched from a Long March 2F rocket, which has a payload capacity of around eight metric tons to Low Earth Orbit, it may be similar to the U.S. Air Force’s X-37B space plane in terms of both its size and payload capacity.

However, what is more interesting is that the reusable space plane, Shenlong or “Divine Dragon,” reportedly released six unidentified objects in Earth’s orbit. The objects are being observed by both the U.S. Space Force and amateur astronomers alike. The objects, designated as OBJECT A, B, C, D, E, and F by the U.S. Department of Defense, are still emitting signals. The U.S. official NORAD TLE designations for these objects are 585573 through 585577 and 585581.

Scott Tilley, one of the amateur astronomers who has been tracking these objects, called it the “mysterious wingman.” Tilley, in a thread on X, formerly Twitter, added, “We have confirmation of S-band signals from the 3rd Chinese ‘space plane’ mission. However, this time the ‘mysterious wingman’ emitter is only sending signals intermittently but it is fading deeply like earlier missions.”

Speaking to space.com via email, Tilley is reported to have said that OBJECT A is possibly emitting signals quite similar to those objects from China’s previous space plane missions. In an email, Tilley said, “OBJECT A’s or nearby emission is reminiscent of earlier Chinese space plane ‘wingman’ emissions in the sense the signal is modulated with a limited amount of data. There is speculation that the emission from OBJECT A may be from an object close to it, but this is speculation not based on any evidence I’m aware of.”

According to Tilley, two other subjects, OBJECT D and E, also “appear to be emitting idle ‘placeholder’ signals with no data accompanying them.” Various satellite trackers including Tilley are of the view that these emissions could be from OBJECTS A, D, or E, or they could also be coming “from something else very close to them.”

These are speculations at this stage by those who have been tracking the spacecraft and the objects that have been released, but there is very little credible information to go by on the mission including its goals or plans for the future. In some ways, this is similar to the United States’ X-37B reusable space plane, whose planned operations and capabilities have remained unclear. But it can be said with reasonable confidence that China will continue to mature these capabilities and undertake more complex maneuvers.

As one media report noted, that China can release objects into orbit from its space plane is not the mysterious aspect of the mission, especially since the past two missions had released at least one object into the orbit. The objects involved are thought to be either small satellites for tracking the space plane or a small test payload, which could provide China with some experience in releasing objects from the space plane.

There is now speculation that China’s capability in this regard has matured for it to undertake more complex missions. Given the kind of space security developments on display over the last few years and considering that there are growing attempts at interfering with satellites of other countries, China could now have developed capabilities where it is able to do “on-orbit manipulation and disrupting, degrading, destroying, and surveilling other satellites.”

Given the dominant space security dynamics at play, with no new rules or even guidelines to govern new sets of activities like on-orbit satellite servicing, China, Russia, and the United States can be expected to step up their activities in terms of intelligence gathering but also more disruptive actions using cyber or electronic warfare means.

Understandably, the U.S. is monitoring China’s growing technological prowess in this area, and that is one reason why it appears to be continuing with the X-37B program. In 2020, there was speculation that the U.S. space plane was on its way out, having “served its purpose.” But Chief of Space Operations General B. Chance Saltzman, on the sidelines of the Space Force Association’s Spacepower Conference earlier in December, referred to the China-U.S. dynamics as spurring the X-37B program.

He went onto add, “It’s no surprise that the Chinese are extremely interested in our space plane. We’re extremely interested in theirs. Because it is a capability; the ability to put something in orbit, do some things, and bring it home and take a look at the results is powerful. … It’s probably no coincidence that they’re trying to match us in timing and sequence of this.”

The X-37B space plane was supposed to have its seventh planned lift-off recently, but SpaceX stood down its Falcon Heavy rocket from the Kennedy Space Center launch pad. That liftoff has been delayed several times in the past week, although reasons for the delay are unclear.

The China-U.S. space competition and the broader strategic rivalry will only intensify in the coming years. This competition will also intensify the space race, especially in these new areas of technology development.

Workers Lose as Indonesian Laws Can’t Keep Pace With Rideshare Apps

Gig platforms have mushroomed in Indonesia in the past decade. But regulations have lagged, and it’s the workers who pay.

Catherine Putz   22 Dec, 2023

Indonesia ridehsare gojek

In just eight years, the gig economy has grown from nothing to being the primary source of income for up to 2.3 million Indonesians.

Known as the Gojek effect, so called because of the pioneering ride sharing app, the industry has seen dozens of companies pop up across the country since 2015, offering mostly rideshare and food delivery, along with other services.

But regulations governing the app-based sector have struggled to keep up. Workers have few or no rights. They have no sick leave or holidays. And they’re working longer hours for less pay.

Gig platforms have mushroomed in Indonesia in the past decade, from super apps like Gojek and Grab to more specific apps like Shopee Food, Maxim, or InDrive to local platforms like Jogja Kita. Ride-hailing and food delivery dominate.

There are anywhere from 430,000 to 2.3 million people (0.3 to 1.7 percent of the workforce) whose primary job is in the gig economy in Indonesia, the latest research shows.

This is similar to the United States, Europe, and the United Kingdom, where gig workers range between 0.5 to 5 percent of the workforce.

The difference is, in these countries, the gig economy has been regulated much more seriously, especially concerning labor rights of gig workers. In the U.K., for example, platforms can no longer categorize their workers as independent contractors. Gig workers in the U.K. are entitled to core employment protection like the national minimum wage and paid leave.

In the early days, most gig platforms emerged from the unregulated voids. Motorcycle ride-hailing platforms, for example, were about to be banned by the Ministry of Transportation in 2015 but the decision was reversed within 24 hours. President Joko Widodo asserted that the apps were essential for the Indonesian people’s needs, and “a regulation should not harm the interest of the people.”

Regulations were later put in place, with the Ministry of Transportation issuing rules in 2018 and in 2019.

Although both platforms and workers consider these a “victory” as they provide legitimacy and a regulatory framework for the ride-hailing business, both regulations are limited in substance.

First, they apply only to rideshare apps, which means Gojek and Grab are bound by these regulations, while food delivery platforms such as Shopee Food aren’t. These legal disparities impact workers. For instance, those who work for Shopee Food or other food delivery platforms earn less than those on the ride-hailing platforms.

Second, these regulations focus more on the responsibilities of the workers than the platforms’ responsibilities. Permenhub 12/2019, for example, imposes the obligation to fulfill the safety, security, comfort, affordability, and regularity of ride-hailing services on the drivers, not the platforms.

The logic is that those who provide the transportation services are the drivers, not the platforms. Indeed, platforms never referred to themselves as transportation companies but technology companies, and therefore, the Transportation Ministry regulations cannot be used to regulate these “technology companies.”

Third, the main problem with these regulations is they do not solve the central issue regarding gig workers’ welfare and working conditions. Gig workers in Indonesia are not considered workers but “partners.” This means they do not have legal protections, as the Manpower Law does not apply to them. They are instead bound in “partnership relations,” or hubungan kemitraan, relations in which legal protections are almost non-existent.

Various studies have criticized the use of partnership relations in the gig economy. The partnership relation or independent contractor model is considered a ploy so platforms can avoid their obligation to provide employment rights for gig workers, such as a minimum wage and paid leave. Court decisions in several countries have made it clear that relationships in the gig economy should not be considered partnerships but employment relationships.

But not in Indonesia.

There have been no significant regulatory developments impacting the welfare and overall working conditions of gig workers in Indonesia. One study found most gig workers in Indonesia work an average of 12 hours a day.

Other studies highlight an apparent decline in gig workers’ earnings, with many now earning less than the minimum wage. The partnership relations are also normalizing piecework, because minimum wage regulations do not apply to this so-called partnership.

The partnership relations in the gig economy are simply unfair because even though they are called “partners,” the majority (if not all) of the decisions regarding the “partnership” are decided only by one party: the platforms. In that sense, the term “partnership” itself is misleading.

In Indonesia, current gig economy regulations are limited to the services (even those that are limited toward specific transportation services), without any policies that acknowledge the root of the problems: the partnership relation in the gig economy.

The imbalance between platforms and their workers, exacerbated by legal loopholes, is making the gig workers’ welfare decline over time.

Gig workers enjoyed decent earnings during the honeymoon period, when platforms paid bonuses and gave incentives to workers and customers. But now, with the honeymoon over, it has become a race to the bottom. Research shows that poor working conditions mean many gig workers want to quit.

However, finding new jobs in the Indonesian labor market is challenging. For those who cannot leave gig work, a policy intervention to improve the quality of their welfare is desperately needed. Regulating partnerships is one logical way to move forward.

This article is part of a Special Report on the Asian Gig Economy, produced in collaboration with the Asian Research Centre – University of Indonesia.

Originally published under Creative Commons by 360info™.

Table of Contents

The Diplomat: 29 Dec, 2023

29 Dec, 2023

Does Competing with the Chinese Communist Party Mean ‘Kicking It When It’s Down?’

Historic Feats and Enduring Debates: U.S.-India Relations in 2023

Women Bear the Brunt of Asia’s Climate Failures

Asian Geopolitics in 2023: A Retrospective (Part 2)

28 Dec, 2023

India’s Opposition-free Parliament

What Lies Ahead for Bangladesh

The Implications of China-Serbia Relations for Kosovo

Sino-Indian Border Infrastructure in the Indian Defense Ministry’s Year End Review

Thailand’s Wage Battle: Economic Boost or Competitiveness Concern?

US Coast Guard’s Role in the Blue Pacific on the Rise

Why Australia Isn’t Sending a Ship to the Red Sea

27 Dec, 2023

Enthusiasm Marks Filing of Nominations for Elections in Pakistan

Why Early Retirement of Coal Power is Faltering in Southeast Asia

India’s Space Program in 2023: Taking Stock

The Delimitation of Pakistan’s Democracy

26 Dec, 2023

Isaac McKean Scarborough on Moscow’s Heavy Shadow in Tajikistan

Economic Revival is on the Minds of Bhutanese Voters

Why Do Half of Pakistan’s Voters Stay Away From the Polls?

Huawei’s Growing Presence in Central Asia’s Telecom Industry

23 Dec, 2023

How China Games the Universal Periodic Review System

Japan-South Korea Cooperation: Strength in Unity, Danger in Division

Philippine Broadcast Regulator Suspends TV Show of Former President Duterte

An Interview With Song Young-gil, South Korea’s Other Opposition Leader

The Evolution of Identity in Taiwan

India Announces Republic Day Chief Guest: French President Emmanuel Macron

China’s Electric Vehicle Expansion in Central Asia

Balochistan’s Long March Protest

Previewing North Korea’s Strategic Moves in 2024

22 Dec, 2023

In Coal’s Shadow, Bangladeshi Women Forge a New Life Through Art

How Can Australia Stand up for Human Rights in Xinjiang?

The US Does Not Lack Leverage Over India

Japan Approves 16.5% Increase in Defense Spending for FY2024

North Korean Exports Hit Record High Since UN Sanctions Took Full Effect

Bombing Revives Fears of Islamist Militancy in the Philippines

The Untold Stories of Chinese Translators in Angola

Rights Group Accuses Myanmar Rebel Outfit of Forced Recruitment

Thai MPs Urge Talks with Cambodia Over Access to Preah Vihear

How Taiwan-ASEAN Semiconductor Cooperation Can Bolster Taipei’s National Security

Looking Back on Deng Xiaoping’s Landmark Visit to Singapore

Thailand’s Quiet Pivot to the Maritime Sphere

Political and Electoral Uncertainty in Sri Lanka Ahead of the 2024 Elections

Thailand Takes Another Step Toward Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage

New China-Serbia Free Trade Agreement Raises Security Concerns for Europe

China, America, and Vietnam’s Diplomatic Blitz in 2023

As Scandal Engulfs the LDP, the Kishida Administration Goes on

Hong Kong’s Dismal December

The China-Philippines South China Sea Face-Off Requires Restraint

New Zealand Abandons Indigenous Rights and Pacific Priorities in Foreign Policy

Another Launch for China’s Reusable Space Plane

Workers Lose as Indonesian Laws Can’t Keep Pace With Rideshare Apps